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S U M M A R Y
This thesis is an historical case-study of the place of 
the writer Günter Grass in West German nolitical life 
between 1960 and 1974.
The primary research presented here is of the sequence 
and context of all the important political initiatives 
Grass was responsible for in the sixties and seventies. 
They are brouqht toqether here for the first time, 
using press reports, his publications and details of the 
origins and proqress of the central Soz ialdemokratische 
WühlerInitiative gathered from its Bonn office.
The presentation moves from Grass as writer to Grass as 
semi-oolitician; from his novels, throuqh his ideas to 
political conditions and to the voters* initiatives. I 
analvse how the treatment of political matters in the 
novels became increasingly subjective the nore active 
a part Grass took in political affairs. His thinking is 
examined historically within the chanqino ideological 
climate of the sixties and through the languaqe in 
which he sought to bring his views to bear. This shows 
how the traditions of liberalism and the demands made or. 
modern social democracy mutually formed his resolve to 
make a creative contribution to democracy in Germanv.
The final part argues that his retreat from politics 
and the diminishing importance of the social-democratic 
voters* initiatives after the 1972 election is to be 
explained in connection with the SPD government's loss 
of the reforming energy it had had, marked by Willy 
Brandt's resignation from office. Grass' political 
career corresponds to the period between the 
programmatic reform of the SPD in 1959 and the end of 
Brandt's chancellorship in 1974. I show here how it was 
in this chaotei in the SPD's history under Brandt that 
Grass' views and commitment could grow and bear fruit in 
voters' initiatives.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTIONS
GRASS AND THE STATE OF THE PROFESSION
Social and economic conditions In the cultural sector In 
West Germany
I shall begin this chapter by sketching the conditions of 
contemporary literary work in West Germany because they 
played their part in changing writers' attitudes to litera­
ture and politics. By the sixties the production and disse­
mination of culture in the Federal Republic had grown into 
such a large, industrialised sphere that it took on a 
collective identity which we must consider when we look at 
the individual career of any one writer. This collective 
entity is often regarded as a monolith and given the pe - 
joratlve title "Kulturbetrieb" in German. Grass' political 
individuality amongst writers becomes clearer if it is set 
against the collective experiences of his profession, as 
we shall see in this relatively brief opening chapter.
Retrospectively we can see the sixties as a whole 
as a period when people in literary circles were perpetually 
discussing their attitudes to their work and to their 
politics. This is not to say that the fifties before or 
the seventies since then have been stagnant, but they were/ 
are calm compared with the instability of literary theories
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and genres, of political identity and political alliances 
in that decade in between. By the early seventies the 
questioning of the sixties had brought practical results. 
People earning a living from literary work had become suffi­
ciently aware of their social and economic position to form 
a new national organisation of the profession - the Verband 
Deutscher Schriftsteller (VS). The strident theoretical 
and political debates amongst writers nurtured this growing 
awareness of their own material position and vice versa.
Thus the marked crisis of social and political identity they 
experienced accompanied a decisive shift in their profess­
ional identity as a group within the whole sector of culture- 
production in West Germany, because it was a sector where 
the differences between 'writers','journalists' or 'broad­
casters' etc. were becoming increasingly blurred.1* Writers 
responded to this situation by founding their orqanisation 
and then joining one of the industrial trade-unions. This 
was a watershed; it showed that writers had achieved a 
degree of consensus about their political role.
One of the first steps taken by the VS was to com­
mission an investigation into the working conditions cf its 
clientèle. When completed this demonstrated how'people who 
produce literary work had more or less ceased to form a 
separately i dentifiable profession. The distinction bet­
ween supposedly and traditionally ’independent’ writers and 
all the other people working in “H  the areas of culture- 
production was breaking down. According to the report, they 
were becoming less and less distinguishable from media- 
employees with fulltime work - contracts. With the
extension of investment in the cultural Bector combined with 
the concentration of control and/or ownership, writers were 
finding themselves bound to the same conditions and relations 
of work as colleagues who in economic status were wage­
workers in the privat« and public media:
Im Prozeß der Vermarktung der "geistigen Ware" 
treten neben die mehr oder weniger originären 
Leistungen der Autoren diejenigen anderer am Her­
stellungsprozeß beteiligter Personen oder Gruppen, 
z.B. anderer freier Mitarbeiter (in den Bereichen 
Bild, Ton, Darstellung bzw. Realisation), aber 
auch der angestellten Autoren (Redakteure, Lekto­
ren) . Die Funktionsteilung, wie sie vor allem bei 
den Medien Fernsehen, Film, Publikumszeitschriften 
und selbst beim Hörfunk für die Produktion erfor­
derlich sind, verlangt daher vom Autor medienbe­
zogene Verhaltensweisen. Die Marktorientierung der 
Produktion bedeutet aber auch, daß Programmkonzep­
tionen und Interessen von Auftraggebern teils durch 
den Autor schon antizipiert werden, teils durch die 
inhaltliche Festlegung des Auftrages den ursprüng­
lichen Mittler an der Urheberschaft beteiligen. 
(...) Durch Konzentrationserscheinungen, Konkur­
renzmechanismen und Umstrukturierung der inneren 
Organisation der Medien nach Managementgesichts­
punkten, auch durch die Neuentwicklung audiovisu­
eller Medien und Kommunikationsverfahren sowie 
durch den zunehmenden Berufscharakter ihrer Tätig­
keit (Professionalisierung) ergeben sich für die 
Autoren Leistungszwänge, wie sie in anderen Produk­
tionsbereichen der Wirtschaft längst üblich sind.2)
Formally 'independent' writers were finding themselves in
this position, subject to the same sort of conditions of
work as all other employees in the cultural sector, because
they make their living nowadays from short-term commissions
r&tfief1 than From m&jor literary productions:
Ganz eindeutig sind nunmehr die hauptberuflichen 
freien Autoren dies nicht mehr aufgrund exzeptio­
neller belletristischer Einzelerfolge; ihre wirt­
schaftliche Basis ist jetzt klar die kontinuier­
liche, damit professionelle Produktion. In der 
Rangliste ihrer Haupttätigkeiten rangiert die 
Produktion von 'Gebrauchsware’ mit den vier Grup-
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pen Feuilletonbeiträge (44%), Rezensionen/Kriti- 
ken (37%), Glossen/Satlre (28%) und Dokumentar­
berichte (28%) an der Spitze der Nennungen (...) 
bevor die erste 'klassische' Gattung mit Erzäh- 
lungen/Kurzgeschichtcn (25%) überhaupt erscheint. 
Romane gar haben nur 18% der befragten Autoren in 
den letzten drei Jahren geschrieben, wobei über­
dies die Gruppe der alten Autoren (Uber 60 Jahre) 
hier noch deutlich Uberrepräsentiert ist.3)
The report consequently refused to confine its investigation
to those writing in the traditional field of belles-lettres.
It took all branches into account - television, radio, film,
theatre, the press and all the different areas of publishing.
It then found that an estimated 55% of people writing for a
living are economically dependent on their employers like
wage-workers in all the other sectors of the economy.4*
These were the material trends confronting literary 
work across all its different functions in culture-production 
as a whole. The writers who united in the VS found themselves 
caught up in this process. The social and economic position 
of the majority amongst them was becoming insecure; the 
question facing them was how to retain more than a 
semblance of conceptual independence and choice in the work 
they produced.
This combination of circumstances meant that 
organising writers in a trade-union was a relatively slow 
and-controversial process?* It took some time to arrive 
at ^ .consensus about priorities : should they concentrate 
on their legal and financial interests, or should they 
tonsider politically how they could defend
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what was left of writers' independence. The latter was 
threatened by the dramatic concentration which had been 
taking place amongst the private publishing corporations. 
This divergence of emphasis within the VS membership gave 
rise to a disagreement which lasted some three years about 
whether they should join the union which covered the pub­
lishing industry and press etc. (IG Druck und Papier ) - 
Grass and Dieter Lattmann led this lobby - or whether they 
should and could take the whole step of establishing a 
union for all those working in the cultural field (an IG 
Kultur). The argument was that the latter would be the only 
effective counter-weight to the monopolistic structure of 
ownership and power in the whole culture-sector which was 
ultimately foreseeable. At the VS' first congress held in 
the autumn of 1970, Martin Walser was the chief spokesman 
of those who wanted the VS to face up to this politically 
and not just as an ordinary trade-union concerned with 
collective bargainings
Die zunehmende Monopolisierung im Verlagswesen 
zwingt uns dazu, die Organisationsfrage endlich 
ernst zu nehmen. Die Bestseller-Listen sind die 
andauernde Illustration dieser Monopolisierung.
Es sind immer dieselben Verlage und eigentlich 
auch immer dieselben Autoren. (...) Die meisten von 
uns sind an kleine und mittlere Verlage gebunden und 
können also jeden Tag aufwachen im Portefeuille 
eines Konzerns. Unsere Urheberrechte schützten 
uns nicht davor, daß wir verhökert werden im Paket 
und danach vielleicht sofort abgeschrieben werden 
auf Null. (...) Vielleicht glauben die Gewerkschaf­
ten immer noch nicht, daß es sich da, wo Kunst und 
Information produziert werden, tatsächlich um 
eine Industrie handelt. Zumindest müssen wir, die in 
der Kulturindustrie oder für sie arbeiten, schon 
durch unsere Organisation auf das Stadium der öko­
nomischen Konzentration antworten, dem wir ausgesetzt 
sind. Da unser Partner oder Gegner neuerdings immer
-7-
nach der Verfügung Uber alle Medien strebt, ist es 
nur komisch, wenn Autoren als Schriftsteller, 
Journalisten, Komponisten, Graphiker, Bühnenbildner, 
Schauspieler, Maler, Kameraleute, Regisseure in 
separierten Häufchen herumoperieren. Ich glaube, 
nur eine IG-Kultur kann aus dem GrUppchen-Wesen 
eine Gruppe machen, die den Multimedia-Konzernen 
gewachsen ist. (...) Ich halte es für fast schäd­
lich, Schriftsteller-Interessen isoliert zu orga­
nisieren. Ich halte den Schritt in die ig Druck und 
Papier allenfalls für einen Anfang (...). ich halte 
die jetzt sich abzeichnende kentaurische Lösung 
Edel-Lobby plus Gewerkschaftstouch für einen Verzicht 
auf politische Vertretung. '
However, at the VS’ second congress in January 1973, the 
majority resolved to join the IG Druck und Papier. Walser 
had called an 1Arbeitskreis Kulturindustrie’ into being two 
years earlier to pursue the possibility of unionising across 
all branches of the cultural sector, but this grouping also 
decided in the end to endorse the course the majority had 
chosen as a first step at least?^In joining the union the 
largest body of writers in West Germany showed that they 
had left traditional individualism far enough behind to 
recognise that in econorlc and social position the fate of 
each was broadly speaking the fate of all.
The Politics of literature
The industrialisation of literary work, the diminishing 
control its practitioners had over the bulk of what they 
produced led to a change in the conceptions writers had 
of what their work was for. It was nothing new for writers 
to be politically concerned and alert, but, as tJrs Jaeggi 
has said, the first generations of writers in West Germany 
after the war had rarely brought their politics directly 
into their texts:
Literatur war nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg eine weit­
gehend private Angelegenheit. Zwar hatten sich ei­
nige Schriftsteller frühzeitig auch wieder politisch 
engagiert? privat. Ihre politischen Absichten äußer­
ten sich neben ihren literarischen Arbeiten. (...)
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Man schrieb, um nicht schreiben zu müssen. - Man 
sprach, um schwelgen zu können. (...)
Man schrieb nicht ohne politische Gesinnung, aber 
diese zeigte sich in direkten Antworten we.l häu­
figer als im Geschriebenen, in den Texten.
This is what changed in the sixties, particularly in response 
to the student movement. More writers started producing 
overtly political work and certainly their discussions 
about their work became overtly political.
It would be stretching the point to say that 
writers of imaginative literature are under any direct 
control from publishing corporations, however monopolised 
these may be. But they are associated with, or integrated 
into to different degrees, the other branches of the 
cultural sector whose employees are in a position of
9)dependence and whose products are marketed as commodities. 
These links are the source of the dissolution of the faith 
they commonly held previously in the ideal power and role 
of culture as a whole, literature in particular and of the 
individualist image writers had of themselves. Literature 
found itself face to face with social and political 
questions about its own function in society because of the 
industrialisation of its own production and distribution.
This is where we can see the individual character 
of Grass' political view of himself as a writer. It is hardly 
necessary to stress how successful he has been ever since 
the publication of Die Blechtrommel. This success has
brought him economic independence as a professional writer
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untypical of the broad mass of his colleagues. As a result 
he has been in a position to take individual initiatives 
to further the interests of writers. For instance, he had 
sufficient influence with his publisher, Luchterhand, to 
push for co-determination for its employees and authors.10*
He also took a prominent part in collective initiatives 
to found the VS. But he was not economically tied to the 
goals of the VS in the same way as the mass of writers. His 
sympathy for the pressures on authors as a whole, and his 
own relative freedom from those pressures can be seen as 
a combination which sustained the span of liberal ideas 
which inspired his political role in the sixties and early 
seventies. His social and economic position as a writer left 
him room for individual manoeuvre.which supported his 
individualist image of himself as a social and political 
being, an image he retained at a time when notable colleagues 
were departing from it. There were certainly others who 
retained the same control of their work and professional 
life. Those who went further towards a radical vii of 
their work and of their social and political role, despite 
comparable economic independence, did so beca< >e they re­
cognised the trends affecting the economic position of workers 
in culture-production as a whole as the nub of a more 
material and materialist vi w of the politics in literature. 
BÖ11 is a prime example here:
Es mag manchen von uns trösten, daß er möglicher­
weise Ewigkeitswerte schafft, dieser Trost sei ihm 
unbenommen, wenn er uns nicht hindert, uns hier und 
heute, gestützt auf diesen Gesamtverband, Gedanken
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darUber zu machen und einmal öffentlich darzulegen, 
wie wir unser Geld eigentlich verdienen. (...)
Ir. Wirklichkeit sind wir tarifqebundene Mitarbeiter 
einer Großindustrie, die hinter einer rational ge­
tarnten Kalkulationsmystik ihre Ausbeutung ver­
schleiert.
Auch das komplizierteste esoterische Werk wird 
eines Tages nicht nur Uber den Bildschirm gehen, 
es wird als Kassette in Ton oder Bild nach der 
Organisationsform der Leserzirkel von Tür zu Tür 
gebracht werden. Wir schreiben, reden, denken, 
diskutieren und reflektieren viel Uber das Industrie- 
Zeitalter - daß wir (...) industrialisiert oder 
ganz gewiß >ndustrialislerbar sind, sollte uns 
spätesten;' diesem Herbst klar werden.11'
Grass by contrast never showed a great deal of 
interest in thir. connection. He saw his own road to politics 
and polii. 1 commitment in general as a matter of values 
and moral res isibilities. As a result, politics came to 
literature as far as he was concerned from th* outside. 
Politics and literature were compatible in his view (and in 
his own practice), but he did not see the one as intrinsic 
to the other. The political part writers could play was not 
dependent or. theiz work but on favourable constellations 
outside, in politics and society at large:
Lritdem Gustav Heinemann Bundespräsident ist und 
sp em Willy Brandt, ein Mann des Widerstandes 
■«n den Nationalismus, Bundeskanzler ist, fin- 
c : wir Schriftsteller zum ersten Mal Gelegenheit, 
aut, teils anerzogenen, teils überlieferten Rollen 
herauszufinden und inmitten, nicht außerhalb der 
Gesellschaft als verändernde Kraft zu wirken.12)
In his speech at the Gruppe 47 conference in Princeton in 
1966 he had seen literature as a field of its own which was 
quite a separate thing from politics, with separate starting 
points, even though the two could come together:
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Und es gibt auch eine Menge Schriftsteller, bekannt 
und unbekannte, die, weit entfernt von der Anmaßung 
'Gewissen der Nation' sein zu wollen, gelegentlich 
ihren Schreibtisch umwerfen - und demokratischen 
Kleinkram betreiben. Das aber heißt: Kompromisse 
anstreben. Seien wir uns dessen bewußt: das Gedicht 
kennt keine Kompromisse; wir aber leben von Kompro­
missen.
This view came from his still seeing writers as incorrigible 
individualists by virtue of their calling:
Dabei lehrt einige Branchenkenntnis, daß Schrift­
steller exzentrische Einzelwesen sind, auch wenn 
sie sich auf Tagungen zusammenrotten. (...) auch 
(...) die Progressiv-Konservativen, sind aufgespal­
ten in Ein-Mann-Fraktionen, und jeder liest seinen 
eigenen Marx.13'
Martin (falser was one who criticised Grass' sepa­
ration of literary and political tasks. He thought that only 
making them integral to one another was to be really political 
as a writer:
Schade noch mehr, daß man das Politische eines 
Schriftstellers weniger nach seinen literarischen 
Hervorbringungen beurteilt als nach seinem aktuel­
len Auftritt. (...) Ich glaube, vertrauenswürdiger 
ist der Autor allemal in seinen Arbeiten. (...)
Ich finde, das ist eine bewunderungswürdige arti­
stische Anwendung der Talente eines Schriftstellers. 
Er wirbt für seine Persönlichkeit, von der er sich 
Gutes verspricht. Er selber versteht seinen Einsatz 
aber als politisches Engagement. Da würde ich schon 
ein wenig zögern. (...) Ich halte alle Empfehlungs­
kampagnen heutiger Wahlkämpfe für Kosmetik.14'
Even up to the early days of the VS Grass had an 
idealist view of literary production in society as something 
not bound to ideology even though literature should certainly 
address itself to political issues:
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Umweltverlust und Umweltschutz, Bildungsnotstand 
und Leistungsgesellschaft, Überdruß am Überfluß 
heißen die Schlagworte. Welche Schriftsteller 
werden ihrer abseits vom gängigen Jargon und ohne 
vorgefaßte dogmatische Diktion geformten Inhalt 
geben?
Und welche Leser, welche neuen Leser, werden sie 
finden? Welche Literatur wird den Begriff Eigentum 
aus doppelt puritanischer Hörigkeit lösen und ihm 
zwischen westlichem Privatkapitalismus und kommu­
nistischem Staatskapitalismus zwangsfreien Raum 
schaffen?15)
Grass had the same attitude to politics in literature as he 
had to politics as a whole. In the former he implied that 
the mysteries of the social autonomy of writers still hold, 
that literature has a special power to defy ideology. In 
politics as a whole, he envisaged the same power in ideals 
and morals and also believed that it could lie in certain 
personalities who stand for these ideals and morals, like 
Brandt and Heinemann. In fact, a fervent conviction that 'people 
make politics' has been the driving force behind his poli­
tical attitudes, activities and his view of his own role in 
public affairs. This is a rough and ready maxim which could 
veer between liberal and radical-democratic shades of meaning.
As a result his political ideology has been very elastic 
compared with someone like Bttll, who has virtually always 
stood out against the dominant ideological climate of his 
society. Grass, on the other hand, has at times been more 
radical and critical than the mainstream of the SPD with 
which he allied himself, and at others has completely 
acquiesced with its politics and supported the status quo.
I shall look more closely at this in chapters three and
four.
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Grass had an individualist view not only of himself, 
but of everybody an social and political beings. And he made 
little or no distinction between a writer's part in political 
life and every adult's - as citizen, voter, taxpayer.16*
His view of himself was intimately bound to the literal 
political liberalism which is so characteristic of his 
convictions. For him, literally every individual's voice and 
vote counts in a parliamentary democracy and indeed is 
sovereign. The critical responsibilities of writers and 
intellectuals were consequently ordinary democratic rights, 
subject to more abuse than the layman's, but not different 
in kind or value:
Im Jahre 1937, als Emigrant, entrechtet und ausge­
bürgert, klagte Thomas Mann: "Es gibt keinen sub­
alterneren Hohn als den auf den Dichter, der in die 
politische Arena hinabsteigt."
Dieses Wort gilt bis heute. Wen also die ungebundene 
Sprache des Schriftstellers stört, wer sich aller 
Kritik enthoben sieht und wie unser Bundeskanzler 
rasch bei der Hand ist mit plattem Schimpfwort und 
altvertrauten Obrigkeitsallüren, dem sei gesagt, daß 
- laut Grundgesetz - die Bürger der Souverän unse­
rer parlamentarischen Demokratie sind. Wäre es an­
ders, es müßte der Rechtsstaat verkümmern.’''
He made himself out to be just an ordinary person, just 'der 
schreibende Bürger')®}oining in the political processes of 
a democracy. A democracy was for-everyone, everyone should 
participate in it ¡hewas setting the example. His approach 
to politics was always pedagogical - to encourage people to 
live up to the opportunities and possibilities promised by 
democracy. Twenty years after National Socialism, West German 
society still lacked democratic maturitj?*he said and . 
was not alone in gaying so.When the SPD-FDP coalition was
elected In 1969, he thought for a time that the battle had 
been just about won. But his literal liberalism gave him a 
populist concept of democracy which meant it was by no 
means just who the government were that guaranteed democracy, 
but how they had gained popular support and what the people's 
attitudes to the government were. So he did not always take 
the government's view at all:
Spontane Bürgerinitiativen gegen Mietwucher und 
die ungewohnte Entschlossenheit der Gewerkschaften 
zum Streik (weisen) auf demokratische Reife und 
mündiges Selbstbewußtsein.20)
It was because Grass never thought that as a writer he 
brought any special qualities to politics that he ended up 
after years of involvement seeing himself as a politician, 
or at least a part-time politician. He said so, for instance, 
in an interview in the midst of his second federal election 
campaign in 1969:
Grass: Ich hab' meinen Beruf. Ich schreibe gern 
Bücher. Und ich habe vor, noch mehrere Bücher zu 
schreiben. In einer Regierung jedoch, in der die 
SPD die Richtlinien der Politik bestimmt, wäre ich 
bereit, nach meinen Kenntnissen und Fähigkeiten ein 
Amt zu übernehmen.
St.N.: Sie fühlen sich also nicht nur als Schrift­
steller, sondern auch als Politiker?
Grass: Ja, das kommt mit der Beschäftigung dazu.
Ich seh' da auch keinen Gegensatz. Beides -Politik 
und Schriftstellerei- hat mit der Gesellschaft zu 
tun. Ich schreibe als Schriftsteller und spreche 
in der Öffentlichkeit als Politiker.21)
We can see here that Grass thought of himself in a 
dual capacity as writer on the one hand and politician on the 
other, whilst these separate occupations were not mutually 
exclusive. This was precisely because his political activities
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made him politically professional for a time, taking him 
away from literature. What happened to the politics in some 
of his literary works will be the subject of the next 
chapter. The most obvious result of his dual but separate 
occupations was that his own political ideas became ever more 
explicitly the material of which he fashioned his literary 
works.
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footnotes
1 ) I use this term because in a capitalist society the 
sphere of culture and communication is one of economic 
activity as well as of ideas. This is meant to be a 
matter of emphasis and not an abuse of the other sides 
there are to art and culture. It is an emphasis which 
is chosen as appropriate to the culture and communication 
industry in West Germany.and I am taking this approach 
from, for Instance, Enzensberger, who stressed the 
industralisation of literary production nearly twenty 
years ago:
Der Buchverlag hat als Unternehmen lange Zeit an 
gewerblichen, ja, man könnte beinahe sagen, hand­
werklichen Formen des Produzierens festgehalten. 
Der Chef des Hauses kannte im allgemeinen jedes 
Manuskript, das er veröffentlichte. Jeder Titel 
warf besondere Vertrags-, Finanzierungs- und Her­
stellungsfragen auf, die individuell zu lösen 
waren. (__)
Der typische moderne Großverlag ist dagegen ein 
durchaus rationell arbeitender Betrieb industriel­
ler Prägung. Sein Ziel ist ein sehr großes, kon­
stant bleibenden Produktionsvolumen, das die Ka­
pazität des Betriebs völlig auslastet. Das inve­
stierte Kapital muß sich rasch amortisieren.
Hans Magnus Enzensberger: "Bildung als Konsumgut. Analyse 
der Taschenbuch-Produktion", in: Einzelheiten I / Bewußt­
seinsindustrie, Frankfurt/M., 1973, pp. 141/2.
2) Karla Fohrbeck, Andreas J. Wiesand: Der Autorenreport,
Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1972, p.19.
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3) Hannes Schwenger: Schriftsteller und Gewerkschaft / 
Ideologie, überbau. Organisation. Darmstadt t Neuwied, 
1974, p. 108, referring to the Autorenreport * s findings.
4) Fohrbeck • Wicsand, op.clt., p. 242.
5) as described by Schwenger, op.clt., pp.161-188.
6) "IG Kultur?", in Dieter Lattmann (edj : Einigkeit der 
Einzelgänger / Dokumentation des ersten Schriftsteller- 
Kongresses des Verbandes Deutscher Schriftsteller,
Munich, 1971, pp. 33 f..
7) On the other hand, the idea of a cross-media union was 
still formally pursued as an ultimate aim of the 
writers' organisation although it was postponed apparently 
indefinitely. See resolutions on 'Medienpolitik' in 
Horst Blngel(ed.)¡Phantasie und Verantwortung / 
Dokumentation des dritten Schriftstellerkongresses des 
Verbandes Deutscher Schriftsteller (VS) in der IG Druck 
und Papier, Frankfurt/M., 1975, pp. 102 - 108.
8) "Politische Literatur / Tie Grenzen der ' 'ulturrevolu- 
tion'", in Wolfgang Kuttenkeuler(ed.)¡Poesie und Politik / 
Zur Situation der Literatur in Deutschland, Stuttgart, 
1973, pp. 262 • 259.
9) Schwenger, op.clt., pp.98/99:
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Dle historisch aktuelle Form der materiellen Pro­
duktion ist überwiegend die kapitalistische Waren­
produktion. Die aktuelle Form der geistigen Produk­
tionstätigkeit ist unterschiedlich, aber durch das 
Vordringen des kapitalistischen Produktionsverhält- 
nisses bestimmt. Sie existiert
- als geistige Lebenstätigkeit des Menschen außer­
halb der Wertproduktion
- als Bestandteil des materiellen Produktionspro­
zesses
- als unproduktive immaterielle Arbeit, entweder 
in der Form kleiner Warenproduktion oder Dienst­
leistungen
- als produktive immaterielle Arbeit, entweder als 
kapitalistische Warenproduktion oder als produk­
tive Dienstleistung.
1 0 ) As reported by Dieter E. Zimmer: “Gewonnen haben beide 
Seiten", in DIE ZEIT 18/6/1976; also Der Spiegel 14/6/1976, 
"Verlage: Grass setzt Mitbestimmung durch".
11) "Ende der Bescheidenheit / Zur Situation der Schrift­
steller in der Bundesrepublik" (Rede anläßlich der 
Gründung des überregionalen Verbandes Deutscher Schrift­
steller (VS) am 8 . Juni 1969), in Kuttenkeuler, op.cit., 
pp. 347/8.
12) "Schriftsteller und Gewerkschaft", in Lattmann, op. cit..
13) "Vom mangelnden Selbstvertrauen der schreibenden Hof­
narren unter Berücksichtigung nicht vorhandener Höfe", 
in Ober das Selbstverständliche / Politische Schriften, 
revised paperback edition, Munich, 1969, p. 89.
14) "Engagement als Pflichtfach für Schriftsteller", in 
Kuttenkeuler, op.cit., p. 308.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS IN DIE BLECHTROMMEL. HUNDEJAHRE. 
ÖRTLICH BETÄUBT AND AUS DEM TAGEBUCH EINER SCHNECKE
Grass' politics and the reception of his literary works
From the outset Die Blechtrommel was greeted by a 
style of reviewing that distinguished itself by an extra­
ordinarily unembarassed use of superlatives, as examples 
from Enzensberger and Walter Widmer illustrates
Diese Sprache (...) ist (...) von einer Formkraft, 
einer Plastik, einer überwältigenden Fülle, einer 
inneren Spannung, einem rhythmischen Furor, für 
die ich in der deutschen Literatur des Augenblicks 
kein Beispiel sehe.
Man ist glatt erledigt, über den Haufen geworfen 
und weiß nicht, was man mehr bewundern soll, das 
handwerkliche Können und die sprühende Phantasie 
des Autors, seine pralle Lebensfüllung und seine 
unversiegliche Darstellungskraft oder seine naive 
Verruchtheit, sein bedenkenloses Hinwegschreiten 
Uber sämtliche Schranken bürgerlicher Moral.U
Superlatives to excess on the one side, aggressive denigration 
from the offended on the other, combined to give Grass a 
•socially critical' image from the evidence of the Danzig 
Trilogy. Enzensberger's excitement about him: "Dieser Mann 
ist ein Störenfried, ein Hai im Sardinentümpel, ein wilder 
Einzelgänger in unserer domestizierten Literatur", became 
virtually as well known as the contents of the books them­
selves. This kind of critical vocabulary appears to be
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politically innocent even il it has political implications. 
Although his first novel brought him a reputation as 
socially and morally radical, nobody tried to link his 
political ideology to his literary work, until the issue 
could no longer be avoided after he had set the pace himself 
with his first campaign for the SPD in the 1965 federal elect­
ion. When Holthuscn wrote about the political nature of the 
Danzig Trilogy he did so under the influence of what Grass 
had done in 1965.
Up to then reviews and criticism the. Danzig Trilogy had 
been mainly unpolitical3^following the example of Enzensber- 
ger's review of the first novel in which he acclaimed the 
book's ideological innocence or naivety as the very virtue 
of its realism:
Dieser Autor greift nichts an, beweist nichts, 
demonstriert nichts, er hat keine andere Absicht, 
als seine Geschichte mit der größten Genauigkeit 
zu erzählen. Diese Absicht setzt er freilich um 
jeden Preis und ohne die geringste Rücksicht 
durch. Der Skandal, der darin liegt, ist letzten 
Endes an keinen Stoff gebunden: er ist der Skandal 
der realistischen Erzählweise überhaupt.4*
This approach meant that there was a vague consensus that 
the third parts of both Die Blechtrommel and Hundejahre , 
dealing with post-war society in the Federal Republic, were 
comparative failures, but critics were at a loss to account 
for this. Reinhard Baumgart tried to explain this failure in 
both the novelist and his critics, but his sociological 
explanation was very general and vague:
Der Erzähler Grass, so hieß es, nach der Blech­
trommel wie nach den Hundejahren, überzeugt nicht 
mehr, sobald er auf westdeutschem Boden steht.
Hier kommt es auf solche Urteile nicht an, es geht 
um eine Diagnose. Auch der Erzähler Günter Grass, 
so scheint also, mußte entdecken, wie wenig Wesent­
liches die kleinbürgerliche Perspektive von unserer 
zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft noch fassen kann.
Was er auf intimer Guckkastenbühne nicht mehr dar­
zustellen vermag, sucht er auf breitem allegori­
schem Podium einzuholen.'*
However, after the appearance of Die Plebejer proben den Auf­
stand Grass' reviewers took an almost entirely political 
approach, even if some of them argued that his work had 
deteriorated aesthetically the more politically: SctUve 
he had become.6* Now Grass had to try and defend
his own idea of his literary work from too literal a political 
interpretation, arguing that Die Plebejer etc. was not 
directly hostile to Brecht und that örtlich betäubt was more 
than a polemic against the radical students.7*
This practice of literally equating Grass' public political 
position on the one hand with the social and political con­
tents of his literary work on the other was to some extent 
provoked by his publishers' marketing policy , örtlich 
betäubt and Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke were published 
just before his campaigns for the SPD in the Federal elections 
of 1969 and 1972 respectively. It is not surprising that 
the bool I and the politics came to be interpreted in the 
light of each other.8* Grass' politics provided reviewers 
with a ready-made critical schema and vocabulary to apply 
to his literary works. They served as a handy product- 
description.
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Sufl^ reviews mate • free use of the intentional 
fallacy. It Is true that the later books do reflect their 
author's politics more or less directly. But this is not 
simply because in content they deal with the same ideas and 
issues he has been concerned with in his public activities 
in political affairs. They do so because the textual 
transformation of authorial conceptions, whether these be 
implicitly or explicitly to do with politics, has become 
thinner with each new book. This can also be put positively 
as Charles Russell has done:
With the shifting of his focus from the war era to 
the present. Grass recognised that the aesthetic 
distance of the writer from the subject was no longer 
tenable. There is no priveleged perspective in 
contemporary society from which a writer can naively 
direct satiric barbs at his or her subject. It is 
necessary for the satirist to evaluate his or her own 
assumptions. The greatest danger for the contemporary 
writer. Grass shows, is bad faith.
But Russell is yet another critic who equates the text 
directly with the author's intentions. He does not in any 
way justify why he takes the author as the subject of the 
novels in this way. This is a literary question. There is 
little gained by deducing the politics in the literary texts 
directly from the author's own position in public affairs.
We have to examine first how the political dimensions of 
social life enter the works taken in their own right.
Taking the major prose works up to 1972, this chapter will 
show how the author's ideology increasingly becomes 
the dominant ideology of the texts, because between Die 
Blechtrommel and Aus dem Tagebuch elner Schnecke the
experience and responses of the characters of the novels
cease to be bound to a class and a community. The distinction 
I want to make is between the political character of the 
material itself within the world depicted, and the author's 
own political conceptions when brought to his literary 
material from the outside, or in other words when Grass' own 
political attitudes appear to the reader to intrude into the 
texts. The result is that the later novels show us much less 
about the political character of the society they depict 
than the earlier ones, and tell us more and more about Grass' 
own political ideas alone.
Die Blechtrommel101
Die Blechtrommel is a novel full of historical 
dates and facts which are used ironically to produce a 
sense of the passive experience of political developments 
on the part of a petit-bourgeois community, and thus of the 
ideological situation of this class, not in relation to the 
historical experience of the whole of German society, but 
rather as how it was lived by one section of it. The novel 
concerns itself with the experience of a particular section 
of society in terms of how it makes sense or non-sense of 
history and of itr political environment.
Some of the dates and facts in the novel are rele­
vant to the chronology of the story11*, some of them are 
mentioned just because Oskar has an idiosyncratic interest 
in them.121 From the very beginning of his supposed auto-
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blography Oskar makes a habit of discursively linking 
events In his story to some arbitrarily chosen details of 
world hlstoryi
Jedenfalls sagte meine Trommel: An jenem Oktober­
nachmittag des Jahres neununc.neunzig, wahrend in 
Südafrika Ohm Krüger seine bjschig englandfeind­
lichen Augenbrauen bürstete, wurde zwischen Dlr- 
schau und Karthaus, nahe de: Ziegelei Bissau, 
unter vier gleichfarbigen Röcken, unter Qualm, 
Ängsten, Seufzern, unter schrägem Regen und leid­
voll betonten Vornamen der Heiligen (...) meine 
Mutter Agnes gezeugt. (../) Nur um die Spannung 
etwas zu erhöhen, nenne ich den Naren jener Stadt 
an der Mottlaumündung noch nicht, obgleich sie als 
Geburtsstadt meiner Mama jetzt schon nennenswert 
wäre. Ende Juli des Jahras nullnull - man entschloß 
sich gerade, das kaiser’/iche Schlachtflottenbau­
programm zu verdoppeln - erblickte Mama im Stern­
chen Löwe das Licht der Welt. (...) Das erste Haus, 
auch Domus vitae genannt, im Zeichen des Aszenden­
ten: leicht zu beeinflussende Fische ...
With this kind of irony, history is just as irrelevant to 
the scene-setting as astrology: the geography of the scene 
is more interesting. This pattern of narrative emphasis 
divorces the domestic world Oskar depicts from the inter­
national and national developments he drolly mentions in 
passing. Paying lip service like this to historical realism 
is trivial and banal. The banality is functional, and is in 
no way woven into the fabric of this social world. The 
section of Danzig society which is portrayed reduces itself 
to the private and the provincial. This self-reduction is 
thrown into relief when Oskar mentions historical conjunctures 
external to the domestic community, because the 'small world' 
and the 'large world' only meet ironically through his drum.
By means of Oskar's ironical distance and narrative omnipo­
tence through the drum, this community's lack of awareness
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of the world outside Itself is exposed as precisely Its 
problem. In this way Die Blechtrommel is a novel concerned 
with the ideological disposition of this section of society. 
It shows how this class perceives and responds to its 
historical environment.
The first two parts of the novel depict how 
nazification creeps into these people's lives without their 
being award of it or making conscious responses to it. The 
political background to this society is glimpsed only through 
the unexplained, unthinking responses of its members. An 
example of this is the way the Jewish toy-seller pleads 
with Agnes Matzerath for her to make a politically 
opportunist choice between her lovers according to their 
nationality, German or Polish, when the former is in the 
ascendent over the latter . The problem of the Jew's
own position within this scramble for conformity crops up 
only in parenthesis:
Setzen Se nich auf de Polen, setzen Se, wenn Se 
setzen wollen, auf de Deitschen, weil se hoch­
kommen, wenn nich heit dann morgen; (...) Oder 
wenn Se mechten setzen gefälligst auffen Markus 
und kommen Se middem Markus, wo er getauft is seit 
nelllch. Gehn wä nach London, Frau Agnes, wo ich 
Lait hab drieben und Papiere genug, wenn Se nur 
wollten kommen oder wolln Se nich middem Markus, 
weil Se ihn verachten, nu denn verachten Se ihn.
Aber er bittet Ihnen von Herzen, wenn Se doch nur 
nich mehr setzen wollen auffen meschuggenen Bronski, 
dä bei de polnische Post bleibt, wo doch bald ...
färtich is midde Polen, wenn se kommen de Deitschen!1 '
Glimpses such as these of the problem of nationality as part 
of National Socialist ideology, and of the domination of 
that ideology ever the way people think as the Third Reich
-2 7 -
expand«, show how political forces are reflected as if they 
were only the background to domestic choices. In fact they 
are all the time becoming the very fabric of this world as 
its members Just absorb them passively. This community's 
very lack of awareness is political.This is the historical 
picture of the petit-bourgeois class which emerges,by contrast, 
from the narrator's ironic misuse of chronological material.
Thus the novel does not show the historical causes 
of political development, but rather how they were lived from 
day to day in the immediate relationships within this class. 
Consequently it is appropriate that the aggressive expansion 
of the National Socialist state enters the story as just so 
many distant news reports, as distant as those events of the 
past which Oskar wilfully and gratuitously drums up from 
time to time. Just about the only time Oskar makes any 
explicit reference to Nazi domination of the state, he 
combines it with an ironic, veiled reference to the economic 
interests of this petit-bourgoisie in Fascisms
Da gab es zwar immer noch die alte Teppichklopf­
stange, auch stand in der Hausordnung: Dienstag 
und Freitag Teppichklopfen, aber das knallte nur 
noch spärlich und fast verlegen an den zwei Wochen­
tagen: seit Hitlers Machtübernahme gab es mehr 
und mehr Staubsauger in den Haushaltungen.14)
The banality of his commentary emphasises how the economic 
basis of Nazi ideological and political power is irrelevant 
to the way the experience of this community is invoked. The 
whole point of Oskar's narrative stance is that it insists 
on recognising the political in the trivial, as wnen he
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claims that he felt Sütterlln script to be ominous from the 
very first, even when he could not yet read it.15* The way 
politics is lived through the habits and symbols of 
authority in this community is more important than how it 
was determined in this period of capitalist crisis. History 
at large, within and without this section ot society, is a 
senseless stream of tragedies and banalities to it precisely 
because it fails to recognise what is happening to it in 
the present. Georg Just demonstrates this taking the scene 
at Kurt's christening (B.tr. p. 247 "Es wollte kein Gespräch 
aufkommen ..."):
Der unreflektierte, großsprecherische Jargon ver­
hindert eine angemessene Erfassung der Bedeutung 
jener kriegerischen, unmenschlichen Ereignisse; 
in ihm erscheinen sie abstrakt und verharmlost. Die 
Mühe, die sich die Personen andererseits geben, die 
kleinste Peinlichkeit in ihrem privaten Bereich, 
die Erwähnung Jans, zu vermeiden, zeigt, wie sich 
die Proportionen im Kleinbürgerbewußtsein völlig 
verkehrt haben. Die Erkenntnis, daß "geschicht­
liches" Geschehen und "privates" Geschehen identisch 
sind, der "Krieg im Osten" und der Tod Jans, wird 
durch Sentimentalität verhindert.16)
The figures depicted in the Danziq community also 
embody more particular types of the social and political 
make-up of this society in this period. Matzerath and Bronski 
represent Germany and Poland respectively, Markus the Jews, 
Greff the homosexual scout-type, Meyn the SA man. As Just 
points out17*, this is particularly so in their deaths in a 
number of cases: Matzerath's is correlative to the collapse 
of the Third Reich, Jan's to the outbreak of war between 
Germany and Poland, Markus' to the persecution of the Jews, 
and the Stüuberbande's presumably to the execution of
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resistance fighters18*. This provincial petit-bourgeois world 
is thus a microcosm of the agents through whom National 
Socialism gained control over German society.
This class was the social base of National Socialism 
by virtue of its very passivity and its lack of an organic 
ideology - a coherent and meaningful sense of itself-, 
laying it open to the mythology of an aggressive political 
movement. Its members here end up playing their political 
roles, playing with political forces, without being aware 
of it. They do not 'stand for' the types mentioned out 
of deference to a broad historical realism, but
rather to illustrate by default their lack of awareness that 
’geschichtliches Geschehen und privates Geschehen identisch 
sind'.
The novel thus reproduces in relief the poor 
political conscience and historical sense of this class at 
this time. However, as a whole it i>lso gives us _• a 
feeling of the senselessness of history in general, inde­
pendently of the impoverished perception of the Danzig 
characteJli Oskar is cynical about historical sequences:
•Der Krieg hatte sich verausgabt. Man bastelte, Anlaß zu
2 0)
ferneren Kriegen gebend, Friedensverträge.' He derisively 
veils the course of the Nazi Imperialist machine in an image 
of history as a moving phantom: 'Während die Geschichte 
lauthals Sondermeldungen verkündend wie ein gutgeschmiertes 
Gefährt Europas Straßen, Wasserwege und Lüfte befuhr, durch­
schwamm und fliegend eroberte, liefen meine Geschäfte (...
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schlecht . ..'.21*And he mystifies the fate of Danzig by 
caricaturing a school-book account of it«
Ein zerstörerisches und wiederaufbauendes Spielchen 
treibend, wechselten sich jetzt mehrere Jahrhunderte 
lang die Herzöge von Pomereilen, die Hochmeister des 
Ritterordens, die Könige und Gegenkönige von Polen, 
Grafen von Brandenburg und Bischöfe von Wroclawek ab...'
Encapsulating itself in its own problem of how to perceive 
and respond to what was happening to German society at large,
Die Blechtrommel does not transcend the class-specificity 
of this inability to see the sense of and make sense of 
history and politics, because it is organised around Oskar's 
self-consciously perverse autobiography. He is continually 
claiming that his career deliberately ran athwart history, 
athwart the social and political order of the period of the 
first two books of the novel. This is further entangled 
because Oskar also makes us doubt the sincerity of virtually 
all of the attitudes he professes, including this very 
cynical attitude towards historical reflection and political 
commitment. The first warning of this ambiguity comes in the 
very opening lines, when he slips in the information that his 
autobiographical tale is 'vorgelogen'. We are set wondering : 
is he telling lies about lying?
Just claims that Oskar's equivocation challenges 
the reader to reconstruct the sense of the epoch which the 
narrative does not communicate , and which its class- 
perspective could not construct:
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Die Beschreibung des kleinbürgerlichen Romanpersonals 
ist dann zugleich Beschreibung des für eine adäquate 
Realisation des Textes vorauszusetzenden Lesers.
(...) die Verfremdungsstruktur des Welkes (...) bie­
tet dem Leser gerade die Möglichkeit, sich im darge­
stellten Milieu (und dessen Einstellungen) wiederzu­
erkennen, entzieht ihm aber sogleich die Möglichkeit, 
sich mit ihm affektiv zu Identifizieren. Gerade dar­
in besteht ihre kritische Funktion und mögliche kor­
rektive Wirkung.
Die Erzählperspektive realisiert sich in einer Art 
Reduktionstechnik, wonach die Situationen und ihre 
Gegenstände nicht gemäß dem ihnen objektiv, d.h. in 
in der Erwartung des Lesers, eignenden Interesses, 
Wertes dargestellt werden, sondern reduziert auf das 
"Interesse" Oskars. (...) Der durch Verfremdung di­
stanzierende Erzählstil erreichte damit eine Emotio­
nalisierung des Lesers, wie sie die zur Identifika­
tion aufrufende, eindeutige Parteinahme des Erzählers 
und die dadurch bedingte pathetische Darstellung 
nicht bewirken würde.23'
But I believe that this possibility is frustrated because the 
perspective provided by Oskar is both too confusing and too 
potent.
It is too confusing because he refuses to commit himself 
either to a reliable narrative status or even to a definite 
personality (his accounts of his own motives are hazy to say 
the least). This leaves us with the problem of either
a) accepting the ambiguity and/or dishonesty of Oskar and 
his story,as Just does, regarding it as a critical 
virtue, or
b) taking this to be merely Oskar's perverse self-character­
isation and not allowing this to detract from the status 
of his story, or
c) not knowing how to relate Oskar as character to Oskar
as narrator. Oskar's self-consciousness about presenting 
these problems does not relieve the confusion, it just 
makes us aware of it.
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Oskar's perspective is overpowering because 
how the members of this society pprceive history is overladen 
with the dominant character's difficulty in making 
Sensé of himself. Oskar is
unable to come to terms with himself as much as with the 
things he experiences, and the same is true of all the 
narrative figures:in the 'Danzig Trilogy'.
In all three novels the first-person narrators 
ostensibly try to present a view of past and present'matters 
put are really occupied with observing themselves, 
a process which only reveals how each is incapable of doing 
this honestly or satisfactorily. His status as first-person 
narrator gives Oskar too much scope to distort the truth.
He pretends to be a winner but is much more a victim; 
pretends he has power over things with his drum and glass­
breaking voice, whereas in fact he is at the mercy of his 
physical environment; pretends he has control over his own 
growth for the sake of protecting himself, whereas others 
have to protect him and it is only Matzerath's loyalty to 
his late wife's wishes which stops Oskar being handed over to 
the Nazi health authorities, in Katz und Maus Pilenz avowedly 
intends to tell the tale of his friendship with Mahlke, 
but actually attempts to conceal his own part 
in his friend's destruction. Neither does third person 
narration succeed in making sense of the self. In the first book 
of Hundejahre Eddi Amsel does not disclose anything important 
about himself, neither his thoughts nor the real facts about 
his activities during and after the war. He only intensifies
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the enigma of what he is. In the third book Matern blames 
everyone else and never recogniRs Us own responsibilities. 
Narrative irony and dislocation of perspective In the stories 
point up these contradictions but do not reveal how the 
unasked and unanswered questions might be understood to 
relate to each other. The characters and the narratives 
work through different roles, but an amalgamation of them 
exposes how they conceal and do not reveal. The contra­
dictoriness of petit-bourgeois ideology is not transcended 
but reproduced in its absences and limitation.24*
Consequently the narrative voices have to retreat 
for the dimensions of their stories beyond these particular 
class-perspectives to be introduced. In the case of Die 
Blechtrommel the 'Glaube - Hoffnung - Liebe' and 'Atlantik- 
wall' excurses throw into relief how the main course of the 
story , as told by Oskar, cannot and does not deal with 
the moral and military dimensions of Nazi power in Europe: 
in the one the persecution of the Jews as in the 'Kristall- 
nacht' in Danzig; in the other the occupation of France.
Oskar retreats in both. Instead the issues are allegorised: 
in 'Glaube - Hoffnung - Liebe' through the fairy-tale format 
of "Es war einmal"; in the chapter entitled "Beton besich- 
tigen - Oder mystisch barbarisch gelangweilt" through 
dramatic form.
Past and Present
In a sense it is a mere truism that Die Blech­
trommel is a novel concerned with how a particular class and
a particular community perceived and responded to Its 
historical environment (is this not true of all novels?).
So the matter of real interest is the particular way in which 
the past and the present's relation to that past are treated 
in Grass' novels. In Die Blechtrommel this is embodied in 
Oskar's dual (or even triple) role as 1) an agent himself of 
the world depicted and 2) a3 an ironically critical observer 
and organiser of the tale which is told. This latter role in 
turn has two aspects to it, roughly applying to the past and 
present respectively. In relation to the past he is the 
ironical observer who can throw the matter of the tale into 
relief and who prevents emphathetic identification with it.
In relation to the present (as of the time of writing at the 
end of the fifties) he is the moral memory of the members 
of the society he addresses.25*
Hanspeter Bode assumes that this latter aspect 
of Oskar as link-man between past and present applies to 
what the book does with history altogether, so that the 
novel deals with the history of the Third Reich predominantly 
as a component of the moral condition of post-war society.
This would mean that the moral continuity between past and 
present German society dominates the picture of the past.
As Brode says, the narrative position in the present supports 
the view that the novel's historical character serves a moral 
reckoning which he believes the book embodies. He consequent­
ly assumes that Die Blechtrommel and Hundejahre are identical 
in this regard.
-31 ,.
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If we are to accept that the novel treats history 
in a primarily moral spirit, it is necessary to consider the 
agent of that spirit . So critics have tried to extrapolate 
authorial intentions and preconceptions about the reader- 
ship from the text.26^Contending outcries about the morality 
of the Danzig Trilogy and its author have constantly attended 
Grass’ career as a novelist. Against charges that Grass' work 
is immoral or amoral, its partisans have simply turned the 
tables and argued that the lack of regard for conventional 
sexual and religious tabus is itself inspired by a humanist 
morality.
This has befen a false approach 
to Die Blechtrommel , precisely because Oskar 
is the fictional mediator between any intention which may be 
attributed to the author and the readership. By working at 
different levels, he prevents his function as moral memory 
dominating over the other historical parts which he simultaneous 
ly plays (Agent-and-observer of a particular period of the 
past). Authorial intention has thus been objectified success­
fully to a degree which (I shall argue) Grass abandons there­
after.
The voice of the author becomes more intrusive the 
further he moves away from historical realism and the more 
self-consciously he inserts his own ideas and intentions 
into the social and political ideologies which his fictional 
or semi-fictional characters embody. In his major prose works, 
this development can be detected through the consecutive
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changes in the balance of historicity to morallsm, of realism 
to the novel of ideas. Grass' prose works move further and 
further away from the realist mode of Die Blechtrommel 
towards the novel of ideas, until Aus dem Tagebuch einer 
Schnecke is a semi-novel of his own ideas alone.
This is a move towards a bourgeois treatment of 
ideas because they are abstracted from their basis in social 
life. It happens because Grass' fiction increasingly loses 
a sense of social context and of class to depict how people 
live historical and social relations and to depict their 
perception of them (Die Blechtrommel); it withdraws this 
living substratum from the picture of how people derive 
and express their ideas, so that ideas become abstractly 
and randomly attached to discrete individuals set loose 
from society (örtlich betäubt), and consequently ends up 
with the individual he knows best, namely himself (Aus dem 
Tagebuch ...).
Hundejahre27*
In many ways the transition begins in Hundejahre, 
where it can be diagnosed as a further reduction of cognitive 
content in the treatment of history. This novel 
handles historical experience obliquely, as 
remembrance. Compared with Oskar's linear looking-back in­
to his own and his ancestor's past, the opening of Hundejahre 
in the 'Erste Frühschicht' re-invokes factual particulars
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from the past, interwoven into a quasi-mythologlcal texture. 
These two different ways of referring to the past - the 
specific and the mythological generality - can be united 
here because the narrator's purpose is to remember sensuously 
rather than to make history rationally intelligible, and 
because his ambigpus social position at this point (as 
Brauxel) makes him an agent of a moral rather than a 
cognitive approach to history.
On the first page paragraphs about the person 
"Der hier die Feder führt, wird zur Zeit Brauxel genannt, 
steht einem Bergwerk vor, das weder Kali, Erz noch Kohle 
fördert", are juxtaposed with ones about the River Weichsel's 
flow through time without beginning or end. This establishes 
the two aspects of Amsel-Brauxel' s narrative function. The 
first is to re-invoke the past in his fictional capacity 
as artist, instigator and organiser of the narration; 
the second to mediate the tension which pervades the novel 
as a whole between a determinate period of German history 
between the First World War and the Federal Republic on the 
one hand, and a symbolically distilled feeling of the 
German past with mythological connotations on the other.
The narrative present dominates the narrative past 
in Hundejahre, whereas it does not in Die Blechtrommel, through 
the distorted fashion in which Brauxel personifies culture- 
production in contemporary capitalist society. The book is 
about writing about the past just as much as it is about 
what happened in the past. As entrep&neur and artist Brauxel
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condenses in one person both parties involved in the produc­
tion and manufacture of art-commodies. Because he is both 
the capitalist who commissions the work of Harry Liebenau 
and Walter Matern and the producer of the first book him­
self, the two different social positions are conflated to 
what the entrejsneur and the literary producer have in 
common, namely different sorts of exceptional position. 
Brauxel is in a dual position which places him doubly above 
and beside society. By virtue of this elevation he approaches 
the past from a moral point of departure. But at the same 
time he is the task-master over his co-authors, which means 
that none of them is free, and so none of them is capable 
of assuming proper responsibilities for himself. Brauxel's 
:noral authority over Liebenau and Matern and his organisa­
tional control over their literary production form a nexus 
of dependence which trustâtes mutual emancipation. Neither 
are the individual fictional figures able to take responsi­
bility for themselves, nor does the society the book is 
being written for take responsibility for itself - so that 
at the end "Jeder badet für sich", as the very last line 
puts it.
Having chosen to stick with this frustrating device 
the novel flees from cognition to moralism and from realistic 
representation to mythologising allegory. This is evident in 
the Third Book in particular where social, economic and 
political developments of the period are 
gratuitously allegorised.. The scenario in which the worms 
in the flour direct the post war reconstruction of West-
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Germany Is a notorioua case in point. Here the vagueness 
and lack of seriousness of the narrative voice can be felt:
Und welch kostenloses Vergnügen wäre es, jetzt, 
da der Schluß dieser Chronik Atem holt, noch 
dieses und jenes Zwischenspiel einzulegen; denn 
jeder könnte jetzt Anekdoten erzählen. Etwa das 
Histörchen von der Ufa, die ihre Treuhänder zu 
spät nach Neu-Nickelswalde schickt. Jeder könnte 
jetzt ein Lamento loslassen.*“)
The whole of the Third Book does not handle post­
war-developments in an historically serious fashion; it shows 
neurosis. It opens with the statement "Der Hund steht zen­
tral" and throughout the dog accompanies Matern as a reifi­
cation of the guilt he cannot quite suppress but cannot ad­
mit either and which is consequently the source of his ob­
sessive vengeful behaviour. His psychological ill-health is 
caused by his moral failure. In Hundejahre this spiritual 
responsibility for the past is demonstrated much moie power­
fully than what the past was. Cepl-Kaufmann has enumerated 
the structural features of the book through which it removes 
itself beyond historically and socially locatable behaviour 
during the periods portrayed, towards the timelessness 
2g;evoked by the Weichsel. 'The river flows through and past 
a time and a place, Langfuhr, which "war so groß und so 
klein, daß alles, was sich auf dieser Welt ereignet oder 
ereignen könnte, sich auch in Langfuhr ereignete oder hätte 
ereignen können"30* (which appropriately comes from the 
'Schlußmärchen').
Albrecht Goetze argues that whilst the separate 
parts of Hundejahre reproduce German amnesia about'the 
Third Reich, taken together they surmount it. and that sftch 
was the didactic end Grass aimed for.3** This states the 
case the wrong way around, because the three-dimensional 
narrative structure does not heuristically help explore and 
explain a society's political history, it is about how to 
remember ("Was längst vergessen war, bringt sich bäuchlings 
und rücklings als Schwimmer und mit Hilfe der Weichsel in 
Erinnerung")32*. It does have a pedagogical effect, but one 
which is moral much more than political in emphasis.
Throughout the book the references to Brauxel's 
commissions to Liebenau and Matern remind us how each narra­
tor has to be nagged into confronting his own memories, but 
they still all fail to do so. Liebenau appears to in the 
'Schlußmärchen' , but having written his love letters in the 
first person he changes in the 'Schlußmärchen' to. the third, as 
if not he but someone else were witness to the atrocities he re­
calls.
In the Third Book "Matern schreibt Präsens"33*: 
his helter-skelter language is comically satirical and is 
another portent of his failure to reminisce critically, in­
stead of which he is just reliving his own delusion. The circ­
ling and recircling of the narration in the 'Frühschichten'34 n^>l 
the 'Liebesbriefe', the 'Schlußmärchen's ' mixture of taking 
forward and recapitulating the story Harry has revealed3^*, 
and the hectic present tense of die 'Materniaden' produce a
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sense of remembering, not of historicity. Inthis process of 
remembering the agents of the story all remain oblivious to 
the bearing of their own behaviour on the horrors of the 
past. But aside from them, Oswald Brunies is a guide to how 
these things should be remembered, as a figure critical of 
the National Socialist regime and the paraphenalia of its 
ideology3®^, who promotes a moxal response in sympathy with 
the humanism he rather laconically represents.
Thus the triadic narrative structure of the novel 
does not so much refract complementary perspectives of an 
intricate historical experience, as Goetze claims3^ , 
as embody different aspects and different stages
(in descending order of enlightenment from Brauxel and 
Matern) of the frustrated state or absence of moral memory 
in contemporary West German society: the artist's ambiguous 
authority between conscience and capitalism (Brauxel), the 
insufficiency of privately remembering personal fate aione 
(Liebenau), the latent neurosis of a society which will not 
remember (Matern). An authoritative voice is heard only at 
the end of the last section of Book Two: "Vergessen wollen 
alle die Knochenberge und Massengräber, die Fahnenhalter und 
Parteibücher, die Schulden und die Schuld. " This authority 
is clearly moral and it is one which falls outside the triadic 
narrative structure. The voice here is effectively the
3iauthor's own, being quite uncharacteristic of Harry Liebenau.
Not that the book does not illustrate a particular 
epoch at all. Certain real features of the National Socialist
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era and of the period of its gestation before the seizure of 
power are there. As in Die Blechtrommel they enter the novel
as its personae absorb National Socialist ideology. The 
racial laws of the time are mentioned and the anti-semitism 
which was behind the persecution of Amsel shows how the 
other protagonists connived in it and also their lack of 
a sense of guilt about this. The school's part in the 
socialisation of the community into militaristic Nationalism 
is exposed not least in the way Brunies detracts from the 
general conformism.As Nazi domination creeps into people's 
lives it creeps into the language of the narrator of that 
period, Liebenau. An example is the letter announcing that 
the pup which Harry's family dog sired is to be presented 
to Hitler:
jener eingeschriebene Brief (...), der uns Uber 
der Unterschrift des Gauleiters Forster mitteilte, 
man habe (...) im Namen der Partei und der deut­
schen Bevölkerung der deutschen Stadt Danzig be­
schlossen, den Schäferhund Prinz dem Führer und 
Reichskanzler (...) übergeben zu lassen. '
The leitmotif phrase "Führer und Reichskanzler” reflects 
the mindless subservience of people to the leader-ideology 
of Fascism, but beyond that only the dog bears witness to 
the details of Nazi politics, allegorically clustered around 
the demonic figure of Hitler.
Whilst the private and the political are thus 
joined through sheer passivity, the social and historical 
particularity of this passivity.which was tangible in Die 
Blechtrommel, is missing in Hundejahre. The relation between 
the private and the political does not characterise the
view of a community, it ia part of how individuals fail to 
recognise their moral responsibilities.
In the 'Letzte Frühschicht' Brauxel interviews Harry 
for the job of second narrator and tests his knowledge of 
historical details about Danzig. These facts are both rele­
vant and irrelevant to the narrative and they are apparent­
ly connected quite gratuitously.42)
The interview shows how a knowledge of historical details 
does nothing to correct Harry's inability to relate this 
political world to his own memories. There then follows a 
transition passage to Harry's book of love-letters which 
conjures up the scene immediately prior to the Nazi period, 
like the overture of an opera. It ends up obsessively repeat­
ing the phrase 'Als Tulla geboren wurde' which portends the 
way Harry will be preoccupied with his private passion in 
the ensuing section of the narrative. Throwing disparate 
'public world' and 'private world' contingencies together, 
this passage suggests that the personal obsession is prone 
to political forms, that is,allegorically represents them, 
but it is as if the needle got stuck in the record just 
before the link was to be made, so that the phrase is just 
statically repeated.
Indeed throughout the novel political behaviour is 
determined by characters'predispositions.43’ Matern's dispo­
sition to violent behaviour is a case in point. As a Communist 
he threatens a Jungvolk leader with a beating and
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later starts a fight with him. In the SA he picks fights 
with a Polish student organisation. He is involved in the 
attack on Amsel in the snow, and so on.44*As a violence that 
leads him into, through and out of the SA and its brawls, 
he comes to represent the generalised Nazi violence in which 
he becomes involved, which leads to the extermination of 
the war and the concentration camps. Through the symbol of 
the crows which hover above both the incidents of assault in 
the snow scenes and over the mountain of bones outside the 
concentration camp45*, the ultimate violence of the gas 
chambers is presented as an extension of the demonic be­
haviour of the child Tulla, the connivance of the other 
children and Matern's own part in the attack on Amsel. In 
turn, Tulla's nastiness seems to have come simply from hell; 
Matern's was supposedly inherited, most recently from his 
grandmother (leitmotif of grinding-teeth for both of them), 
and all of them are linked together through the archetype 
of the dog, whose genealogy goes back endlessly through 
the ages.
If not absolutely timeless, these sorts of links
seem to speak of some kind of vague German predispositions.
Furthermore, this latent and general propensity to violence
is what actually connects the narrative trio. The evidence
for this is Amsel's teeth, which Matern knocked out in the
snow-scene assault and one of which Harry still carries
with him at the time of writing.46*Above all else the narrative 
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trio is moulded/of guilt and complicity. They are respectively
the victim, the compliant observer and the aggressor.
Goetze believes that the determinist characterisation 
in Hundejahre reveals "die systembedingte Deformation des 
M e n s c h e n " . It is true that in the first two books of the 
novel all the characters have a defined social and economic 
position, although in Rook Three everything of that kind 
becomes extremely nebulous. Yet it is impossible to see how 
the social system conditions people's psychology and behaviour 
because nobody can break out of it. Character exists in a 
particular social situation, certainly, but there is little 
sense that the one is formed by the other and vice versa.
There is no dialectic between personality and society.
For example, Matern is compulsively subordinate to 
Amsel and he attempts to break away from this authority by 
throwing away the knife his friend gave him. This shows that 
their symbiotic relationship is a matter of economic power:
Nicht Amsel kassierte. Walter Matern hatte, während 
Amsel gleichgültig tat, den Kaufpreis zu nennen, 
den Kauf durch Handschlag nach Viehhändlermanier 
zu besiegeln und die Münzen einzustreichen. Zudem war 
Walter Matern für den Transport der verkauften wie 
der ausgebliebenen Scheuchen zuständig. Er geriet 
in Abhängigkeit. Amsel machte ihn zum Paslack. In 
kurzatmigen Revolten versuchte er auszubrechen. Die 
Geschichte mit dem Taschenmesser war solch ein ohn­
mächtiger Versuch.48)
So economic oipression appears to be the cause of Matern's 
lack of self-awareness. But is it the cause or the effect?
Or is there any interaction between the two? Quite the 
opposite is the case. His psychology is so static throughout
that the symptoms of his character are only tangentially 
diagnosed in society and in his position within it. Hundejahre 
does not deal in psychological motivation, only in neurotic 
49)effects, reified impulses. 'An early image of the relation­
ship between Amsel and Matern is of the latter as a boy 
poised to throw the knife into the water. The muscular ten­
sion of throwing something away is described in slow-motion 
sequences in the course of four chapters in alls
Auf dem Deich gibt es keinen Stein. Er aber 
sucht (...). Er will muß will aber schmeißen.
(...) Und es knirschen oben Zähne von links nach 
rechts. Es entspannt sich, während es fließt 
kommt untergeht treibt kreiselt zu- und abnimmt, 
die Faust Uber dem Taschenmesser, daß alles ver­
triebene Blut in die nunmehr locker geschlosse­
ne Hand schießt.50)
Whatever is going on in Matern’s heart and mind 
is objectified here in the penknife "als geworfener Gegen­
stand der Wurfkraft"51 *. The same impotence which his grand­
mother gave vent to when she attacked Lorchen with the 
wooden spoon keeps him tied to this wheel of karma. And 
Amsel took that assault as the subject of his very first 
scarecrow-sculpture, the commercial art-production under 
which Matern becomes subsumed. So the heritage he bears in 
his character is the occasion of this economic activity 
rather than the other way round!
Throughout the novel nobody is shown to have an 
active mind and will. Even Brauxel-GoldmUndchen makes all 
his moves behind the scenes. Motives for action and behaviour 
disappear into objects. Jenny's appearance in the story is
supposed to be occasioned by a 'Schlagball'.52> TulJ.a's life 
is a story of obsessions with things! with Jenny's training- 
bag, later with having a child like a thing. This reification 
makes her incomprehensible as a person and that is why she is 
such a demonic figure. Matern's post-war trip of revenge is 
traced through the same sort of objectified metaphors. His 
visits are distinguished one from another only by the smells 
of people's houses. Objects substitute for psychological 
processes because the novel deliberately refuses to inter­
pret and explain:
Erinnerungen. Dabei sollte niemand versuchen, die 
Gedanken eines Tischlermeisters zu lesen, der einer 
leeren Hundehütte gegenüber zögert und den Schritt 
verhält. Mag sein, er denke zurück. Mag sein, er 
denkt an Holzpreise. Mag sein, er denkt an nients 
Bestimmtes, sondern verliert sich, seine Fehlfarbe 
rauchend, zwischen Erinnerungen und Holzpreisen.53)
Ultimately, this lack of a psycho-social dynamic 
robs the fictional social setting amongst the petit-bourgeoisie 
of any purpose. Hundejahre provides no opportunity to discover 
the constituents of the protagonists' experience, the why and 
the wherefore of their behaviour. This virtually robs these 
people's lives and the political life of their society of 
any historical intelligibility. We have instead an archetypal 
mode of feeling about violence, guilt and bad faith. In 
Die Blechtrommel the lack of a sense of history was particular 
to a class and a community, it was a symptom of their social 
ideology. But in Hundejahre the texture of history has become 
vaguely all-German, and it is not at all obvious why 'Klein­
bürger' should continue to appear as the protagonists of the 
eras depicted.
Örtlich betMubt
54)
The thoughts and actions of the characters in 
Ortllch betkubt are self-consciously political. Unlike the 
two novels discussed so far, the political and/or moral 
significance of their experiences and their behaviour is 
not a matter of what they make of their lives themselves 
but of how the narrator views them.
The past is refracted through his biography, and 
the main concern is how it is related to his present 
behaviour and through him to the other people he can in­
fluence. A sense of history has now become completely abstrac­
ted either from a particular class or a particular period.
It is attached only to the individual consciousness of the 
narrator.
It is a symptom of the abstraction from class and 
time that Starusch, the narrator, is the spokesman o* an 
absurdist view of history: for how couId it make sense 
without any referents?
Denn was, Dokter, und wieviel können wir aus der 
Geschichte lernen? Gut, zuqegeben: Ich war unfolg­
sam, hielt mich nicht an vermittelte Erfahrungen 
(...). Nichts können wir lernen. Es gibt keinen 
Fortschritt, allenfalls Spuren im Schnee.55>
However, as this view of history is attributed to an indivi­
dual mind, it is given no general or absolute status and so 
it need not lead to nihilistic attitudes:
Meine SchUler lächeln, sobald ich die Lehrbücher 
ln Zweifel ziehe: "Da ist aber kein Sinn, sondern 
nur organisiertes Chaos. - Warum lächeln Sie, 
Scherbaum?"
"Weil Sie trotzdem unterrichten und (...) trotzdem 
einen Sinn in der Geschichte suchen."56'
Political views are presented as a matter of how 
to make sense of history in personal terms and how to 
communicate ones individual experience:
"Sehen Sie, Philipp, im Grunde stellt sich immer 
wieder die Frage: können Erfahrungen vermittelt 
werden? Wir beschäftigen uns seit einiger Zeit mit 
der Französischen Revolution und ihren Auswirkungen. 
Wir sprachen Uber Pestalozzis Resignation und über 
das tragische Scheitern des Georg Förster in Mainz 
(...). Sie werden sich fragen, Philipp, was will er 
mit dieser Geschichte? (...) mir sollte es erlaubt 
sein, Ihre geplante Tat am historischen Beispiel
The individual^ perception is paramount in örtlich betäubt. 
The social basis of people's attitudes has disappeared 
since Die Blechtrommel. Instead ideas are exchanged from 
person to person. Starusch is bothered about how he can 
make Philipp Scherbaum personally respond to his stories. 
His affection for Scherbaum adds to the feeling of one 
individual trying to communicate with another. The teacher, 
the adolescent and the dentist are all presented (through 
the teacher's eyes) as having different ways of viewing 
the world. But they are all figures from a 'free-floating 
intelligentsia'and hence their attitudes are not placed 
within any picture of a section of society from which they 
have emerged andwithin which they could be understood and 
judged for themselves independently of the narrator's 
account of them. The reader is forced into dependence on
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Staruach. The subjectivity of hia view ia much more dominant 
than in Grass' earlier novels. This must be one of the rea­
sons why critics overhastily, but not entirely unsurprisingly, 
equated Starusch with Grass himself.
This is a novel of political inquiry. Between Sta­
rusch, Scherbaum and the dentist it inquires about how values 
and experiences can form the basis of purposeful political 
behaviour. In particular the adults talk about how the huma­
nism which inspires Scherbaum's present rejection of prevalent 
attitudes can be harnessed to reforms which he can partici­
pate ins "Da ihn die Welt schmerzt, geben wir uns Mühe, ihn 
örtlich zu betäuben."58* It is assumed that moral and political 
awareness can be selectively anaesthetised, unlike the total 
historical anaesthesia of Die Blechtrommel's petit-bourgeoisie. 
The answer which örtlich betäubt finds to the question it 
raises,is to make personal experience of the mistakes of the 
past on the part of the members of the generation who went 
through the Third Reich the criterion of how the younger ge­
neration should choose to act politically. The experience of 
someone like Starusch must be communicated to this younger 
generation. His personal problem is that he has trouble ad­
mitting to himself what his past has been, and keeps fanta­
sising different versions of it.
Apart from the narrator, none of the personae can 
offer an alternative basis from which to form judgements, 
so the various political postures which are shown are mani­
festly coloured with his prejudices. He gives people political
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labels all the time, and they are not characterised 
in any other way. The dentist is described as "ein bißchen 
fortschrittsglßubig"59*, and Irmgard Seifert lacks no detail 
of the stereotyped radical:
Noch vor zwei Jahren marschierte sie mit den Ost­
marschierern. Da in Westberlin dir DFÜ nicht zur 
Wahl steht, enthielt sie sich bei den regionalen 
Wahlen, aus Protest, der Stimme. Vor ihrer Klasse 
(...) berief sie sich gelegentlich auf Marx-Engels 
und verblüffte aufbegehrende Schüler mit scharfer 
Kritik an Ulbricht.60'
As a result, personalities are composed of political stereo­
types and political thinking is expressed as a series of 
self-confessions.
Critics are mistaken to criticise Scherbaum's plan 
to burn his dog on the grounds that it is a trivial device 
to represent extra-parliamentary protest and the opposition 
to the Vietnam War prevalent in the years depicted.®1  ^ This 
is taking the metaphor too literally, örtlich betäubt does 
not deal with the opposition on its own ground at all. It is 
not interested in the people who formed it but in what can 
be abstracted from the issue at a general level. Even if the 
tone is tongue in cheek, the basic material of the novel is 
world views, political ideologies, social philosophies in 
abstract terms. That is why the concrete social background is 
notable for its absence:
Sagen Sie, Dokter, was halten Sie eigentlich vom 
Räte-System?
Was uns fehlt, ist eine weltweite und sozial inte­
grierende KrankenfUrsorge. - (...)
Aber in welchem System soll Ihre internationale 
Fürsorge ...?
Sie soll anstelle aller bisherigen Systeme ...
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Aber ist Ihre Krankenfürsorge, die ich im Verhältnis 
zu meinem Entwurf einer weltweiten pädagogischen 
Provinz sehe, nicht auch ein System?
Die globale Krankenfürsorge ist, abseits jeder Ideo­
logie, Basis und überbau unserer menschlichen Ge­
sellschaft. 62)
One of the things which is supposed to be shown is 
the danger of such views becoming extremely dogmatic.63*
The dentist takes a positivist pragmatism to absurd lengths. 
In his scepticism of this technocratic view, Starusch is 
prone to violent and romantic revolutionary day-dreams. Irm­
gard Seifert is already a caricature of extremism. Scher- 
baum's humanist voluntarism is distorted into vulgar-Leninism 
in Vero lewand. But all these ideologies cannot be seen to 
be historically relative as coherent aspirations within a 
particular society, because they just float admidst the 
'BildungsbUrgertum', where all the characters in the book 
belong. And these characters are not social types, because 
they are not shown in a social textu: They are only
psychological types, like the sort of totalitarian personality 
Seifert represents.
The only relief there is to the narrator's monopoly 
of perception is through the reader being invited into the 
text through montage: "Denn schauen Sie, Scherbaum, die 
Gleichzeitigkeit einer Vielzahl von Tätigkeiten will beschrie­
ben werden."64* Instead of one set of events superceding 
another, past, present and future constantly interact.65* 
Between narrative devices like the dentist's promptings to 
distract his patient and the picture on the television screen
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into which Starusch projects his fantasies, the reader is 
invited into the mind of the narrator because the links are 
left entirely open.
The historical and political environment in which 
the characters operate is passed over in silence, in favour 
of how the main protagonist perceives the messages of that 
environment. The reader's knowledge of this background to 
the time of writing is presupposed if those messages are to 
be intelligible. Thus the reader has to meet the author's 
prejudices about the various types of ideology represented 
with his own preconceptions. Reading örtlich betäubt is con­
sequently a silent dialogue between the author's view of 
political ideas and one's own. We can thus call it a novel 
of ideas.
Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke66*
This semi-fictional diary makes this dialogue even 
more abstract than in örtlich betäubt. History has no socio­
logical content whatsoever here. Individual experience 
(which is now either Grass' or the surrogate for Grassian 
principles: Ott/Zweifel' s) is connected to the socially 
undifferentiated national past on the one hand, and the 
Social Democratic Party, its leadership past and present
on the other.
These are the two sources of authority in the 
text, and individual personalities are the pointers for 
them. One reason for the diary format is that the diary is 
a medium where people appear as personalities as perceived 
by the writer. So it is a medium in which Grass can illusLrate 
the two levels of authority which to him are politically 
decisive through any number of personalities he has known.
The way Brandt is treated is a case in point, the case par 
excellence in fact:
Jemand mit Hintergrund.
Jemand, der beim Aufstieg von Kehre zu Kehre 
Niederlagen gesammelt, verpackt und mitgeschleppt 
hat. (Doch selbst nach Siegen, die immer nur Teil­
siege waren, wollte er nicht abwerfen, Ballast 
verteilen). Sobald er Schritte macht, bewegt er 
Vergangenheit, seine, unsere: die nationalen 
Wackersteine.67'
The book is obviously first and foremost Grass' 
own story. His political attitudes appear on the very first 
page:
Liebe Kinder, heute haben sie Gustav Heinemann zum 
Präsidenten gewählt. (...) Doch wenn ich genau
rechne und jede Verzögerung (__) in mein Sudelbuch
schreibe, dann wurde dieser Tag zwanzig Jahre lang 
vorbereitet, auch wenn er, Gustav, Gustav, kaum 
ahnte, wofür man ihn garkochte und wie zäh in 
Deutschland nicht nur das Rindfleisch ist.
Thus Grass' own view of history, progress and poli­
tical principle informs the whole book. Because it is an auto­
biographical voice, the authorial voice claims an interpreta­
tive authority quite missing in the previous novels. It is a 
nymptom of this authority that unashamed psychologistic 
stereotyping sits alongside affectionate portraits of politi­
cal friends and colleagues. Augst is an example of this kind
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of dérision:
Ich kannte die Aufgeregtheit fünfzigjähriger Männer, 
die alles, aber auch alles, in einem einzigen, rand­
vollen Bekenntnis loswerden, quittmachen wollen. Ich 
kannte ihre leeren, Werte beschwörenden Gesten, 
ihren Kriegsbilderbuchtraum, als Einzelkämpfer (...) 
auf verlorenem Posten zu stehen (...). Auch kannte 
ich, da beide alterslos sind, den jungen Augst, 
bevor der ältere zu sprechen begann. Beide sind Zeu­
gen des Absoluten. Beide sind süchtig nach Untergang 
und Erlösung.69)
or again as a generalisation:
Jemand ist streng katholisch erzogen worden, hat, 
noch während des Studiums, den Glauben, aber nicht 
das Bedürfnis nach Religion abgelegt, ist längere 
Zeit erfolgreich ironischer Freidenker, wird (sei­
ner Ironie überdrüssig), wider besseres Wissen 
Kommunist, beträgt sich neuerdings wieder gläubig, 
wie er erzogen wurde. (Jemand, parallel, konver­
tiert vom Kommunismus zum Katholizismus: nichts 
leichter als das.)'®)
Personalities and their behaviour here are illustra­
tions, either by example or by default according to Grass' 
views, of that sociologically bland kind of history which 
emerged from the murkiness of Hundeiahre into örtlich betäubt. 
This process of abstraction ends here in Grass' 
philosophising, whose concepts are derived from a view of an 
undifferentiated collective national experience:
Denn manchmal, Kinder, beim Essen, oder wenn das 
Fernsehen ein Wort (über Biafra) abwirft, höre ich 
Franz oder Raoul nach den Juden fragen:"Was war denn 
los mit denen?"
Ihr merkt, daß ich stocke, sobald ich verkürze. Ich 
finde das Nadelöhr nicht und beginne zu plaudern: 
Weil das und zuvor das, während gleichzeitig das, 
nachdem noch das ...
Schneller, als sie nachwachsen, versuche ich Fak­
tenwälder zu lichten. Löcher ins Eis zu schlagen 
und offen zu halten. Den Riß nicht vernähen. Keine 
Sprünge dulden, mit deren Hilfe die Geschichte, 
ein schneckbewohntes Gelände, leichthin verlassen 
werden soll ...71)
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The book is testimony to Grass' own political 
determination not to have this snail's,pace evolutionist 
image of history abused. This is why it is about himselfs 
"Weil immer noch unbestimmt, werde ich langsam zum Schnek- 
kenprinzip"72*, because he believes you can only have a 
valid sense of the course of history by inserting yourself 
into its
Nur wer den Stillstand im Fortschritt kennt und 
achtet, wer schon einmal, wer mehrmals aufgegeben 
hat, wer auf dem leeren Schneckenhaus gesessen und 
die Schattenseite der Utopie bewohnt hat, kann den 
Fortschritt ermessen.73'
History is a stream of experiences which in itself has no 
purpose and only acquires one when individuals make choices 
and put their experiences to use according to these choices. 
The distinction between fact and fiction almost becomes 
irrelevant as a result. Hence the semi-fictional nature 
of the diary and the semi-biographical nature of the fiction 
around Ott/Zweifel testify to this haziness:
Auch wenn ich ihn erfinden muß, es hat ihn gegeben. 
(Eine Geschichte, die mir Ranicki als seine Ge­
schichte vor Jahren erzählt hat, blieb bei mir lie­
gen und lebte behutsam für sich; geduldig besteht 
sie auf einem gesuchten Namen, auf gesichertem Her­
kommen, auf einem Keller für spätere Zuflucht.)74'
In his diary Grass describes himself collecting data 
about the Danzig Jews and the survivors in Israel to fill in 
the Ott ptory. His interest in following them up is not to 
document the history of a group of German Jews as represen - 
tatives of their people under the Nazis and after the war.
What he does is reproduce a set of facts which are pretty
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unintelligible on their own and which he makes sense of for 
the purposes of his book by inserting the fictional character 
Ott into their midst. This gives an oblique reminiscence of 
the history of the Jewish community in Danzig. It breaks up 
its community-reality and illuminates the fate of people 
persecuted by the Nazis through the one individual rather 
than the group, an individual who suffers for his radical 
scepticism rather than his ethnic identity. Basically Grass 
is more interested in Ott than in the Jews, perhaps because 
he feels he must always remain an outsider to their sufferings 
However, the result is that again we are looking at one 
rootless individual rather than a socially coherent group.
Within the diary format Grass does not reflect on 
the effectiveness of what he was doing in his campaigns. He 
just describes incidents from them in the light of his 
conceptions of moderate Social Democracy, expressed in the 
metaphors of the snail, of grey tones etc. At one point he 
laconically indicates the response he got to his speech at 
the SPD party conference,75* but he does not then tell us 
what significance, if any, he attaches to this. Grass 
highlights his descriptions with personality-sketches of 
persons he has known, cherished or respected in the course 
of his political work. The identity of the persons behind 
these character-portraits is often not explicit in the 
text, 76*and the background to episodes he relates is 
often not clear77*. Thus factual details are less important 
to the picture he conveys of his political activities than
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the general principles which can be abstracted from them, 
just like in örtlich betäubt. When he refers to the SPD's 
decision to use the colour orange for its publicity because 
the traditional red was deemed to be too radical, his own 
attitudes to this commercial approach to what alioujd 
be a political decision-making process remain inscrutable.
He covers over the paraphenalia with a metaphor for his own 
general principles:
Doch Zweifel, dessen Meinung und Kellererfahrung 
zumindest beiseite gesprochen, Wert hat, ließ mir 
(Uber Gaus) die gezwinkerte Nachricht zukommen: im 
Grunde ist auch Orange nur ein Deckname für Grau. '
The sense and the spirit of Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke 
is entirely congruent with Grass' own political philosophy 
and he can be taken as his own subject in this book. The 
nature and basis of political attitudes and actions in class 
and community have completely disappeared. Instead the ideo­
logical colour of the text can be justly identified with its 
author.
Within Grass' own political philosophy history is 
a repetitive rather than progressive dimension to the choices 
people make about their lives, their ideas and their in­
terests. I shall show this in chapter four.
Meanwhile, we can see that it is a notion which is at the 
least latent in all his novels, but it only raises its head 
directly and authoritatively in this political and quasi- 
philosophical, semi-fictive diary. In the first novel a 
repetitive historical perspective was a characteristic of 
Oskar's. His place in the structure of the book meant that
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it had no absolute authority as the model for Interpreting 
the story. Die Blechtrommel had a class-based and petit- 
bourgeois sense of politics in half a century of German 
history. Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke has an individualist 
and bourgeois one. Hundejahns und örtlich betäubt marked stages 
between these two poles in Grass' novels.79*
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRASS' POLITICAL IDEAS
The tenor of the times
In this chapter I shall show how the most crucial factors 
which affected Grass' political thinking were the 'Grand 
Coalition' government between the CDU/CSU formed in late 1966 
the student movement of the following two years and the pro­
blems of the new coalition between the SPD and the FDP which 
was first elected in 1969. They were the major political sign 
posts of the second half of the sixties. This period saw the 
demise of CDU government and acute strains on political con­
sensus in the Federal Republic after the heavily conservative 
climate of the previous one and a half decades. One way in 
which these strains made themselves felt around the middle 
of the decade was in a crisis of political leadership in the 
ruling Christian Democratic Union.
The most obvious political characteristics of the 
CDU era had been anti-communism, the patriarchal charisma of 
Adenauer and Erhard, clerical reaction and the supposedly 
hallowed principles of the market economy which had served 
the period of economic recovery and expansion since the war. 
By the mid-sixties this mixture could no longer cope with 
approaching recession. There was a crisis of the state's 
management of the economy and of social institutions.
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Jürger. Dittberner describes the CDU's problems and their 
effects as follows:
Politisch offenbar wurden die inneren Widersprüche 
der Bundesrepublik in der Zeit von 1961 bis 1969, 
die hier Krisenphasen genannt wird. Sowohl im poli­
tischen als aucn im ökonomischen Bereich genügten 
die alten Methoden nicht mehr, um die Perpetuierung 
des Systems sicherzustellen. Der Staat war nach der 
Bundestagswahl von 1961 und der folgenden bis 1963 
zeitlich begrenzten Kanzlerschaft Konrad Adenauers 
sowie während der Kanzlerschaft Ludwig Erhards (1963 
bis 1966) und Kurt Georg Kiesingers (1966 bis 1969) 
in eine permanente Führungskrise geraten, was sich 
u.a. in Vorgängen wie der "Spiegel-Affäre" und der 
studentischen Protestbewegung niederschlug. Im 
ökonomischen Bereich wurden die Schwierigkeiten 
evident nicht nur infolge der sich aus der wissen­
schaftlich-technischen Revolution ergebenden Pro­
bleme ("Bildungsnotstand"), sondern unter anderem 
auch aufgrund des seit 1958 sinkenden Wirtschafts­
wachstums und der strukturellen Schwierigkeiten vor 
allem in der Energiewirtschaft ("Kohlenkrise").
In dieser Situation erlebte die Bundesrepublik ihre 
erste spürbare Rezession in den Jahren 1966 und 1967, 
in deren Folge die Gefahr einer Stärkung des Rechts­
radikalismus real wurde.
Die politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Krisen 
der 60er Jahre wirkten sich im Parteiensystem dahin­
gehend aus, daß die Regierungsparteien CDU und CSU 
Prestige und Selbstvertrauen verloren, während die 
Oppositionspartei SPD an Terrain gewann und die FDP 
sich von einer mehr national-liberalen zu einer mehr 
sozial-liberalen Partei wandelte.1'
In 1965 Erhard made an attempt to rethink the role 
of government. He proposed a model of a society which he 
said would be one which: "nicht mehr aus Klassen und Gruppen 
besteht, die einander ausschließende Ziele durchsetzen wollen, 
sondern (...) fernab aller ständestaatlichen Vorstellungen 
ihrem Wesen nach kooperativ ist."2* But many people who 
opposed Erhard thought that the detalIs of this picture 
sounded as corporatist as its appellation - "eine formierte 
Gesellschaft" - implied. This slide away from pluralist ideas
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about democracy radicalised much liberal opinion at the 
time against the Christian Democrat government and its 
leader. Grass criticised it vehemently in his first campaign 
for the SPD in 1965. One of his speeches "Ich klage an"3* 
illustrates how his position took shape within the context 
of this rupture in styles of government. It is designed to 
mobilise liberal opionions against the Christian Democrats' 
record towards the democratic values the SPD stood for.
The SPD claimed a special commitment to democracy. When Willy 
Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, his catch-phrase was "Wir 
wollen mehr Demokratie wagen".
Erhard's clumsiness was a sign that the CDU had 
arrived at an 'ideological block which rendered it incapable 
of producing a suitable policy to steer the economy away from 
imminent recession4*. Such a policy was what the SPD brought 
to the Coalition government5* following a rupture between the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP over the tax requirements for the 1967 
budget. They could not agree on whether or how far to go with 
deficit financing of state spending to invigorate the ailing 
economy. The pact between the CDU and the SPD accentuated 
the militancy of the student movement in West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic. This movement was growing the while in 
response to various problems. Chief amongst them were the 
death of a student during demonstrations in West Berlin in 
1967 against the visiting Shah of Persia, the war in Vietnam 
and the state's extension of its control in the field of 
higher education, with its attempts to rationalise courses
and teaching structure. The moral Issues combined with the 
threatened restraints on their autonomy in their studies, 
politicised the students at a time when the political tempo 
overall was gathering new pace, which was to bring the 
change over to Social Democratic government and its inter­
ventionist management of the economy.
As a result of the CDU's political deficit and of 
the hand the SPD had in the readjustment of government poli­
cies, impulses for new, or renewed, political ideas were re­
leased. Grass' most important political work was done in this 
climate. His attitudes were jolted beyond the constitutional 
priorities he held at the outset of his political interests 
in the early sixties. The radical stimuli from the student 
movement on the one hand and the political decisions made by 
the SPD on the other,between them made him more intellectually 
concerned with the traditions and aims of Social Democracy.
He invariably used negative contrasts in the first 
instance to endorse the Social Democrats. It is clear from 
this that he evolved his political ideas by negotiating 
successive malaises in his society as and when he was obliged 
to come to terms with them, rather than deriving his views from 
any theoretical understanding. He saw Social Democracy as the 
alternative to successive groups of twin-evils: the "Kra 
Ulbrich/Adenauer", then the radical left in the student move­
ment and the extreme right, and finally to Capitalism and 
Communism.6^
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What Social Democracy represented itself remained unclear 
for a long time.
Although the Sozialdemokratische WählerInitiative 
(SW1) which Grass brought into being was something new, a 
new kind of support for a political party, it too tended to 
present its case for voting SPD only in terms of various 
reasons for rejecting the contenders. Virtually all the 
articles in the two magazines the SWI published for the 1969 
Federal election argue simply for a change of government 
rather than for particular policies.7* The positive tones 
amongst this propaganda are almost entirely limited to a few 
essays in appreciation of a number of leading SPD politicians. 
So the SWI's approach is another example of how Grass' 
political views and attitudes developed in a very direct 
sense according to the dictates of the times and the issues 
which arose therein. It is important that the period which 
moulded the man's politics was overall one of strain and tension, 
the symptoms of a transition towards a period of reform 
politics under the Brandt government in the early seventies. 
For, at least in a general sense, the turbulence of these 
years explains why Grass became so very political at all, 
so energetically active for the SPD and for various other 
causes he supported. Not having started out in the socialist 
movement, he acquired the social democratic convictions he 
now holds from the resurgence of socialist ideas of the 
sixties. I shall now sketch what those convictions are und 
where he got them from.
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The supremacy of parliamentary democracy
It was not any prospect of a socialist society 
which made Grass support the SPD when he first did so with 
colleagues in 1961?*His open letter to Anna Seghers in that 
year9*, in which he exhorted her to say something publicly 
about the Berlin Wall, spoke of Socialism and Communism 
being dreams he respected but did not share.Four years 
later when he campaigned for the SPD himself, his reasons 
for doing sc became clearer, and they were to do with par­
liamentary democracy and not with socialism. His foremost 
argument was to criticise the CDU-led governments of the 
last decade and a half for having abused the rights and 
freedoms which were formally guaranteed in the Federal 
Republic's Basic Law. He thought that constitutional rights 
were the most important things to be defended in a democracy10* 
and that improving social welfare was just a matter of legis­
lation. He did not think it was up to him to make any 
proposals about social and economic programmes,and entrusted 
that job to the SPD politicians.11* It is clear that so far he 
was more interested in the methods and means of politics 
than with policy objectives. He supported the Social Demo­
crats for their gradualist methods12* and said little about 
their ends.
Grass was not out just to raise support for the 
SPD. He proclaimed rather grandly that the choice which 
the people would make in the election would not be only for 
the short term but would be crucial to the whole future of
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democracy in West Germany. In his speeches he used the 
phrase 'Wir haben die Wahl' in a dual and mutually reflexive 
sense. It referred straightforwardly to the forthcoming 
election but it also had larger dimensions. It was not just 
an election but also a choice facing West Germans between 
an entrenchment of undemocratic practices if the government 
remained unchanged, or a new lease of life for the values 
and constitutional principles of parliamentary democracy 
under the SPD:
Wer sich aller Kritik enthoben sieht und wie unser 
Bundeskanzler rasch bei der Hand ist mit plattem 
Schimpfwort und altvertrauten Obrigkeitsallüren, 
dem sei gesagt, daß -laut Grundgesetz- die Bürger 
der Souverän unserer parlamentarischen Demokratie 
sind. Wäre es anders, es müßte der Rechtsstaat 
verkümmern. Wird es anders, dann darf der Tolizei- 
staat wieder einmal seine engen Reviere abstecken. 
Wehret den Anfängen. Wir haben die Wahl."'
So thus far Grass had shown no interest in the 
particular traditions of German Social Democracy. Instead 
he had seen the SPD's traditions entirely in the light of 
liberal democracy:
Die SPD mit ihrem Reformwillen und ihrer demokrati­
schen Tradition fußt auf Vernunft und Aufklärung.
(...) mit ihrer erprobten Verfassungstreue haben 
die Sozialdemokraten mehrmals die Weimarer Republik 
gerettet.14)
The motto he had chosen for this campaign was "Dich singe 
ich Demokratie"1 »deliberately ä la Whitman, and he celebrated 
the virtues of the SPD in the context of expounding the 
values and principles of parliamentary democracy, regard­
less of its social content.
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Reaction to the Grand Coalition
Grass' response to the Grand Coalition marks a 
change from the essentially liberal basis of his original 
allegiance to the Social Democrats. In his correspondence 
with Willy Brandt erf this matter he defended a concept of 
Social Democracy as something greater than what ever the 
SPD presently might decide to do. In the name of Social 
Democracy with capital letters, he upheld the principles 
of a tradition which went beyond the parliamentary priori­
ties which had apparently been his own and the SPD's up to 
that time. But now he derided the way the SPD leadership 
had interpreted those priorities to get a foothold in 
government, and called the decision to enter a coalition with 
the CDU cowtowing to the "Fallgesetze der Taktik"16 .^ The 
SPD had betrayed its electoral mandate by deserting from the 
opposition in parliament, which had now been reduced to a 
handful of FDP members. Faced with this distortion of parlia­
ment's representative function and the SPD's responsibility 
for this situation, Grass could no longer equate the SPD 
with the democratic values enshrined in the constitution. 
Consequently he had to reexamine either his faith in the SPD 
or his own unqualified faith in parliamentary democracy.
In the course of time he did both.
He began with the former. He redefined Social 
Democracy for himself and for Brandt as a body of principles 
whose logic could not be expropriated by any one leader be­
cause it was built into the whole history and tradition of
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"die Partei eine* August Bebels".17*He did not describe how 
this differed from the SPD leadership's view. When Brandt 
warned him that "Das Gewissen der Sozialdemokratischen Par­
tei schlagt nicht außerhalb dieser Partei" he could only 
counter negatively and say that whatever Social Democracy 
stands for, it is not homogenous and Herbert Wehner's design 
betrayed its pluralism. He was no more precise than this.
The dilemma about what Social Democracy was if it had com­
promised the spirit of parliamentary democracy as the SPD 
had done, could not be clarified as long as Grass thought 
that democracy itself was in crisis. In an open letter to 
Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia, in 1967, he said that 
democracy was crumbling world wide and in the West was corrup­
ted by opportunism. But he said nothing about whose interests 
this "bloße Interessenhörigkeit"18*served, or about what kind 
of democracy could better fulfill the political will and 
social interests of the people. Later he was to have some 
clearer ideas about this. In 1966/67 his original faith that 
justice and freedom were guaranteed by the SPD on the one 
hand and the Basic Law on the other had been shaken, but he 
had nothing yet to put in its place.
He gradually found something in the course of his 
own political work and his disagreements with the student 
movement. Within two years this experience had reconciled him 
to the SPD's record within the Grand Coalition. This was 
partly because of the policies that the Cabinet had intro­
duced, particularly economic policies which appeared to cure 
the recession. But it seems that the main reason was his
objection to the radicalism of the Extra-Parliamentary Oppo­
sition of the day. By autumn 1968 he was still criticising 
the Grand Coalition but his greatest virulence was directed 
at the students:
Denn ziemlich allein gelassen, zermürbt sich die 
SPD an den Folgen ihrer Entscheidung vom Dezember 
1966 (...).
Doch wer meint, links von der SPD zu stehen, und 
wer glaubt, nun Anlaß zur Schadenfreude zu finden, 
der möge sich bewußt sein, daß mit dem Abgesang 
dieser großen demokratischen Partei auch und wieder 
einmal der Abgesang der Demokratie in Deutschland 
angestimmt werden könnte.19)
So he came to the conclusion that to rescue democracy, one 
would have to rescue the reputation of the SPD even if it 
meant putting up with the coalition it was in:
Wenn mich vor zwei Jahren der Abschluß der Großen 
Koalition ernsthaft und grundsätzlich an der SPD 
zweifeln ließ, der Generalangriff der links- und 
rechtsextremen Flügel auf diese Partei hat mich 
darin bestärkt, weiterhin als Sozialdemokrat den 
langsamen und permanent von Rückschlägen gezeich­
neten Weg der Reform zu wählen.20)
This was still rather defensive. Before long he was 
supporting the SPD's position positively, on the grounds 
that its actions in government were helping to break down 
conservatism and to foster democratic attitudes as he said 
during the 1969 election campaign:
Die Bürger der Bundesrepublik beginnen mündig zu 
werden und auf demokratische Weise erwachsen. 
Allzu lange war die Politik hierzulande auf den 
Slogan der CDU "Keine Experimente" gestellt. Seit 
drei Jahren haben die Sozialdemokraten begonnen, 
ihre Reformpolitik gegen den lähmenden und kri­
senfördernden Stillstand zu setzen.21)
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Being a man of initial liberal priorities. Grass had reacted 
to the severely compromised parliamentary situation on the 
one hand and the radical anti-parliamentary opposition on 
the other by criticising virtually all the important political 
forces of the day to a greater or lesser extent. This was a 
futile experience and as the prospect of a resolution drew 
near with the approaching federal election in 1969, he put 
his faith in a change of government, which is one reason why 
he concentrated so much of his political energies into that 
campaign.
However, by the time of the actual change of 
government, he could not just breathe a sigh of relief and 
rest content on his laurels again. For in the meantime he 
had been faced with the student movement's radical politics 
and its challenge to liberal democracy, which in 1965 he
could afford to deride as just so much elitist intellec- 
22)tualism . This political confrontation, which was a con­
frontation of ideas as well as actions (even if Grass despised 
the action the students took) meant that he had to think 
about the long-term purpose and potential of social-demo­
cratic government. It had to promise more than a resolution 
to this latter period of parliamentary stagnation and extra- 
parliamentary polarisation.
Grass' own political disposition brought him face 
to face with the extra-parliamentary campaigns. He supported 
their right to freedom of speech and assembly, and when
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things in his view got out of hand, he felt continually 
behoven to take the student movement to task in defence of 
both the parliamentary democracy which he supported himself, 
and of the reformist perspective which he thought ought to 
inform their criticism of West German society and their 
activities23*. Thus his own opposition to their politics 
brought him up against the revolutionary traditions which 
the student movement reclaimed. This exchange of rhetoric 
influenced his view of what social-democratic politics stood 
for and what they should be. For the match between the Social 
Democrats and the meaning of democracy which he had cherished 
in 1965 to be remade in 1969, democracy had to be conceived 
in greater depth than it had been before. Liberal democracy 
had come under fire under the influence of the student 
movement. And from the trade union's policies too, Grass 
learnt that democracy could not be left as political demo­
cracy, but ought to involve social and industrial democracy 
as well.
Defence of Social Reformism
Roughly speaking Grass defended the gradualism of 
reform politics against ideas of revolutionary change before 
he ever gave the public any account of what racial reforms 
could or should achieve. This chronology is not surprising 
considering that his earliest political statements said little 
or nothing about social objectives either. His altercations
wlth the student left Introduced a lot of socialist terms 
and names into his political vocabulary. On various occasions, 
for instance, he sketchily defended Marx against Lenin, 
whom he saw as a fiendish traitor (so his polemics often 
implied) to what was worthwhile in Marxism.24* He damned 
Lenin's politics in the name of Rosa Luxemburg25*, but as he 
did not elaborate on the issues they had disagreed about, 
these names served little more than polemic. At the same 
time, this polemic was part of his response to the student 
left. He took up their own points of reference to criticise 
them, whilst this criticism was also an introduction to 
the history of Marxism and the traditions of Socialism for 
himself. He ultimately saw his own political ideas in the 
light of the historical split in the socialist movement 
between Communists and Social Democrats, between Revolution 
and Reformism.
The reasons Grass gave in the late sixties and 
around the turn of the decade for rejecting revolutionary 
change were partly ethical, partly historical and partly 
psychological, welded together into a combination which led 
to inescapable disaster - the "Mechanismus der Revolution"26*. 
Ethically he had a horror of revolutions for what he sees 
as their inevitably consequential terror.27* He is convinced 
that this is inevitable from the history of the French and 
Russian Revolutions and the dictatorships which arose after 
them.“8* He also talked about a psychological dynamic in 
violent politics, identically pathological whether associated 
with the right or the left:
-8 3 -
Dabei ließe sich leicht beweisen, daß ohne die mo­
natelange Hetze mehrerer Springer-Zeitungen der 
Dutschke-Attcntäter, Josef Bachmann, kaum ein Ziel 
für seine latente Aggressivität gefunden hatte; 
dabei ließe sich leicht beweisen, daß es ohne die 
Gewaltaufrufe des SDS (...) kaum zu den Frankfurter 
Kurzschlußtaten gekommen wäre.
Es handelt sich in beiden Fällen um irrationale Ge­
walttaten. Bachmann ist ein Psychopath: die Kauf­
hausbrandstifter in Frankfurt sind exaltierte Neu­
rotiker . 29)
Grass was an angry man in these times and he thought that 
the far left was no better than the far right, because its 
actions polarised and poisoned the climate in which suppor­
ters of gradual reform wanted to work.30^In 1968 he derided:
die Gratisproklamation der Revolution in einem 
Land ohne revolutionäre Basis, ohne revolutio­
näre Vergangenheit und Tradition inmitten einer 
Gesellschaft, die mehrheitlich konservativ denkt 
und wählt ... ^ •)
The only people to benefit from revolutionary movements in 
his view were conservatives. The victims were the reformists. 
This is why his main argument for gradualism was his oppo­
sition to revolution. How far parliamentary gradualism can 
change society has always been a secondary question to him.
He sometimes said that Britain and Sweden showed what could 
32)be done through degrees of socialism. There were no other 
precedents available. West Germany's first experience of 
a programme of reforms was to be the Social-Liberal government 
under Brandt. Until that government had been in office a few 
years there were few examples which could help Grass substanti­
ate his ideas;he had to insist that reforms should be made to wor 
It is characteristic of the Idealism of Grass' 
politics that he used the term 'democratic socialist' for
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at least four societies whose socialist common denominator 
is far from obvious:Britain, Sweden, Czechoslovakia in its 
six months of freedom in 1968,and potentially the Federal 
Republic. This must mean that he is not talking about the 
structure of the economy at all. Democratic socialism must 
describe the general tenor or direction of a society. He 
foresaw no limitations to reforms and what they could achieve 
towards a better society, because the tasks of the democratic 
socialism he has in mind vary from country to country and 
are not trapped in the mechanical logic of revolutions, which, 
he has implied,is universally homogenous and of iron 
necessity, however varied the conditions of revolutionary 
societies. He certainly judged with two sets of standards 
here.
So in his opposition to revolutionary methods Grass 
did not at first get as far as defining the content of social 
democratic politics, any more than he had done when he had 
opposed the methods of the Christian Democrat governments.
In the course of berating the students for the revolutionary 
theories they proclaimed, he took sides himself on the great 
split in the Marxist tradition. His intellectual advocate for 
the reform-politics he supported was Eduard Bernstein. He 
considered that his own views were faithful to the spirit 
and principles of the theoretical Revisionism which is linked 
to Bernstein's name. He took up from Bernstein what appears to 
be a theoretical premise that social formations require
constant revision:
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- Ich bin ein Revisionist. Dieses folgenreiche 
und n«ch Säuberung schreiende Schimpfwort trifft 
mich nicht. Keine Gesellschaftsform, die nicht 
der unablässigen Revision bedurfte. Keine Reform 
ohne Revision des Bestehenden. 3'
In Grass' hands this premise was less theory than a maxim 
for practice, for supporting and working through the 
existing social system and its institutions:
Wir leben in einer nur unzulänglich von Reformen 
bewegten, insgesamt mittelmäßigen parlamentarischen 
Demokratie. Ihre Fehler liegen offen zutage. Man 
muß nur hinlangen, hindeuten, und schon reagiert 
sie, entweder hilflos oder polizeistaatlich, ins­
gesamt unsicher und für den, der genau hinhört, 
oft auch einsichtig und vernünftig.34'
We can see a reason for Grass making this link with a 
theoretical tradition in his need to come terms at this 
time with the SPD's position in the Grand Coalition without 
abandoning his critical stance. In the name of Revisionism 
he could accept the existing state of affairs even when as 
deformed as this, because the maxim that societies always 
need reforming meant that his acquiescence was only relative. 
Thus »apparently paradoxically, he appeared to move away 
from the left into a closer alignment with the SPD leadership 
at the same time as he adopted a theoretical view which 
would later allow him to criticise his society more substan­
tially? more substantially in fact than he had done in his 
original objections to the Grand Coalition, when he had 
appeared to be a natural ally of the emerging radical left. 
Armed with the principles of Revisionism Grass could justify 
his more benign attitude to the government against the 
critique of the student left and of other writers and
intellectuals.
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Thus his political premises and attitudes were 
modified, but they did not move intellectually beyond the 
common re-shuffle of views which was going on at this time. 
He readjusted his attitudes along with the trend to the left 
in this brief heyday of socialist ideas. The sort of refer­
ences he made to Lenin, Luxemburg and Marx when stating 
his positions, his stand for reforms against revolution, hin 
alignment with Revisionism and Democracic Socialism made up 
his individual blend of political ideology. But that blend 
was drawn from the pool of available ideas which were re­
leased, or re-released ,in the ideological and social tur­
bulence of those years between the middle and the end of the 
decade.
The particular concepts he took up were his cudgels 
against the far left who appeared to be menacing the s'p d 's 
road to power. But when the SPD did get into power in 1969, 
those ideological weapons turned into his tools of analysis 
for assessing the new government's performance critically. 
For once Grass had articulated his revisionist position, 
its own logic presupposed a critical view of the social 
order and of the aims of Social Democracy. So he was able 
to endorse the SPD's record over a hundred years .including 
the Grand Coalition,in the name of ever greater degrees 
of social reform35*, whilst he preserved a seat for himself 
on the leftish wing with a more radical view of social- 
democratic objectives in the long term.
The Reform-Government and Democratic Socialism
The centre of Grass' ideas on democratic socialism 
is power-sharings Mitbestimmung. He was keen to see existing 
legislation on workers' co-determination extended, so that, 
for instance, participation in management decisions would 
include pricing and profits.36* In his view Mitbestimmung 
was the cornerstone of socialism if it were extended hori­
zontally in a radical farhion. Power-sharing as envisaged in 
industry could only be effective if people participated 
in decision-making in all areas of social life, in education, 
in legal institutions and so on:
nur als eine Gesamtform in allen Bereichen der Ge­
sellschaft wird (die Mitbestimmung) sich -in den 
Schulen und Universitäten, am Arbeitsplatz wie im 
Rechtswesen- verwirklichen lassen.’»)
Without this parliamentary democracy is only formal demo­
cracy, "der nur formal-demokratische westliche Kapitalismus"38* 
a counterpart of Communism, for under both systems the state 
holdsfway beyond genuine popular control. He spoke of "der 
formalistische Leerlauf der Staatsapparate beider Gesell-
3 9)schaftssysteme .
Grass has no view of a final design of society 
which is to be worked towards. The details of how democratic 
socialism is to function must be established through trial 
and error. The propositions he made as a propagandist and a 
political intellectual were throughout the years of his active 
commitment to the Social Democrats for the most part of the 
most general kind:
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Veränderungen werden durch Veränderungen möglich 
und lösen Veränderungen aus, die abermals Verän­
derungen ermöglichen. Deshalb wird jede Reform, 
die sich isoliert versteht, am Mangel an Einsicht 
in ihre eigenen Konsequenzen scheitern. (...) Da 
sich die SPD ihren Wählern oft nur ungenau und 
ihrem Selbstverständnis widerspruchsvoll darstellt, 
soll die Partei die Grundlage der Sozialdemokratie 
immer wieder überdenken und ihre langfristigen 
Reformaufgaben konkret formulieren.40»
He is essentially a mentor of German political life, and he 
only made statements about specific problems and proposals 
when they had already been raised by other people. The mentor 
position defined the limit of his political thinking. He 
arrived at his idea of democratic socialism after at least 
five years (i.e. from the end of 1966 to 1972) of declaring 
his allegiance to Social Democracy as a political method and 
tradition and to Revisionism as a theory, whilst only latter­
ly addressing himself to definite policies. He built upon 
his party-political affili ations with ideas from a number 
of external sources.
In the first place, his own public image since 
his campaign in 1965 encouraged him to raise the banner of 
Social Democracy around 1967 to 1969 in order to distinguish 
himself from both the Grand Coalition and from the extra- 
parliamentary opposition. This banner gave him a kind of 
historical respectaUlity. It allowed him to define himself 
against the right and the left and gave him a bulwark against 
the arguments of the left, which the virtually pure consti­
tutionalist position he held before 1967 could not have 
done. After the SPD took office in 1969 he began to talk
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about some kind of a long term social-democratic programme. 
Here he took up co-determination from the trade unionB and 
from the SPD's own legislative intent. His ideas for ex­
tending it to a range of social spheres and his belief that 
it could represent a qualitative change of power were basi­
cally the ideas of the Young Socialists in the SPD. The
very fact that the SPD had got into power, particularly after 
41)
1972 when the SPD-FDP's Ostpolltik had a secure future, was 
a spur for him to find to a forward-looking view of why he 
supported that government for more than the fresh air it 
brought with it after twenty years of Christian-Democrat 
government.
Having originally seen Social Democracy as a purer 
kind of democracy. Grass first began to think about it as a 
kind of Socialism when the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 
showed him that if a state with a socialist economy could 
be politically democratised, socialist reforms should be 
made in a parliamentary democracy with a Capitalist economy:
Für mich als Sozialdemokraten bedeutet das: im 
gleichen Maß, wie sich der Sozialismus seinen 
Geschwistern aus Zeiten europäischer Aufklärung, 
nämlich den demokratischen Grundrechen, zu nähern 
versuchte, sollte sich die Sozialdemokratie vom 
kurzsichtigen Konsumdenken lösen und einen Sozia­
lismus der siebziger Jahre entwerfen, in dem durch 
qualifizierte Mitbestimmung und Mitverantwortung 
die Kontrolle der Macht- und Produktionsmittel auf 
demokratische Weise gesucht wird.42)
Co-determination was thus in his view the key area of reform 
for a modern socialist strategy. This was not a very ambitious 
vision of democratic socialism. Mitbestimmung was an issue
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which was revived ■ on all sides at this time. The govern­
ment's economic planning required the cooperation of the 
trade unions to control wage Increases and to have reason­
ably reliable expectations of what they would be in order 
to be able to project how the economy would develop. The 
German Trade Union Federation (DGB) was willing to cooperate 
if it was promised legislation to improve and extend in­
dustrial co-determination. That is the main reason why 
there was such a lively interest in the subject of partici­
pation. In March 1968 the DGB published its own model le­
gislation to cover the biggest companies. The CDU's labour­
wing (the Sozialausschüsse) also produced proposals in May. 
And in December, the SPD published a draft bill with a view 
to the elections which were due the following year (Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes über die Unternehmensverfassung in Großunter­
nehmen und Konzernen).
After the SPD-FDP coalition won that election, it 
showed little sign of advancing towards socialism. The 
halting progress it made to fulfil its election promises 
about participation in particular made Grass disillusioned 
with piecemeal reform for its own sake, and he began to 
think that reforms needed some kind of theoretical struc­
ture.43  ^ He criticised the way that the government's prag­
matism depoliticised the principles of Social Democracy.
Now that the SPD was in power, it needed to rethink how it 
should act upon those principles. Its current programme, 
the Godesberg Programme»which had been adopted in 1959, no 
longer met this requirement. The SPD as a whole felt this
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was the caee and the leadership needed something which would 
help alleviate the strains between the government and the 
party membership. As a result, years were spent discussing
two versions of an extension to Godesberg. In 1975 the party 
conference finally resolved upon an Orientierungsmaflnahmen
Grass entered this debate about programme-planning. 
He saw that it was imperative to structure a programme of 
reforms and to clarify their aims. The task would then be to 
make it carry popular support:
Ich habe in meinem Beitrag in Saarbrücken darauf 
hingewiesen, daß die einzelnen Reformen in ihrem 
Zusammenhang dargestellt und auch von der Planung 
her als eine Einheit begriffen werden müssen. (...) 
Wenn ich dabei davon ausgehe, daß natürlich für 
das Gesamtmosaik, d.h. für Umweltschutz, Mitbe­
stimmung, Vermögensbildung, Realisierung des großen 
Schulkonzepts der integrierten Gesamt- und Hoch­
schule, Wohnungsbau, Gesundheitswesen, ganz neue 
enorme Mittel bereitgestellt werden müssen, dann 
wird es gelingen müssen, den Bürger zu überzeugen.
He is talking here of what is desirable. Whether it is feasible 
seems to be entirely a matter of will-power, for Grass never 
said anything about the economic limits of a capitalist system 
and of its tolerance of reforms. He is an idealist in his 
determination that the support of individual citizens can be 
gained whatever their material concerns, so long as everyone 
can understand what the long-term alms are.
To sum up. Grass' earliest public statements about 
politics were essentially liberal in the sense that he con­
centrated on the polity and relegated the social and economic
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dimensions of politics to a subsidiary position. He assumed 
that if people took parliamentary democracy at face value, 
the spirit of democracy would flourish. Legislative loopholes 
and cracks in the social fabric would be a purely technical 
matter regulated by the four-yearly choice between contending 
sets of experts. In the seventies he looked at these things 
the other way round and saw that the values of the consti­
tution could only be brought to fruition when social, eco­
nomic and political questions were related to each other.
Nevertheless, this was all part of the same way 
of thinking. It was the very literalness of his commitment 
to democratic values, civil rights and freedoms that made 
him move beyond the parliamentary realm eventually in his 
understanding of what democracy is and what it should include. 
He thought that participation should be extended to all social 
spheres, his primary reason for advocating co-determination 
being that he saw it as a means of fostering democratic atti­
tudes. It was the lack of these in his compatriots which was 
his most important reason for entering politics in the first 
place.
Thus by the mid-seventies, Grass' view of what 
social-democratic strategy should be certainly changed, (and 
no doubt is changing still), but the values he brought to 
politics have not. His consistently literal view of democracy 
as the sovereignty of the people unites his political atti­
tudes from the time when he thought of that sovereignty in 
purely parliamentary terms to the time when he advocated it
in as many levels of society as possible. It is this consistency 
rather than the actual ideas which gives Grass'; ideology its 
individual character, for none of his main ideas were 
unusual at the time he advocated them. In this chapter I 
have described what those main ideas were. In the next I shall 
look at them as a whole, as an ideology as opposed to a 
series of ideas, and I shall attempt to probe that Ideology 
analytically.
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CHAPTER_FOUR
CONCEPTS AND LANGUAGE 
Grass' conceptual framework
When Grass tried to persuade people to support the 
SPD or talked about why he was a Social Democrat himself, he 
generally emphasised the means by which political choices 
are made and acted upon more than their aims. Indeed, most 
of his political speaking and writing has been about general 
principles, not single topics: about the state of parliamen­
tary democracy in Germany, about Social Democracy, Democratic 
Socialism, the political climate in the country.
Even when he chose a single issue to talk about, 
he invariably took a very wide and general approach to it.
For instance, in a speech entitled "Die kommunizierende Mehr­
zahl"1  ^he discussed reunification of the two German states 
in the light of a couple of centuries of German and European 
history. And in "Was Erfurt außerdem bedeutet"^1, his May 
Day speech in 1970, he talked about the tentative diplomatic 
rapprochment between the FRG and the GDR under Brandt in the 
light of the history of the European and German Labour Move­
ment. Between 1970 and 1972 he wrote a series of articles 
on issues of the day for the Süddeutsche Zeitung.Although the
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certainly had topical subjects, they were rarely if ever about 
any particular policies or objectives.
Similarly, in the election campaigns he participated 
in he referred to current policies and problems in the course 
of his arguments, but his speeches were impassioned by a more 
general concern with what kind of politics,what kind of atti­
tudes the SPD's policies and politicians stood for on the 
one hand, and the CDU/CSU's on the other. A quote from 1972 
illustrates Grass' preference for moods and trends rather 
than giving'details:
Um es knapp zu sagen: Im Spätherbst dieses Jahres 
wird es darum gehen, ob eine neue Bundesregierung 
unter Bundeskanzler Brandt die so mühsame wie not­
wendige Reformpolitik fortsetzen kann oder ob mit 
Strauß und Barzel an der Macht eine zweite Restau­
ration eingeleitet wird; an den Folgen der ersten 
tragen wir noch.
Ich will es Ihnen und mir nicht leicht machen, es 
also nicht bei der bloßen Personalisierung Brandt 
oder Barzel belassen, (...).
Vielmehr meine ich, daß Brandt und Barzel jeweils 
auch Ausdruck ihrer Partei sind, also auch Ausdruck 
aller mit dieser Partei verbundenen Interessen. Das 
Verhalten der sozialdemokratischen Partei als der 
ältesten deutschen demokratischen Partei ist ge­
zeichnet von über einem Jahrhundert Reformarbeit 
und von einem Fortschrittsglauben, der manchmal 
(...) in naive Fortschrittsgläubigkeit zu münden 
droht.
Die christdemokratische Partei weiß ihre Stärke im 
pragmatischen Beharrungsvermögen. Nur ist ihr die­
ser, an sich akzeptable, konservative Standpunkt 
nur Bewegungslosigkeit, ja, in vielen Bereichen zur 
reaktionären Tendenz des Rückschritts geschrumpft. 
Wenn die Sozialdemokraten auf der einen Seite zu 
viele und oft unleserliche Reformpläne vorlegen, so 
verarmte die christdemokratische Partei andererseits 
zu absoluter Programmlosigkeit.
( . . . )
Ein Sozialdemokrat ist jemand, der die Verhältnisse 
für veränderbar hält. Ein Sozialdemokrat ist jemand, 
dem Demokratie ohne soziale Gerechtigkeit bloße 
Formeldemokratie ist. Ein Sozialdemokrat ist jemand,
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der den Sozialismus ohne demokratische Grundrechte 
ablehnt. Denn Demokratie und Sozialismus bedingen 
einander ... 4>.
This is a good example of the way in which the How 
comes before the What when Grass talks politics, even in 
connection with elections. The same i6 true of his approach 
to an audience. In the first instance he spoke about the 
criteria which should be used to décide which way to vote. 
Then in the second instance he would argue 
that if they made these choices in the right way, with the 
right attitudes, in the right light, they would logically 
decide in favour of the Social Democrats every time! In his 
election speeches he was occüpied with the right way to 
decide, with the right attitudes.
Using concepts from the liberal tradition: ratio­
nality, enlightenment, individual responsibility, he aimed 
to convince people that the SPD was the party which best 
fulfilled these standards. His criteria
focus again and again on the individual's judgement. Reason 
is a faculty of each individual person. Its connotations 
as a concept are implicitly (and in some of his speeches 
this was explicit) rooted in the tradition of liberal thought 
since the European Enlightenment, whereby reason is the 
fount of the individual's conscious behaviour and politics 
the business of reasonable people. In the spirit of classical 
liberalism, Grass usually talked about reason as itself a 
force in politics, believing that each voter would respond
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to rational arguments:
Am 19. November werden wir beweisen müssen, daß die 
Mentalität Strauß-Barzel in Deutschland keine Zu­
kunft hat.
übrigens bin ich überzeugt, daß die Vernunft siegen 
wird. Jenes christdemokratische Geschäft mit der 
Angst hatte nur Ladenhüter und kurzlebige Saison­
schlager zu bieten.
Durchsetzen werden sich die Argumente. Zählen wird, 
was politische Wirklichkeit ist.5'
Grass used reason as the criterion for making choices 
between ideas and proposals, which in his view are imme­
diately practically feasible. He defined it in a tautological 
fashion as the enemy of any kind of emotive approach: "Wah­
len sind Appelle an die Vernunft. Es kann mir also nicht 
daran liegen, Sie mit meiner Rede in Begeisterung zu ver­
setzen."6* or any kind of polemic: "Kühl gilt es abzuwägen. 
Nicht strahlendes Weiß und düsteres Schwarz stehen zur Wahl, 
sondern mehrere Grautöne. Kein Grund besteht also, von die­
ser oder jener Partei begeistert zu sein."7* He used the 
term enlightenment in its most literal sense as clear, 
comprehensible language and informative arguments:
Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund Hamburg möge einen Ar­
beitskreis beauftragen, aufklärendes und in der Öf­
fentlichkeit wirkendes Material zu sammeln, damit es 
überall dort, wo es an Aufklärung fehlt und wo Springer 
vorherrscht, in Umlauf gebracht werden kann.8'
In ihrem bedenkenlosen Kampf um die Macht scheuen 
sich Politiker wie Strauß und Barzel nicht, Emotionen 
zu wecken, den rechtsradikalen Mob zu mobilisieren 
(— ). Linke Politik kann und darf nur eine aufklä- 
rende sein; sie setzt aufs Argument. (— ) Wer die 
Sprache und die Methoden seines Gegners übernimmt, 
ist schon geschlagen. *
As an election-campaigner Grass had to find a style 
which imputed a consensus between himself and his audience 
about the terms of reference he was using, in order to be 
able to reinforce that consensus, or tip it in the direction 
he wanted. For the aim of an election campaign is to create, 
redirect or recreate as wide a consensus as possible about 
the next four years of government. Grass invoked rationality, 
enlightenment, individual responsibility and practicability 
as principles he and his audience unquestionably shared. He 
strengthened this consensus by wagging a finger at those 
who remained outside it, i.e.at intellectuals who according 
to him would not commit themselves to practical politics.
By ridiculing dissidents as idealists, he was in a position 
to argue that the existing political order was the home of 
all rational people:
Darum fort mit allem geistigen Hochmut und dünkel­
haftem Elitegeist! Ihr Utopisten und Sektierer in 
Eurem schönen, windstillen Gehäuse: Tretet vor die 
Tür! Stoß Euch Knie und Stirn wund an unserer Rea­
lität! Genie wohnt nicht mehr im holden Wahnsinn, 
sondern in unserer nüchternen Konsumgesellschaft.
Die Heiligen sind Pragmatiker geworden. (__) hier,
in der Bundesrepublik, gilt es, zu zahlen und den 
Mund aufzumachen, gilt es, tagtäglich neu zu bele­
ben die teuer erkaufte, geliebte und penetrante, 
in Kerkern ersehnte und leichtsinnig aufs Spiel 
gesetzte, immerfort unzulängliche, heilig-nüchterne 
Demokratie.
Thus in 1965 he ended up equating the existing with 
the rational, on the grounds that only reformist ideas are 
rational. By this score both left-wing and right-wing 
radicalism was anything from foolish to dangerous.
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Anything which in Grass' view smacked of an ideology 
was derided and rejected. On the basis of the Godesberg 
Programme the SPD's politics were the most realistic be­
cause they had rid themselves of any "restlichen ideologi­
schen Ballast"11* left from the party's Marxist heritage.
Such was the rationalist framework of Grass' views 
in 1965. It remained the birthright of Democratic Socialism 
for him when he later defined his ideas further in the name 
of Revisionism. The concepts which he drew from the liberal 
tradition and from the Revisionists had a crucial thing 
in common in his hands, namely that he believed they were 
the only ones free of any ideology and as such the only 
ones relevant for today:
Die großen Themen sind verhandelt worden. Totale 
Weltanschauung blüht nur noch in wohltemperierten 
Seminaren (...). Erweitern wir unsere mühsam ge­
wonnene bürgerliche Freiheit, bis sie auch ihren 
sozialen Ausdruck gefunden hatl Neue Ideologien 
sind nicht vonnöten.12)
Grass then took up some assumptions about ideology 
and science into his political vocabulary to underpin his 
own views. His companion between liberalism and Democratic 
Socialism was an idea of science which equated all philo­
sophical and political ideologies with dogmatism and 
science with empirically established truths. Consequently, 
he never questioned his own attitudes for their own ideo­
logical characteristics. In the last chapter we saw how 
he propounded the virtues of Social Democracy in programma­
tic terms as those of reform against revolution. In 
epistemological language he argued that gradual reform had
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a scientific foundation as a means of social change, whereas 
revolutionary ideas were ideological, that is to say in 
his words, they were dogmatic, irrational and totally im­
practical.
In the May Day speech he made in 197o "marxistische 
Wissenschaftlichkeit" is identified with "praktischem Re­
formwillen" and "marxistischem Dogmatismus" with "revolu­
tionärer Forderung"13 .^ Grass gave an account of what is 
known as the Revisionism debate in the SPD in the 1890s. 
According to him Marx's work had been partly unscientific 
because it had prevented the SPD from matching its theory, 
which it had largely from Marx and Engels, with its practice 
in the Wilheminian period, which concentrated on social and 
political reforms under the Empire. Led by Eduard Bernstein 
the Revisionists had tried to correct this dichotomy by 
making the theory as reformist as the goals the party prac­
tically pursued. The logic of Grass' argument is that pro­
grammes for social change are practical only if they aim 
to work through reforming the existing system, and that a 
political theory is only scientific if tried and tested in 
such a process. Thus science as he used the term had an 
empiricist complexion, whereby social-scientific data must 
be verifiable directly. Only a gradualist political theory 
could have scientific status, because it was restricted to 
immediate practice.
The premise behind this rather hazy of the
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terms Ideology and science ia that facta are not ideological 
and that an Ideology has nothing to do with the facta. Graaa 
consistently Ignored or rejected any holistic analysis 
which probed the future in terms of fundamental structures« 
because he was only interested in what he believed to have 
been empirically established:
Wir werden lernen müssen, daß unter Umstanden ein 
Schritt mehr Gerechtigkeit in sich neue Ungerech­
tigkeiten birgt, die dann wieder auszugleichen sein 
werden. Das sind Dinge, die eine: evolutionären Pro­
zeß auszeichnen, und da wird jeder bei sich ent­
scheiden müssen, ob er sich an wissenschaftlid*; Er­
gebnisse, an einen nachweislich evolutionären Pro­
zeß hält, oder ob er meint, daß Wünschen ihn dazu 
bringen kann, Sprungkraft zu beweisen. 4'
Grass believed that his own politics had an ethical 
rather than ideological basis. He assumed that it is possible 
to formulate social and political questions outside any 
Ideological framework:
Ich bin kein Systematiker. Ich käme gar nicht auf 
die Idee, aus Erfahrungen, die ich für beständig der 
Korrektur bedürftig erachte, ein System gewinnen zu 
wollen, das mich nur dann hinterher einengt und 
hindert, neue Erfahrungen zu sammeln und mit neuer 
Erfahrung schon gewonnene infrage zu stellen. - Das 
ist ja kein System z.B. im politischen Bereich ein 
Parteiergreifen, ein Parteiergreifen für Sozialismus 
plus Demokratie, weil ich die demokratische Form 
des Zusammenlebens von Menschen nicht nur für die 
narrensicherste halte, sondern auch für die humanste 
(...). Das ist eine Entscheidung für eine Gesell­
schaftsform, nicht nur für ein System, denn die 
Sozialdemokratie ist in dem Moment überholt und er­
ledigt, in dem sie zu einem System w i r d . "
These ethical priorities arise from his premise that 
truth is relative. He adheres to Revisionist principles be­
cause if the truth changes, these alone can be scientific.
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Democratic Socialism had standards which are not only 
Intellectually superior, because they are in his view the 
most rational , but equally importantly morally superior:
Von keinerlei Glauben geschlagen, also auch ohne 
Heilslehre auf der Zunge (...) handelte (ich) aus 
der Erkenntnis, daß cs nicht nur eine Wahrheit und 
eine Wirklichkeit gibt, daß vielmehr mehrere, dem­
nach relative Wahrheiten und Wirklichkeiten mit­
einander Wettstreiten und sich tolerieren müssen. 
Solch liberale Einsicht schloß nicht aus, daß sich 
(...) die Einsicht festigte, es könne, mit Vorrang, 
der demokratische Sozialismus in der Lage sein, dem 
Menschen jenes Mehr an sozialer Gerechtigkeit und 
jene gesetzliche Garantie freier und chancengleicher 
Entwicklung erkämpfen, das ihm bislang von den vor­
herrschenden Systemen, von privatkapitalistischen 
westlicher Prägung und staatskapitalistischen kommu­
nistischer Prägung, vorenthalten worden ist.16'
Grass' political ideas are thus sustained by his 
moral judgements. Ultimately.when he talks about ideologies, 
he means the social systems of Communism and Capitalism which 
he is against in equal measure on moral grounds. When he 
talked about the Revisionism debate he did not discuss the 
merits of the arguments theoretically, but took Bernstein's 
side because he held Bernstein to be the forerunner of a 
social-democratic alternative to Capitalism and Communism. 
Where he could, he eclectically adopted some currents of 
thought from within the Marxist tradition to find a new 
vocabulary for his own politics. This stiffened the precepts 
of liberal parlamentarianism he held into those of Democratic 
SociqJLism,
Anyway, in the agitational context it was sufficient 
to generalise in this way about reform, ideology, scientifi- 
city. This context encouraged him to personalise theoretical
-no-
problems so that, for instance, the political and theoretical 
status of Marxism became embodied in the persons of the main 
contenders, namely Bernstein and Kautsky.
After 1972 Grass saw the importance of having a more• 
systematic hold on social-democratic alms. But he did not have 
anything like a theoretical system in mind. In 1965 he had 
viewed the tasks facing the government which he hoped would 
get into office as simple and isolatable, as the technicalities 
of an electoral programme. By 1972 he had a better idea of 
the complexity of such matters and called for more research 
into what should and could be done. In his discourse, theory 
does not mean the formulation of paradigms, but empirical 
research into the basis for and the connections between 
political and social aims; research which will put a charter 
for progress into operation. He made no mention of theoretical 
preparation as an analytical framework within which courses 
of action are conceived, and yet he urged the SPD to plan its 
policies more systematically. He thought that the govern­
ment was stagnating in pragmatism and that reform was getting 
lost along with i d e a s . B u t  he did not want to see new 
ideas in the form of a renewal of ideology in politics.
There was thus a dilemma to find something between 
pragmatism and ideology. Development aid and environmental 
protection became high priorities for him because he believed 
they could be substantially progressive whilst neutral to 
the ideology of the social systems in both the East and the 
West.1®^  He navigated between the Scylla and Charibdis of
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pragmatism and dogmatism by effectively talking about ideo­
logies in a more restrictive sense and by merging the question 
of their political and epistemological or theoretical status 
into the moral bankruptcy of the Capitalist and Communist 
powers:
Wir müssen begreifen lernen, daß die Ideologien 
versagt haben. An dem Brennpunkt Nigeria manifestiert 
sich dieser Ausverkauf zur Zeit am deutlichsten: 
beide Positionen, der westliche Kapitalismus und 
der östliche Kommunismus, kompromittieren sich 
gleichermaßen Alle Ideologien, die zwangs­
läufig zu Systemen führen,müssen als gefährlich 
gelten - sowohl die sozialistische als auch die 
der 'Pragmatiker',der Technokraten und Fachidioten, 
die lediglich eine 'befriedete Gesellschaft' bauen 
würden.1 )^
This shows how the conceptual framework which Grass 
worked with was much weaker than the moral rationale of his 
political views. For he was undiscriminating in what he called 
an ideology and in what he made it mean, but he was always firm 
in his moral condemnation of power-politics pursued in the name 
of western democracy or of socialism. When he sought new and 
firmly based ideas about what Democratic Socialism means, his 
horror of ideology put him in a potentially difficult position 
which he avoided by turning the dilemma from a conceptual into 
a moral one. He distinguished between capitalist and communist 
ideologies on the one hand, and an ideologically innocent de­
mocratic socialist programme on the other, by ethically reject­
ing the former both as social systems and political powers 
and as bodies of ideas. This is how he de­
fended the ground on which he believed Democratic Socialism 
stood and on which he urged it to grow and evolve. He defended 
its integrity by attacking the moral integrity of its principal 
opponents.
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Patterns of rhetoric
Embedded in the language Grass uses for political 
affairs is a moral frame of reference from which he draws 
pescriptive criteria for formulating his demands and views. 
There is a moral fervour in his arguments which enables him 
to link his liberalism with ihis! socialism. For the liberal 
element in Democratic Socialism as he understands it is what 
makes it morally superior to the state socialism of the 
communist countries.
As a political intellectual Grass was a pronounced 
moralist. He was particularly mindful of his nation's moral 
responsibilities in the world and its duty to bear the burden 
of crimes perpetrated under the National Socialists. One of 
his very first individual interventions into political 
affairs was an open letter to Erhard demanding that he 
resign because of a trade agreement with Egypt which com­
promised West Germany's penitent' relationship- wfth Israel. 
Grass condemned Erhard for being a bad political leader 
because he had shown himself lacking in moral integrity and 
had failed to observe the nation's moral responsibilities 
in international affairs:
Wie taktlos, befangen und hilflos, aus Griinden be­
wiesener Unfähigkeit, muß ein Bundeskanzler sein, 
der die Ungeheuerlichkeit begeht, heute, da uns die 
heranrückende Verjährungsfrist ungesühnter Ver­
brechen Prüfstein genug ist, nochmals die Toten 
und Überlebenden der Konzentrationslager (...) zu 
beleidigen, ja, ihren Mördern und Peinigern Genug­
tuung zu verschaffen.20)
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He also treated domestic politics as the testing 
ground of the nation's conscience. He saw parliamentary demo­
cracy as Itself a moral order, whose standards politicians 
should meet or else be condemned. In the 1965 campaign he 
said that he wanted to see a kind of parliamentary politics 
which ensured that the elected representatives in the Bundes­
tag would themselves be the conscience of society so that this 
responsibility should not be left to a caste of intellectual 
social critics. There should be no moral and critical division 
of labour between the liberal intelligentsia end the country's 
leaders:
Die weltverbreitete Unsitte, den Schriftsteller als 
"Gewissen der Nation" zu bezeichnen, hat allenfalls 
dazu geführt, das Gewissen verantwortlicher Männer, 
deren Forum der Bundestag sein sollte, zu entlasten 
und ihn, den Schriftsteller, wie ein Orakel-raunen­
des Abstraktum zu behandeln, das mehr oder weniger 
geachtet, außerhalb der Gesellschaft herumsteht. 
Diese Oase gilt es zu verlassen. Ich werde es ver­
suchen, als Bürger vom Standpunkt des schreibenden 
Bürgers aus zu sprechen ...2')
Grass' democratic ethic treats the moral weight of 
the nation as a whole and the individual as equal. He saw 
society as the sum of its individual members, its moral worth 
as their moral worth. This means that each individual has a 
direct responsibility for society. In his speeches in 1965 he 
sought to make everyone aware of their responsibility to be 
conscientious citizens and use their votes, in order to re­
invigorate parliamentary democracy in West Germany:
Diese Wahlreise bricht bewußt mit der Tradition.Die 
direkte Beteiligung am Wahlkampf, ohne daß der Wahl­
redner Kandidat ist oder zumindest eine der großen 
Interessengruppen (...) vertritt, ist ein bewußter 
Versuch, den Wahlkampf zu differenzieren und neben
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oder zwischen den Parteien auch den Wähler zu Wort 
kommen zu lassen.
Als Berliner, also als verhinderter Wähler, habe 
ich doppelten Anlaß, dieses Experiment zu wagen; 
zumal die fünfziger Jahre mit ihrem lähmenden 
Slogan "Keine Experimente" endgültig vorbei sind 
und sich unsere Demokratie, wenn sie nicht weiter­
hin plebiszitär als sogenannte Fernsehdemokratie 
verfälscht werden soll, mit Hilfe der Wähler, 
also der Bürger, regenerieren muß.22)
These political ethics are linked to a bourgeois 
view of social and political behaviour which sees social and 
political affairs as determined by individuals and hardly, 
if at all, by social structure and institutions. The moral 
moving force in Grass' politics both derives from and in 
turn reinforce« such an individualist understanding of poli­
tics and society. The individual's responsibility for 
society takes such precedence that by comparison social 
structures and institutions are scarcely criticised because 
Grass always emphasised only the one half of the dialectic 
between the individual and society. He was only concerned 
with the way individuals make up social institutions and in 
what individuals put, or could put, into them. This is why 
he al ways placed so much emphasis on the electoral process 
and commited himself so heavily to the task of persuading 
people to vote. During a Land election campaign in Nordrhein- 
Westfalen in 1970, he talked about how institutions could be 
changed if people wanted them to be, so that voting would be 
a way of contributing to changing them:
Wir haben es gelernt, entweder das Elternhaus, die 
Schule oder den Betrieb als Quelle so früh begin­
nender Verkrüppelung zu benennen und anzuklagen, 
obgleich wir wissen, daß die Familie, die Schule, 
der Betrieb, keine unerforschlich Schicksal­
-115 '
spielenden Instanzen sind, sondern Produkte der 
Erwachsenen und deshalb veränderbar.
Es ist die kindliche Ohnmachtsbezeugung, die in­
fantile Geste, mit der Erwachsene ständig Schuld 
und Verantwortung außerhalb ihres eigenen Be­
reichs vermuten und mystifizieren; die Gesell- ... 
Schaft ist schuld, die Verhältnisse sind schuld.
The heavy moral tones in Grass' political language 
also cast a shadow over the way he talked about historical 
matters. The way he tends to treat history as a whole has 
its roots in his understanding of the Nazi period. That ex­
perience persuaded him that history is repetitive and 
scarcely progressive. If there is any progress it is won 
from a struggle against the burdens history has imposed on 
the present. He repeatedly inveighed against the younger ge­
neration when they seemed to him close to repeating the 
mistakes of their predecessors : 2 *^
Denn es kommt darauf an, den berechtigten Protest 
der Jugend (...) vor dem Einbruch des Irrationa­
lismus zu bewahren, damit der politisch wirksam 
wird, damit nicht abermals eine Generation der 
apolitischen Resignation verfällt, nur weil sich-.» 
ihre utopischen Ziele nicht verwirklichen ließen^ '.
He thought that what he had experienced of the 
past fitted contemporary political phenomena as well, and 
implied that this cyclical sequence was peculiarly German26* i
Aus Kenntnis meiner eigenen Vergangenheit und der 
Auffälligkeit der Jugend in diesem Land für abso­
lute und selbstzerstörerische Forderungen, bin ich 
dagegen, pauschal in jedem Jungwähler, der seine 
ziellose Wut in die NPD hineinretten will, einen 
Neonazi zu wittern. Ich gebe aber zu bedenken, daß 
seine geplante Entscheidung von den Herren Thadden 
bis Thielen genauso mißbraucht werden wird, wie 
der Idealismus meiner Generation von den Herren 
Schirach und Axmann mißbraucht worden ist.27)
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Grass derives some of his authority as orator from 
his view of the German nation's past. His experience of it 
makes him see it in moral terms and has endowed him ,as far 
as he is concerned .with a responsibility to try and prevent 
anything of the sort happening again. As he explained Fascism 
in terms of recurrent dispositions in the German people, the 
only possible defence against it was the kind of moral alert­
ness which he upheld himself:
Als Neunzehnjähriger begann ich zu ahnen, welch 
eine Schuld unser Volk wissend und unwissend ange­
häuft hatte, welche Last und Verantwortung meine 
und die folgende Generation zu tragen haben würden. 
(...) Ich weiß auch, wie anfällig dieser Staat immer 
noch ist, (...) hier im offenen Gespräch und, wenn 
Sie wollen, auch im Streitgespräch gilt es, dem Ver­
brechen von damals jede Chance einer Neuauflage zu 
nehmen.2“'
Wenn Joachim Steffen und mit ihm die SPD in Schles­
wig-Holstein der Meinung ist, Aufstieg und Fall der 
NPD lasse sich, wie dazumal der Aufstieg und Fall 
der NSDAP im Verhältnis zu steigenden und fallen­
den Schweinepreisen ablesen, mag er recht haben, 
(...), aber meines Vaters gebrannter Sohn ist vor­
sichtig genug, es nicht allein aufs Preisgefälle 
ankommen zu lassen. Ich versuche, zum Neuwähler zu 
sprechen, denn erschreckenderweise ist es der NPD 
gelungen, jungen Menschen in diesem Land alte Hüte 
zu verkaufen. Und nur nebenbei war von Schweine­
preisen und dem Milchpfennig die Rede.2’'
When the neo-fascist NPD began to make gains in 
1966, he turned back to the crimes of the Third-Reich gene­
ration in order to argue that German youth in the sixties 
still had a responsibility to temper its behaviour today in 
the memory of the past.30  ^ In other words, the past was more 
of an issue for him than the present.
Grass always fought against any appeasement of the 
sins of Nazism. He talked about it in virtually exclusively
moral categories like guilt and responsibility rather than 
in politically and historically analytical terms. And as in 
the quotation above, in his political work he preferred 
to leave a social analysis of' Fascism and neo-Fascism aside, 
in order to take up a preacher role. This moral fervour 
was a significant aspect of his persuasive technique.
In public speaking he used it to assess what the Christian 
Democrats had done and what the Social Democrats could be 
expected to do.For instance in. 1965 he argued that the SPD would 
be a good government because it combined expertise with 
conscience:
-- (es) ist an der Zeit, moralische Verantwortung
in der Politik zur Pflicht zu machen. Unsere Gesund­
heitspolitik bedarf eines Arztes, unsere Bildungs­
und Hochschulpolitik bedarf eines Pädagogen, unsere 
Städte bedürfen eines weitblickenden Baumeisters, 
und unsere Wiedervereinigungspolitik bedarf dringen­
der denn je eines wirklichen Staatsmannes. Dieses 
ist mein gründlich geprüftes Votum: Eine sozialde­
mokratische Regierung wird diese Aufgaben lösen 
nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen.
Any power-politics which abused moral debts and 
standards provoked his wrqth. It was this moralist stance 
which gave him the authoritative tone he adopted towards 
politicians in his oratory. This tone is epitomised in the 
title of one of his 1965 speeches "Ich klage an", a la Zola, 
a speech which is a polemic from beginning to end.
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The normative complexion of Grass' language was an­
other means by which he excluded radical political critique. 
His argument was that the first duty of political critics 
was to uphold the values of democracy. So he rejected the 
politics of the anti-Vietnam movement in Berlin and the 
Federal Republic, but praised American students' protest 
against their own government's policy in Vietnam, on the 
grounds that it rescued the moral prerogative of democracy in 
the United States by the very moral quality of the students' 
criticism:
Vor wenigen Wochen haben die Studentenvertretungen 
von Uber einhundert amerikanischen Universitäten 
Präsident Johnson unmißverständlich klargemacht, daß 
er und seine Regierung, ja alle Soldaten, die seinen 
Befehlen folgen, mehr und mehr in die Nähe jener 
Kriegsverbrecher geraten, die 1945 in Nürnberg zum 
Tode verurteilt wurden. Mit Bestimmtheit (...) haben 
sich amerikanische Studenten (...) zum Sprecher ihrer 
Demokratie gemacht. 2 *
This mode of discourse did not take account of the 
economic motives of American intervention in foreign countries to 
protect business interests. This divided him from the New 
Left. Grass put himself into splendid intellectual iso­
lation which could only lead to cynicism when his high moral 
standards were disappointed by the real course of International 
power-politics. When his moral and idealist mode of protest 
proved to be impotent and could do nothing about Biafra or 
Czechoslovakia for instance. Grass ended up with a very sour 
view of the world, a rather sneering resignation. Reflecting 
on international devekpments in 1973 and on Brandt's speech 
when the FRG joined the United Nation's General Assembly, he 
expressed the inevitable impotence of his moralism. It was
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impotent because it obscured the economic reasons for the 
repression and the opportunism he abhored and gave rise to 
a mixture of analytical helplessness and sermonising like 
the following:
Internationale wirtschaftliche Machtgruppen, frei 
von demokratischer Kontrolle, rücksichtslos auf 
Gewinn bedacht, verstärken die arabische Erpressung 
durch eine westlich-kapitalistische: die erste war 
zu erwarten, die zweite stellt die Funktionsfähig­
keit der parlamentarischen Demokratie infrage. Nie­
mand rede mehr gläubig vom "freien Westen", wenn 
dessen Politik nachweislich von industriellen 
Großkonzernen bestimmt wird.
( . . . )
Die Okkupation der Tschechoslowakei durch die War- 
schauer-Pakt-Mächte, der faschistische Militär­
putsch in Griechenland und seine diesjährige Ent­
sprechung in Chile haben uns gelehrt, wie wirkungs­
los Proteste sind, wie leichthin bedauerndes Kopf­
nicken moralische Proteste lächerlich macht, wie 
ungefährdet sogenannte "politische Tatsachen" ge­
schaffen werden.
( . . . )
Die zynische Frage ist erlaubt: Bis wieviel Grad 
winterlicher Zimmertemperatur, bis zu welcher 
Teuerungsrate und bis zu welcher Arbeitsloscnzahl 
stehen wir noch, wenn auch schwankend, zu Israel und 
der wirksamen Garantie seiner Existenz? Wann werden 
wir nur noch haltlose Opfer der selbstgewollten 
Wachstumspolitik sein: unfähig, überlieferte Ver­
antwortung zu tragen, verschrieben nur noch dem po­
litischen Aberglauben, das Hemd sei uns näher als 
der Rock? (...)
Während dieses ausrinnende Jahr seine politischen 
und moralischen Niederlagen datierte, saß ich (...) 
in New York auf der Besucherbank: (...) Vorne 
spricht Willy Brandt. Er spart den Namen Allende 
aus, er sagt nicht "Chile"; und doch wird deutlich, 
welches Verbrechen er meint und wieviel Mitschuld 
dem westlichen Kapitalismus zukommt. Eine gute ver­
gebliche Rede. (...) Und doch macht diese Rede, in­
dem sie (in Untertönen verzweifelt) für Vernunft 
plädiert, den Bankrott der politischen Vernunft of­
fenbar.
Ich befürchte, daß uns nicht mehr bewußt ist, inwie­
weit vernünftiges Taktieren (oder Taktieren, das 
uns als vernünftig gilt) schon absurd geworden ist 
und irrationale Folgen zeigt. Kissingers und LeDucThos 
mühsam ausgehandelter Waffenstillstand in Vietnam 
gilt als Sieg der Vernunft; doch alle beteiligten
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Verhandlungspartner verlachten das "vernünftige 
Ergebnis": der Krieg geht weiter. 3)
Grass' helplessness here was the consequence of 
allowing his moral feelings to replace a more judicious 
view of political history. His response to the civil war in 
Biafra shows this distortion. His perspective led him to see 
quite disparate situations and conditions in models of 
moral burdens transferred from Europe to Africa:
Welches Lehrbuch der Staatskunde empfiehlt den Re­
gierungen der afrikanischen Staaten, eine katastro­
phale Machtpolitik von europäischem Zuschnitt zu 
übernehmen? Wenn Völkermord und Massenvernichtung 
-wie in Biafra- so in SUdsudan-Stufen zur Einigung 
des afrikanischen Kontinents sein sollen, wird 
Schuld der Kitt dieser Einheit sein;34'
Such a transference of moral records from one con­
tinent to another entailed polemical comparisons, which may 
of course drive the point home rhetorically, but which take 
no account of respective political and social forces involved 
in either part of the comparison. By insisting that the Nazi 
past posed ethical demands that had to be adhered to in 
contemporary politics, he paid insufficient regard to chang­
ing conditions in international politics. With the outbreak 
of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1967 he drew an analogy 
between Nazism and Arab antagonism to the Jewish state and 
equated the Egyptian army with the concentration camps. This 
completely ignored the grounds for Arab hostility to Israel. 
Because he applied absolute categories of sin and giilt to 
the Middle East conflict, he transferred German guilt directly
to the Arabs:
- 1 2 1 -
Die Kndlösung, ln Auschwitz und Trebllnka begonnen, 
soll ln Israel vollendet werden. Wer den deutschen 
Gaskammern entrinnen konnte, wer meinte, ln Israel 
seinen Frieden gefunden zu haben, dem drohen heute 
die Gaskampfmittel der ägyptischen Armee.*5)
Grass also deliberately refused to differentiate 
between the super-powers in the degree of evil they were respon­
sible for whenever he was enraged by the international or 
domestic acts of oppression they perpetrated. For instance, 
he equated the fates of Solzhenytsin and the people of Chile36^. 
As I have already indicated, the behaviour of the USA and the 
Soviet Union was the prime area where his moral passions ab­
sorbed all the arguments. As Social Democracy had a cleaner 
record than either American or Russian Imperialism, he could 
get away with sweeping claims of its superiority over
Capitalism and Communism. He could criticise Western Capitalism 
and Soviet Communism because their failings were known, whilst 
Democratic Socialism had not yet been put to the test.
Moral sensibilities played such a big part in the 
way Grass talked about political affairs because he placed 
such emphasis on the individual's role in the political 
make-up, life and character of society. In turn, he built 
his political rhetoric around persons, because this was a way 
of translating those moral sensibilities into tangible forms.
However, this took on rhetorical proportions which 
contradicted his own standards of rationality and clarity.
For his language tended very much to reduce social and historical
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conditions to personalities. In doing so it bypassed the 
issues by subsuming all the aspects of a problem under the 
agents involved. Like his moral fervour, this stress on 
persons made Grass' arguments historically insensitive.
He could have done this for rhetorical convenience 
pure and simple. But there is more to it than that. It was 
convenient for him to personalise everything because he could 
not talk about history in any other way given his pessimistic 
outlook on it. He continually stressed that history had lessons 
for contemporary politics, particularly German politics, but 
they were invariably pessimistic ones:
Die Geschichte bietet uns keinen Trost. Harte 
Lektionen teilt sie aus.Zumeist liest sie sich ab­
surd. Zwar schreitet sie fort, aber Fortschritt 
ist nicht ihr Ergebnis. Die Geschichte schlleBt 
nicht ab: wir befinden uns in und nicht außerhalb 
der Geschichte.37*
Given its absurdity38*, the examples set by a few model indi­
viduals are the only things of value which history bequeaths 
to us. When Grass used history as an authority in his argu­
ments, it was mainly to praise or blame particular persons. 
Thus, as I have already mentioned, in the 1970 May Day speech 
he examined the history and traditions of the Labour Move­
ment in terms of the leading figures who represented the two 
sides of the dispute with the Revisionists in the SPD. He 
claimed that Kautsky and Bernstein personally set the sub­
sequent course of German Socialism's trials and tribulations:
Kautsky und Bernstein, die Väter des Erfurter 
Programms, sind auch die Väter des bis heute 
anhaltenden Konfliktes.39*
-1 2 3 -
His attitude to Lenin is another instance where he perceived 
the socialist heritage through a 'Great Men' view of histo­
rical and theoretical conflict. He blamed Lenin for every­
thing that happened to the Russian Revolution.
Not only did he simplify history down to persona­
lities« he tended to simplify contemporary politics in the 
same way. Brandt personally bore a great deal of the weight 
of his arguments. He often extolled Willy Brandt's character 
to the younger generation. In a little homily in 1968,
he even recommended Brandt's behaviour within his family 
as something practically edifying for everyone:
Meiner Meinung nach hat Willy Brandt in aller Öf­
fentlichkeit die Zerreißprobe zwischen Vater und 
Sohn stellvertretend und beispielhaft für viele, 
ja, wie man vermuten kann, für Millionen Familien 
bestanden. Seine pädagogische Lektion steht auf 
der Gewinnseite meiner Bilanz.41'
The rhetorical value of these simplifications is 
obvious.Grass harnessed the associations which he ascribed 
to particular persons for his propaganda. This was particu­
larly tempting given a coalition government. Too close a 
scrutiny of programme in 1969 or 1972 might have exposed 
the areas of disagreement between the SPD and FDP. So it 
was safer to talk about the union of the two parties by 
praising the compatibility of their respective leaders, and 
their combined superiority over the leaders of the opposition:
Die Friedenspolitik muß fortgesetzt werden, und 
zwar von Brandt und Scheel; denn wer wollte diese 
schwierige Aufgabe Strauß und Barzel, also Poli­
tikern überlassen, die sich im Bundestag, als es 
um die Zukunft der Nation ging, feige der Stimme 
enthielten.42)
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However, this pattern of rhetoric can also be ex­
plained through the value Grass attributes to his autobio­
graphical experience, from which he justifies his agitational 
position. Just as his outlook on political history is shaped 
around individual personalities , so in his oratory he makes 
■capital out of his own biography. The occasion when
he demanded Erhard's resignation was the first time he raised 
his public responsibilities as an ordinary citizen above those 
he had as a writer, and he used his own experience to under­
write these ordinary rights and obligations:
Ich antworte Ihnen als Bürger und Schrifsteiler, 
der 1927 geboren wurde, ein mehrmals gebranntes 
Kind ist und Kinder hat, die er vor den Folgen 
Ihres Unvermögens schützen möchte.43)
Grass can do this because he bases his arguments on what he 
believes to be the exemplary qualities of his past44’, as an 
exile from Danzig, for instance, when speaking about Ost­
politik:
Ich stamme (...) aus Danzig, kann also, am Bei­
spiel meiner Heimatstadt, genau demonstrieren, 
zu welch unwiderruflichen Verlusten deutsche Hybris 
geführt hat. Ich erhebe sogar den Anspruch, mit 
mehr Recht und genauerer Kenntnis vom Verlust 
meiner Heimat sprechen zu dürfen, als es der Ge­
neral de Gaulle mit nationalistischem bis tragi­
komischem Zungenschlag tut.4 )^
He evidently preferred to capitalise on what he 
has been acquainted with himself because he did not wish to 
claim any intellectual superiority over his audience. As a 
result, he tended to be patronising or abusive instead. Auto­
biographical references abound in the 1965 speeches more than
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in any others. When he moved on to Revisionism, Bernstein 
appears to be a model which Grass acquired intellectually 
rather than personally. He chose Bernstein as an intellectual 
model which he thinks fits what he already has knowledge of 
and which gave his experience a terminology , reducing his 
need to make continual autobiographical references to explain 
his views.
When historical and political material is teles­
coped into prominent persons, the symptoms of these persons' 
responses to a given situation are the main criterion for se­
lecting who to talk about. Their comparability is often more 
dramatically than analytically convincing.
Autobiographical references may have an oratorical 
rationale to justify Grass' role as a political speaker. On 
the other hand they affected his analysis of contemporary 
political conditions and his view of groups of people who did 
not belong to his generation. In dealing with them he looked 
for characteristic phenomena which tally with the knowledge 
he has acquired of the past and allow of comparison with him­
self or his generation. This means that he tends to isolate 
the comparable aspects of a situation from their historical 
and theoretical context. He then makes them bear the weight 
of his arguments. This is particularly true of the way he 
approached trends to the far-right and to the far-left in the 
second half of the sixties.46  ^ He diagnosed their psycholo­
gical symptoms and then equated far left with far right be­
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cause he associated them both with the misused and 
misguided idealism of previous generations. He failed to 
qualify this with any kind of probing into the contemporary 
source and significance of their rebirth. Consequently, he 
erased the historical and ideological specificity of both 
neo-fascist and radical socialist movements in an eternal 
right-left equation which suited his view of Social Demo­
cracy .
Due to the heavily autobiographical character of 
his own political insights, Grass needed to search in the 
past for the key to other people's political behaviour.
This also meant that he relegated intellectual influences 
to lesser, even minimal, relevance, and interpreted people's 
attitudes within a generational pattern which was familiar 
to him instead of taking political outlooks which differed 
from his own seriously on their own terms. He did not just 
do this with opponents either. He made the same sort of 
remarks about the internal debates within the SPD which 
arose as a response to the student movement:
... während der Zeit der Großen Koalition, die not­
wendigerweise die Zeit des Studentenprotestes ge­
wesen ist, haben sich alle politischen Jugendver­
bände in der Bundesrepublik verändert, indem sie 
insgesamt und jeweils im Verhältnis zu den ihnen 
nahestehenden Parteien nach links rückten.
Diese Akzentverschiebung wird die Politik in der 
Bundesrepublik entscheidend beeinflussen. Die Sozial­
demokratische Partei Deutschlands wird gut daran 
tun, diese von ihr ausgeldste Entwicklung recht­
zeitig zu begreifen und in Politik umzusetzen.
Es wäre verhängnisvoll, wenn GenerationsDrobleme 
weltanschauliche Farbe annehmen wollten.’''
-1 2 7 -
Because he relies so much on the feelings he has him­
self about what he has known in the past, he reflects on 
history in general in a Machiavellian manner. In particular, 
the feelings he has that in the Third Reich he and his peers 
were wilfully manipulated from above encouraged a  way of 
looking at history in which only strong personalities make 
their mark.4®1 This is carried to the extreme in his speech 
on the division of Germany, "die kommunizierende Mehrzahl".
His declared intention here is to present a history lesson 
about the national question. Yet in the attempt to do so he 
reduces every political force mentioned to personages and 
their psycnology. In this melodrama, opposed positions are 
charged with being no more than different sides of the same 
coin, one which is made less of political and more of 
psychological metal. By attributing malicious separatist 
designs to Adenauer and Ulbricht a period of radically different 
internal evolution in the GDR and the FRG respectively be­
comes the "Ära Ulbricht/Adenauer"49! In so far as the 
figures whom Grass attacked served any wider political 
forces at all beyond their own self-interests alone,they 
represented aspects of the German national character which 
were permanent in his view.e.g. a "permanenter Hang zum 
kleinstaatlichen Separatismus und (...) permanentes Gefälle 
in nationalistische Hybris".501 So history has little more 
to teach than the nation's emotional predispositions "gemes­
sen an unserer Veranlagung (...) belehrt durch geschicht­
liche Erkenntnis"511. The powers and motives of the indi­
vidual victims of Grass' rhetoric illustrate these common
characteristics.
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Even though this speech is an extreme case, Grass 
persisted in his outlook that certain single figures have 
the power and influence to delude masses of people, such as 
Rudi Dutschke did in the student movement according to him'*^ , 
for no better reason than that neuroses are at work in all 
politics he disagrees with. He compared Rudi Dutschke to Axel 
Springer on the grounds that both were demagogues of an
equal o r d e r . S u c h  a reduction of the issues of the day 
mystifies the kind of politics these men respectively stood 
for. Grass had worked up a conspiratorial explanation of 
political affairs and actions based on a picture of history 
from which all socially based conflicts are eliminated and 
replaced by the personal whims of single, rhetorically isolat- 
able agents. Thus the stress on persons was one further way 
in which his language left little or no room for economic 
forces in political and social life.
Cepl-Kaufmann has pointed out that the individual 
models which Grass uses to find a language for his politics 
and as stimuli to his own ideas, are acquired through one's 
personal contacts with people, and that having entered 
politics very much under the influence of Brandt, Grass has 
remained tied to the medium of personal contact.54  ^ Being 
a writer who came to politics as an outsider and remaining 
so over the years because he did not commit himself to the 
collective obligations of SPD membership, encouraged his 
intellectual individualism. It meant that he always had to 
search for intellectually and morally authoritative indi­
viduals to help him find a language for politics, to
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illustrate his terminology.
Finding ways of illustrating his terminology was an 
ever present need because he so rarely pinned his Ideas and 
views down to concrete proposals and nearly always evaded 
the objective conditions of the problems he dealt with. This 
evasion was the correlative to his individualism. One of its 
results was that he read the context in which political 
developments take place right out of history. His remarks on 
Lenin are a case in point:
Man hat sicn in den kommunistischen LHndern ange­
wöhnt, mehr oder weniger offen alle Verbrechen 
des Kommunismus auf Stalin abzuschieben (...).
Meine Meinung ist: all das, was wir heute erleben, 
ob es der Sturz Gomulkas ist, das Schießen auf 
Arbeiter in Polen, die Todesurteile in Leningrad, 
ist auf Lenin zurückzuführen. Ich halte Lenin für 
den genialsten Fehlkonstrukteur der modernen Ge­
schichte. Und solange diese von Lenin gesetzte 
Fehlkonstruktion der zentralistisch geführten 
Parteielite und damit der Parteidikdatur, bei Ent­
machtung der Gewerkschaften, nicht beseitigt wird, 55. 
wird sich der Kommunismus nicht reformieren können.
Another result is that questions about economics are cons­
picuous by their absence throughout his speeches and articles, 
even where he is interested in particular domestic reforms 
such as in education or for the environment.
The relative economic buoyancy of the Federal 
Republic for most of the sixties is no doubt one thing which 
encouraged Grass' complacence. Apparently he assumed that 
implementing social reforms was only a question of raising 
tax-revenue from a seemingly inexhaustibly affluent taxable
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population, who just required persuading that what hurt was 
good for them. Most of the remarks he made about persuading 
people to provide the resources for reforms were made In 
the optimistic period after 1969, when economic policy under 
the SPD had solved the 1967/68 recession for the time being, 
and when national resources to finance reform-progreuranes 
seemed abundant.
On the other hand, it is also clear that Grass' 
lack of interest in economic questions arises from a self- 
imposed division of labour which relegates economics almost 
entirely to experts and financial wizards. He restricts 
himself by always treating himself in his oratory as a 
layman, and not an intellectual, as one amongst the other laymen 
in the Sozlaldemokratlsche wahlerlnltiatlve(SW1)-His account of 
economic measures was at best naive, at worst crude. He 
polemically blamed the 1967 recession entirely on CDU incom­
petence and weak personnel56^and attributed the renewed boom 
which could be felt in 1969 virtually exclusively to Karl 
Schiller's wisdom as Finance and Economic Minister.
This sort of propaganda helped no-one understand 
econcxnic and financial policy for themselves. Grass seemed 
to trust blindly in Schiller as guardian of every­
one's welfare and to expect other people to do the same.
His ignorance in this field led him to make presumptuous 
statements. Consequently his political discourse was funda­
mentally idealist, because he evaded the social and economic 
background to the policies and ideas he advocated.
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CHAPTER FIVE_
FROM BERLIN TO BONN
Literary Intellectuals' search for political identity
In 1961 Martin Walser edited a collection of essays 
by writers and journalists in which they each argued the 
case for voting SPD in the federal election which was to 
take place that year. It is evident from many of the contri­
butions that they were rather hesitant about what they were 
doing in supporting one of the established parties like this. 
This they had never done before as a group. The spirit and 
tone of the book shows that its contributors were highly 
aware of their status as intellectuals. In this capacity they 
saw themselves as the guardians of democratic ideas, in 
which they were entrusted to educate the general 
public. The following examples from the foreward and from 
one of the essays illustrate how these intellectuals sought 
recognition of their special guardianship of political sanity:
Die Schriftsteller, die hier ihre Stimme erheben, 
warnend, mahnend und sehr skeptisch (...) sehen 
sich in der Tradition Frankreichs, das von Voltaire 
Uber Zola bis J.P. Sartre immer seine Männer der 
Feder auch als Gewissen wertete. So verstanden soll 
dieser kleine Band nicht mehr und nicht weniger sein 
als ein Versuch zur Gewissensbildung.
Nur in Deutschland gelten Intellektuelle noch immer 
als Außenseiter. (...) Deutsche Intellektuelle haben 
seit Jahrzehnten kommende Gefahren eher erkannt als 
viele professionelle Politiker. (...) Eine neue Re­
gierung sollte die Intelligenz aktivieren.1)
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When these intellectuals thought about their role 
in politics, they khought about influence, about influencing 
the public, influencing the politicians. They had taken a 
novel step with this book to associate themselves with an 
established party, but they were still thinking of them­
selves as people of a special political value. As Hans Werner 
Richter had said of his generation, the typical political 
stance of left-liberal intellectuals in the Federal Republic 
had been antl-partv. They tended to think of themselves as 
a democratic elite, as Richter saw in retrospect when he 
wrote in 1964:
Die Abneigung (...) gegen jeden Zwang, gegen jede 
Organisation, gegen Parteien, Vereine und gegen 
dogmatische Weltanschauungen, ja gegen jede Form 
des normativen Kollektivs mit Generallinie, Fahne 
und Programm war unter dem Druck des Dritten Reiches 
und auf den Schlachtfeldern des Zweiten Weltkrieges 
zu einer unüberwindlichen Angst geworden. Sie, die 
Anhörigen dieser Generation, (...) glaubten nicht 
an die demokratische Wirksamkeit von Massenorganisa­
tionen. Und anders als die praktischen Politiker woll­
ten sie vorerst nicht die Massen zur Demokratie er­
ziehen, sondern sich selbst, ihresgleichen, jene 
also, die fähig sind, mit dem Wort Einfluß zu gewin­
nen. Ihre Grundkonzeption war die einer demokrati­
schen "Elitebildung" (...). Sie glaubten, demokrati­
sches Denken ließe sich nur dann von oben nach unten 
vermitteln, nicht von unten nach oben und schon gar 
nicht mit einem neuen UntertanengefUhl.2>
However, whilst they might seek influence, the rea­
lity was that such intellectuals generally only influenced
political matters in an intangible way. Their ambitions were 
constantly on shaky ground. The result was that what was some­
times known as the 'heimatlose Linke' kept discussing Itself 
in a nagging search for a political identity which could not 
cease as long as it remained sublimely non-aligned.
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When Grass campaigned for the SPD In 1965 his 
Initiative was a radical one for the time because It broke 
away from the self-centred terms of this discussion. He was 
prepared to support one of the main political organisations. 
To be party-political to this degree was new for his gene­
ration of intellectuals. Social criticism and protest- 
appeals had been their most common forms of political 
expression. Open letters, individual appeals, 
protests and appeals endorsed by collect­
ions of literary and academic personages were the typical 
forms in which critically concerned intellectuals sought to 
intervene in political issues in the early sixties.4^
These forms had suited their feeling of their po­
sition within the polity as its conscience, as the later 
often maligned and derided 'Gewissen der Nation'. Such a 
view of themselves appeared to depend on a faith that 
whatever was wrong with West German democracy could be put 
right by reforms and by changes of attitude. The kind of 
critique which these intellectuals took to be their right 
in a liberal democracy was based on the assumption that 
what was criticised was open to reform. Enzensberger 
expressed this with regard to his work on the "Bewußtseins- 
Industrie", when he discussed why he had to use its 
apparatus in order to criticise it, in this case to have 
his essay on PER SPIEGEL published in the very same magazine:
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Es gehört weder zu den Aufgaben, noch zu den Mög­
lichkeiten der Kritik, ihre Gegenstände abzuschaf­
fen. Wer ihr zutraut, sie werde Herrschaft liqui­
dieren, Machtverhältnisse aus den Angeln heben, 
verschwendet seine Hoffnungen oder seine Besorg­
nisse. Kritik meint nicht gewaltsame Veränderung 
der Welt, sie deutet auf deren Alternative? sie 
ist nicht revolutionär, sondern revisionistisch 
gesonnen. Was sich von innen her nicht verändern 
läßt, an dem muß sie verliegen.*)
Enzensberger articulates here in abstract terms how 
intellectuals like himself saw themselves as social critics. 
The pluralist view of the Western democracies provided them 
with the ralson-d'etre of their role and of their customary 
distance from the political parties. It was a view which was 
dominant up to the mid-sixties and which saw the social cons­
titution and political functioning of a parliamentary demo­
cracy in terms of the interaction of social and economic in­
terest groups which estAlished themselves and sought to bring 
their influence to bear on the administration, or within the 
administrative processes of the state. A liberal intelli­
gentsia could be considered as one of these interest groups. 
As long as writers saw themselves as such an intelligentsia 
with a special critical function (and the book which Walser 
edited is an example of them doing so with a little party- 
political seasoning added) they could see a political role 
specifically suited to themselves, even if (or perhaps pre­
cisely because) this did not go unchallenged by their oppo­
nents on the right. As long as they believed that this kind 
of criticism was part of how a democracy works, their main 
struggle was to keep their special place open amidst the 
power-struggle. I take Enzensberger again as an example here, 
because he considered his position so carefully:
Hingegen muß eine Gesellschaft, die auf den Namen 
Demokratie Ansprüche macht, Kritik schon zur Be­
festigung dieser Ansprüche dulden. Sie räumt ihr 
einen Spielraum ein, dessen Grenzen nicht von der 
Xritik selbst, sondern von den Interessen der Herr­
schaft, also nach taktischen Gesichtspunkten be­
stimmt werden. Der Kritiker gibt seihe eigene Po­
sition preis, wenn er diese Grenzen anerkennt; wenn 
er sie überschreitet, verliert er seine Produktions­
mittel. Das ist sein alltägliches Dilemma.6'
Enzensberger was talking about the press and the 
media here as the critical intellectual's 'Produktionsmittel'. 
Their involvement in the press as writers and critics can be 
said to have prompted many writers to question this social- 
critical position: Enzensberger's own investigation of Per 
Spiegel in 1957 and of the Frankfurter Allgemelne Zeltung 
in 19627^are early and particularly determined examples of 
an intellectual questioning the standards and function of the 
West German press. Writers use of the press as one of their 
literary as well as political media was one of the pivots 
of intensified political questioning on their part in the 
sixties. The standards of news-reporting and the concentra­
tion of ownership of a supposedly independent press were 
questions which were of direct relevance to literary in­
tellectuals in their own spheres of work. These problems 
affected the view they had of themselves as writers and pub­
licists who upheld democratic standards. The nature and role 
of the press was thus one of the challenges to such left- 
liberal (or to such left and to such liberal) intellectuals' 
image of themselves and of what their political commitment 
should be.
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The habit of making isolated interventions occas­
ioned by individual problems began to look more and more 
futile in the sixties. The sustained and mass protest of the 
student movement presented itself as a counter-example to 
the sporadic politics most writers had pursued heretofore.
The "literary opposition" became worried about whether it 
was really as oppositional as it had thought itself to be, 
as it had been led to believe it was especially by the re­
gular hositility it met with from the right. The denunciation 
of literature was part of the same crisis of confidence about 
whether social and political criticism by means of the printed 
page had ever been at all relevant.®^Reinhard Baumgart 
formulated this scepticism offensively:
Das alles hätte auch vor drei oder vier Jahren oder 
so ähnlich gesagt werden können. Außerparlamentari­
sche Opposition, das war bis dahin fast ausschließ­
lich die Politik der Autoren: einiger Journalisten, 
Wissenschaftler, Belletristen. Jetzt ist damit vor 
allem die Politik der Studenten gemeint. Nichts ist 
durch diesen Positionswechsel fragwürdiger geworden 
als der politische Auftrag der Literatur und vor 
allem: seine Wirksamkeit. So politisch nämlich ihre 
Intentionen auch 20 Jahre lang gewesen sein mögen, 
sie hat nichts erreicht, was im Bewußtsein der Na­
tion so folgenreich zu Buch schlug wie gleich die 
ersten Monate studentischer Aktionen.
For West German intellectuals the sixties was a 
period of growing disillusionment with the pluralist view of 
their society and with their own critical role as they had 
conceived it. It seemed clear that with very few exceptions 
this had brought them no enduring influence. The turmoil of 
the mid-sixties,which saw the emergence of the student move­
ment, threw up issues which questioned the democratic and
pluralist claims of the state. In the rest of this chapter 
I shall examine Grass' position within this process. I shall 
aim to describe his responses as peculiar to himself, but 
rooted in his place within a couple of generations of lite­
rary intellectuals who were seeking a political identity 
for themselves.
I shall discuss Grass' political biography as an 
intellectual in the sixties in four stages as follows:
- approaching political issues as moral dilemmas, from 1961 
to 1966
- turning this round, to see national moral offences as 
democracy's political problems, 1966 and 1967
- reacting against mass protest and polarised politics in 
1967 and 1968
- thereafter looking for a place in parliamentary, not 
extra-parliamentary politics. I
I believe that considering Grass separately from 
the SPD in the first instance will show how and why he 
became so involved with the Social Democrats.
'Gewissen der Nation1
When the GDR unilaterally closed the border between 
itself and the Federal Republic on the 13th of August 1961 
Grass and Wolf-Dietrich Schnurre, who both lived in Berlin, 
wrote an open letter to the members of the East German 
Writers' Union. Grass also wrote one personally to its chair­
woman Anna Seghers10*. Both letters appealed to writers 
living in the GDR to take a clear public stand against their 
government's forcible restriction of its citizens. Grass 
begged Anna Seghers not now to fall short of the respect in 
which she was held for her anti-fascist work during the 
Third Reich. He felt she had a responsibility to live up to 
this reputation for the sake of the people he believed she 
had inspired:
Es darf nicht sein, daB Sie, die Sie bis heute 
vielen Menschen der Begriff aller Auflehnung 
gegen die Gewalt sind, dem Irrationalismus 
eines Gottfried Benn verfallen und die Gewalt­
tätigkeit einer Dikdatur verkennen ...
Grass and Schnurre insisted on the moral responsi­
bilities of both GDR writers and themselves in the West and 
on their duty by virtue of their profession to pursue these 
responsibilities vigorously and openly. Thereby they ex­
pressed their own view of the political role writers should 
fulfil s
Wer den Beruf des Schriftstellers wählt, muß zu 
Wort kommen, und sei es nur durch ein lautes Ver­
künden, er werde am Sprechengehindert. (...) Wenn 
westdeutsche Schriftsteller sich die Aufgabe 
stellen, gegen das Verbleiben eines Hans Globke 
in Amt und Würden zu schreiben; wenn westdeutsche
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Schriftsteller das geplante Notstandsgesetz des 
Innenministers Gerhard Schröder ein undemokrati­
sches Gesetz nennen; (...) dann haben Sie genauso 
die Pflicht, das Unrecht vom 13. August beim Namen 
zu nennen. (...)
(...) Wer schweigt, wird schuldig.
These letters were the first occasion where Grass 
personally took on the role of social and political cons­
cience. Evidently he felt bound to this role as a writer, 
whether its corrective intent was purposeful or not. Grass' 
and Schnurre's letters sought no further vindication for the 
demands they made. Their intervention and its effects ty­
pify the dangers intellectuals like themselves could run 
into as long as their political moves lacked clear and 
consistent direction. Because they sought no instrumental 
satisfaction for their protest (or at least not primarily), 
they laid themselves open to the criticism from the right that 
.they had done the West a disservice,either by their criticism 
of domestic public affairs or by default for not attacking 
the East directly enough. Precisely this ensued after these 
letters.11  ^A number of opponents of the country's liberal 
intellectuals seized the occasion to insist that the latter 
should stop interfering in politics at home and instead do 
their own anti-communist government an ideological service 
by themselves condemning the GDR regime. Such whip-lashing 
from the right-wing was just the sort of thing which sharp­
ened intellectuals' faith that they were vitally necessary 
as a critical force.
The Spiegel Affair of 1962 is illuminating here12 .^
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Franz Josef StrauB, who was Minister of Defence at the time, 
had the offices of Per Spiegel raided by the police and its 
publisher and one of its editors arrested overnight on 
suspicion of having betrayed state secrets in an article they 
had published on the government's defence policy.
Many organisations and public bodies expressed their dis­
approval of this, condemning the haste with which StrauB and 
the police had taken action during the nighttime, reminiscent 
as this was of Nazi methods.
The main objection raised in public was to the 
methods StrauB had used in this affair. By contrast, the 
Gruppe 47 declared their objection to the apparent cause 
itself, namely the attempt to silence criticism of StrauB' 
ministry and to stifle investigations into its plans for 
armament. These writers saw it as precisely their own right 
and duty to criticise and investigate matters of public concern 
in the manner of Per Spiegel. The magazine was one of them 
in this sense. Hence the manifesto they published in solidari­
ty with its staff expressed their determination to defend 
against any government encroachment the role which they took 
to be entrusted to them to be constantly morally alert on 
behalf of the general public:
Die Unterzeichneten drücken Herrn Rudolf Augstein 
ihre Achtung aus und sind mit ihm solidarisch. In 
einer Zeit, die den Krieg als Mittel der Politik 
unbrauchbar gemacht hat, halten sie die Unterrich­
tung der Öffentlichkeit Uber sogenannte militärische 
Geheimdienst für eine sittliche Pflicht, die sie 
jederzeit erfüllen würden.
It is significant that they defended this role as 
"eine sittliche Pflicht". Public statements of such a kind 
by intellectuals were best expressed in moral terms precisely 
because they could not claim political authority for them­
selves within a pluralist understanding of democracy, for 
that authority was delegated to the government and the 
political parties. The one avenue which was open to them was 
to question the government's moral authority.
This is not to say that ethical terms of reference 
arc quite separate from political ones On the contrary, 
ethical vocabulary was a way of formulating political demands. 
For Grass himself, moral legitimacy and political legitimacy 
were one and the same thing, as I have shown in the previous 
chapter. The first occasion on which he was bold enough to 
challenge an aspect of the government’s affairs directly 
was in 1965 when he called for Erhard's resignation.14*
Erhard was the figure who offended left-liberal intellectuals' 
view of themselves. When he abused their approach to politics, 
his own political legitimacy came into question. Not only did 
he herald the end of the pluralist view of democracy himself 
with his propositions about a 'formierte Gesellschaft', he 
also challenged the place intellectuals thought they legit­
imately held within a democracy when he rudely chastised 
their inter ference in political affairs, calling them:
... Banausen und Nichtskönner, die über Dinge reden, 
von denen sie einfach nichts verstehen (...) Ich 
wende mich (...) gegen die Versuche intellektueller
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Snobs, den Wohlstand ln der Bundesrepublik lächer­
lich zu machen ...15)
Grass took Issue with the Chancellor over the 
relationship he had arrived at with President Nasser of Egypt, 
which Grass saw as an offence to the Israelis. He felt that 
Erhard's political deals finally demonstrated his moral bank­
ruptcy. Such a Chancellor was not fit for the country which 
was beholden to Israel to recompense for Nazi crimes against 
the Jews.
He thus made a political challenge phrased in entirely 
ethical terms. In these very same months Erhard's political 
authority within his government and within his party was 
crumbling in the political crisis which removed him from his 
leadership of the CDU and from the Chancellorship. The resol­
ution to this crisis of confidence in the government, and in 
particular in its ability to manage the economy, was the 
coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU under Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger which was arrived at in late 1966.
Thus constituted, the Grand Coalition made a 
mockery of the pluralist faith in government as balance.
Given the small size of the FDP fraction in parliament which 
then became the only counterweight to the government, the 
limits of parliamentary democracy became clear now that 
there was no effective control over such a united governing 
bloc. This coalition revealed a concentration of power, far 
from a dispersal of power, which constitutional democracy
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was powerless to prevent.
The political legitimacy of the government and of 
the established parties was seen to be less than secure. A 
reasonable confidence in the potential of West German 
democracy had been necessary to intellectuals' confidence 
in themselves as the mentors of that democracy. Grass' 
challenge to Erhard had thus turned out to be the last 
possible protest against the government which could confine 
itself to judging first and foremost with moral standards. 
In future dissent would have to seek further avenues and 
more conspicuously political terms of reference.
'Gewissen der Partei'?
The Grand Coalition forced Grass to make a directly 
political as well as a moral response. His dilemma was how 
to handle the political consequences, which he foresaw, of 
the SPD's compromise with the CDU as well as the moral im­
plications of its decision to accept an ex-Nazi Chancellor.
He wrote two open letters to Willy Brandt, one to 
Kiesinger and an article in DIE ZEIT dealing with Brandt's 
reply.16*The letters to Brandt were the appeals of someone 
who was helpless and powerless to affect the SPD leadership's 
decision. The one to Kiesinger once again raised ethical 
objections to entrusting political leadership to a man who
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had been a Nazi. The article in DIE ZEIT tell* us most about 
his problems in accepting this coalition which offended his 
sensibilities as a politically conscientious intellectual.
In the first place he had to recognise that he had 
no power. It was now plain to see that power was concentrated 
in the hards of a few and that he was excluded from their 
number as a layman. Grass' letters show that he was aware 
that he could have no pretensions to any real influence. 
Nevertheless he attempted to fight back. It was at least a 
small success to elicit some kind of response from those who 
did have power. That Brandt bothered to reply to Grass was 
a welcome gesture of reconciliation, comfort to hurt pride.
Brandt's letter prompted Grass to write back again 
in an endeavour to keep discussion open, in the hope that 
conscientious dissent like his own from outside the political 
parties should not now suddenly find itself devalued. In his 
letter to Grass, Brandt rejected criticism of the party from 
outside its ranks. This implied that in cases of conflict 
between critical opinion and the party, the standards which 
intellectuals had previously applied were not relevant or 
legitimate.
Grass took issue with this monopoly of conscience 
which Brandt claimed for the political party because its 
decisions affected the whole public. In this debate.
Grass was trying to rescue something of the old position;
however he had been forced to think this out in explicitly 
political rather than moral categories. He staunchly re­
asserted the vital role of criticism which was independent 
of the established parties, but he formulated it in a series 
of political questions. Furthermore, he spoke on behalf of 
the public as a whole, as a member of the general public 
rather than as someone in a special position as a writer:
Die politischen Mächte in unserem Teilstaat haben 
sich umgebettet. (...)
Wir, die wir den regierenden wie oppositionellen 
Parteien mit unserer Stimme zeitbeschränkte Voll­
machten geben, sind in der Lage, zwischen den 
Wahlen mahnend bis empört zu reagieren. Es wurde 
telefoniert, es wurden Telegramme aufgesetzt, die 
Post bekam zu tun. (...) Ich habe drei Briefe ge­
schrieben und bis heute eine Antwort bekommen.
Willy Brandt (...) antwortete postwendend. 
(...) Ein Satz dieses Briefes -"Das Gewissen der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei schlägt nicht außer­
halb dieser Partei"- erregt meinen heftigen Wider­
spruch. (...) Nein, Willy Brandt, so festgefügt 
die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands sein 
mag, so sehr diese Partei sich dem herrischen Zu­
griff eines Herbert Wehner gefügt hat, nicht Sie 
allein können bestimmen, was soziale Demokratie 
bedeutet, sein kann und sein sollte.
(...) Der Staat sind wir. (...)
Wir werden prüfen, wie Kurt Georg Kiesinger 
und Herbert Wehner verantworten, was sie uns zu­
muten. (...) Wir werden prüfen, ob es Willy Brandt 
gelingt, seine Deutschlandpolitik (...) durchzuset­
zen. (...) Wenn diese Große Koalition nur tätig 
sein wird, sobald es gilt, Notstandsgesetze zu 
verabschieden, dann möge sie zerbrechen, bevor die 
Bundesrepublik an ihr zerbricht.
Unter den fragwürdigsten Umständen: Die SPD 
regiert. Schon die Regierungserklärung wird erwei­
sen, ob das Gewissen der SPD auch auf der Regie­
rungsbank schlägt.17)
It was obvious that if a writer was to become a 
real political voice, then he had to try and reach a wider 
audience than he had had before as an intellectual. Making 
speeches was a means of gaining more direct access to an
audlance, even If not necessarily to a larger one. This was 
an avenue which Grass pursued especially energetically in the 
first period after the Grand Coalition was formed.
Political and social tensions accelerated after 1966. 
The instability they caused facilitated Grass' career as a 
political speaker. He wanted to stem the tide of disaffection 
towards the right and the left of the established parliament­
ary parties. In his efforts to find alternatives to this 
polarisation, he left the position of intellectual as conscience 
behind and more or less turned himself into a politician for 
a short period.
Initially he went along with the student opposition 
in West Berlin and shared some of their concerns. However as 
a would-be mediator between the extra-parliamentary movement 
and the political parties, he soon dropped common cause with 
the former, in somewhat bad grace. Vietnam, the Emergency 
Powers Laws and the Springer Press were contentions which 
illustrate how the boundary of opposition for Grass was to 
disclaim his disapproval in each case, whilst the student 
opposition hurtled towards direct action.
Defender of the State
The rise of the neo-Nazi NPD at this time and the 
acceleration of opposition to the Vietnam War and the Emerg-
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ency Laws into the student protests of 1967 to 1969 created 
a tense political climate in West Germany and West Berlin.
The first sign of both these developments accompanied the 
political crisis during which Erhard's government was forced 
into dissolution. In November 1966 the NPD gained nearly 8% 
of the poll in the Land-election in Hessen and was able to 
enter a Land-parliament for the first time. The first important 
Vietnam demonstration took place in the centre of Berlin on 
December loth, in the Land-elections of the following year 
the NPD continued to make gains and finally reached the peak 
of its success ln Baden-Württemberg in April 1968 with nearly 
10% of the votes.
These strains on the left and the right were the 
beginnings of the strife which was felt over the next few 
years. By the end of the sixties all the major capitalist 
countries had seen vigorous and sometimes violent social, 
political and industrial conflicts. In other countries these 
were disputes which had been slumbering and which now re­
erupted on a large scale. In the Federal Republic they 
emerged from the dark after nearly a decade of virtually 
complete civic quiescence.
A more active and lively political climate was 
stimulated after the recession of 1966/67 by the state 
administration's need to manage the economy and the social 
infrastructure much more directly than had been the case 
before in West Germany. Under Erhard's policies, market-
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philosophy had been to the fore and the government had 
appeared not to be an active agent in the economy but rather 
an overseer. Once state intervention and structural planning 
became necessary, the government and the administration could 
be seen to be active agents of the conditions in which people 
lived and worked. This led to social and industrial conflicts 
which began to be felt under Brandt's government after 1969. 
Meanwhile, the change of state philosophy and government action 
had ideological affects which were felt by students and 
intellectuals in particular. For they were strata on the one 
hand whose independence was threatened by the extension of 
the government's politico-administrative arm, and who on the 
other hand had been educated to take the values of freedom 
seriously and who now saw them betrayed over the international 
and domestic issues which fuelled the extra-parliamentary 
opposition.
The revolts of 1966-1969 amounted to a fight against 
the old dogmas of the 'Free West', whose validity was put into 
question by the action of the Western government's themselves, 
the American government in Vietnam, the Grand Coalition at 
home in the Federal Republic. Grass entered into this strife 
and recognised the need for a new ideological spirit which 
would be sufficiently progressive to replace the conservative 
anti-communist consensus of the CDU era. His reactions are 
symptomatic of the political climate of the late sixties and 
early seventies.
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But In the course of these clashes and dissensions, 
his original sympathy for the major protest-issues of the 
day exhausted itself. It is well known that the war in Viet­
nam was a catalyst of the extra-parliamentary movement, and 
it was the first case where Grass rapidly faded from the 
ranks of the opposition.
In 1965 he had signed an international statement, 
published in the New York Times, which criticised American 
intervention in Vietnam. This, however, was about the only 
time he took a definite oppositional stand. In late November 
1965 other intellectuals in West Germany protested against 
the American role in Vietnam and their own government's un­
swerving loyalty to OS military policy.18* Grass did not 
join this and thereafter it became clear that he was not 
interested in protesting over Vietnam at home. Instead he 
selectively supported the SPD's position on the war.
In November 1966 he published an article in the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung in which he sought further publicity 
for Brandt's support of one of the Pope's calls for peace 
in South-East Asia.19)The major part of this article simply 
reprints an interview Brandt gave to the Catholic News- 
agency. Grass' main purpose was to propogate Brandt's position 
on the war, because it had apparently been ignored by the 
press. He was trying to rescue a humanist concern over the 
war from oblivion, so that the issue should not be confined 
to the extra-parliamentary battles. He backed up particular
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people within the SPD leadership, lest they lose their 
liberal identity in a radicalised climate now that the SPD 
was part of the government. Such is the gist of his article 
"Vietnam geht auch uns an" in DIE ZEIT 19/1/68. Earlier in 
January the SPD leadership had issued a declaration calling 
for a cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam. Again 
Grass repeated the SPD's position in his own article and 
demanded that the coalition government and the Bundestag 
as a whole should follow the SPD's example and break their 
silence on the war, a silence which was tantamount to 
supporting American action.
It seems that on the whole he was more concerned 
with attitudes to the Vietnam War at home than with the 
rights and wrongs of the struggle in South-East-Asia.
The issue between the Americans and the Vietnamese had be­
come a domestic political problem for the West Germans.
The polarisation the war caused on the home front was what 
concerned Grass in his capacity as a public figure. He was 
prominent amongst those who organised a rally at the be­
ginning of March 1968, which was supported by three civil- 
rights groups (Humanistische Union, Liga fUr Menschenrechte 
and the Arbeitskreis Kirche und Gesellschaft). This rally 
bore the title "Appell an die Verr.unft” and it aimed to 
take a stand against any further escalation of the confront­
ation in Berlin. On this occasion Grass made a point of not 
taking sides about which forces should be victorious in Viet­
nam. The reason he gave for not being partisan, was that too
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little was known about the Vietcong for people in the West 
to know whether to support them or not.20*
So Grass took issue from the point of view of his 
own society's future rather than of the Vietnamese, and 
here he and the extra-parliamentary opposition parted 
company radically. In contrast to Grass, the students were 
disposed to precisely the sort of emotional identification 
with the Vietnamese people which he backed away from. Their 
slogan "Berlin ist unser Vietnam" expresses how they were 
inspired by just such an identification.
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critical thinker as JUrgen Habermas and a socialist and acad­
emic of such high standing as Wolfgang Abendroth. It was one 
of the opening sessions of the New Left in West Germany.
Grass was not one to participate in circles as 
radical as this, despite a degree of common cause with them 
during this very early phase of the rebirth of the left in 
West Germany. He supported the rights of demonstrators 
against the police and the city authorities in Berlin, but 
he did not extend his solidarity to the SDS. The most serious 
incident in Berlin after Ohneoorg's death occured in February 
1968. A congress had been organised which concluded with a 
demonstration against the Berlin authorities. In response 
the trade-union leadership in the city organised a counter­
march, which stoked up hostility towards the students who 
came under physical attack. A group of 128 figures from the 
intelligentsia considered that the city authorities had 
colluded in this violence. They criticised the authorities' 
law-and-order attitude and expressed their support for the 
rights of oppositional demonstrators.21* Grass was amongst 
them, and this was only one of the occasions when he spoke 
out for the right of public assembly and for tolerance of 
dissent.
However he would have preferred to see this dissent 
transferred to parliamentary ground and its militancy diff­
used because of the polarisation it had led to. He never 
did join the direct opposition to the Vietnam war because
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he favoured seeking influence over the government through the 
political parties, especially the SPD,22* and he wanted to 
have nothing to do with the kind of militancy against the 
state which was emerging in the student movement. Grass' 
preference for chastising the Bundestag, the government, the 
SPD, was not very convincing at this time given that
the Federal Government was bound to the United States in 
NATO and there was little chance of modifying its attitude. 
Consequently,at a time when there was no effective avenue 
of criticism to be seen anywhere apart from the student move­
ment, Grass appeared to have moved to the right when he would 
not join common cause with the New Left.
Alongside Vietnam, the other controversy to 
dominate this decade was proposed legislation to change the 
Basic Law in order to grant the government extraordinary 
powers in times of emergency (Notstandsgesetze). Pressure 
against such a proposal . to give the state the potential 
power to restrict democratic rights had been building up 
ever since a first bill of such a kind had been on the par­
liamentary agenda for the legislative period 1961 - 1965.
The Federal Congress of the German Trade Union Federation 
(DGB) declared its opposition to this bill in October 1962.23  ^
The DGB confirmed its rejection of the legislation in the 
following March. There were academics, writers, clergy and 
teachers who supported the DGB'S position and also opposed 
the idea of Emergency Powers Laws. At the end of 1964 Grass' 
name was amongst 200 people from many intellectual professions
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who subscribed to an appeal Against the bill made to Bundes­
tag members by the Humanistische Union.
In the main it was trade-union pressure which per­
suaded the SPD fraction not to vote in favour of that first 
bill, although the party did not reject such legislation in 
principle. Revised proposals remained on the parliamentary 
agenda under the next two governments. The stumbling block 
for the opposition was whether the trade-unions and the 
student and intellectual wing of the movement against this 
legislation could be brought together to fight a united 
campaign. They failed to achieve this unity. The DGB co­
operated in a congress held in May 1965 which was entitled 
"Demokratie im Notstand", but withdrew its support by the 
time a second one was organised in October 1966 which Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger led. The failure to maintain a united 
movement against the Emergency Powers Bill meant that a 
modified version of it was eventually passed under the 
Grand Coalition in May 1968.
Grass also distrusted the proposals all along. 
Nevertheless he remained sceptical of the attempts which 
were made to organise an extra-parliamentary campaign 
against them. His statements implied that all efforts 
should be directed at the parliamentary process, even when 
under the Grand Coalition this, or this alone, would have 
little if any effect. He had no alternative to offer between
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protest and a discredited parliament!
Mein Nein selbst zu dem demokratischsten Notstand­
gesetz läßt sich nicht juristisch begründen. Die 
Erfahrung zeigt! Uns allen, den Befürwortern wie 
den Gegnern der Notstandgesetze, fehlt die demo­
kratische Reife, um mit einem solchen Gesetz um­
gehen zu können.
Nach den Ereignisse der letzten Monate wissen 
wir, wie hilflos und widersprüchlich Behörden und 
Demonstranten z.B. das Demonstrationsrecht ausle­
gen, wie hektisch die Polizei in den Einsatz ge­
schickt und, aufgrund ungenauer Weisungen, um ihr 
Ansehen gebracht wird.
Äußerungen des Bundeskanzlers und des Bundesinnen­
ministers lassen nicht hoffen, daß die zur Zeit ver­
antwortlich regierenden Politiker größere Demonstra­
tionen oder eine eventuell um sich greifende Streik­
bewegung von einem wirklichen Notstand unterscheiden 
können. Wir sind gebrannte Kinder.
(...) Isoliert, mißgelaunt und das eigene Unbehagen 
mit Forschheit überdeckend, arbeitet der Bundestag 
nur noch unter der Devise: Das muß endlich vom 
Tisch, (...).
Auch wenn viele Bundestagsabgeordnete die neue Ge­
setzesvorlage mit schlechten Vorahnungen lesen und 
mit Fragezeichen versehen werden, am Ende könnte der 
unheilvolle Fraktionszwang wieder einmal beweisen, 
wie demokratisch unreif unsere Gesellschaft bis in 
den Bundestag hinein immer noch ist.24)
Grass did not join the campaign against these laws. 
In this period it became ever clearer that he defended the 
parliamentary process per se and for this reason disengaged 
himself from public conflicts over the content of such 
legislation. Moreover he disengaged himself at a time when 
parliament was clearly of no avail as an instrument of 
opposition to the government's plans. This made it seem that 
all he was interested in was getting protest off the streets, 
because his attitude to the issues themselves was ambiguous. 
The only thing he made quite clear was that as a means of 
opposition he favoured pressurising the parliamentary parties
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to take account of public criticism. His final word on the 
Emergency Laws was to take them as a lesson in how the 
established parties should have treated the opposition to the 
legislation, and how the opposition should behave for its 
part:
Und wie sieht es aus, wenn in einer demokratischen 
Gesellschaft ein Konflikt seit Jahren da i*t, ver­
drängt wird, sich neu zu Wort meldet, verharmlost, 
dann teilweise ausgetragen, am Ende überstürzt ge­
löst wird, um einen neuen Konflikt zu produzieren?
Ich spreche von den Notstandsgesetzen. Wer 
die erste Vorlage des damaligen Innenministers 
Schröder mit der zuletzt verabschiedeten Gesetzes­
vorlage vergleicht, der wird bemerken, wie dank der 
Kompromißbereitschaft der Parteien, dank der öffent­
lichen Kritik und dank des Protestes gegen die Not­
standsgesetze, ein anfangs annähernd polizeistaatli­
ches Konzept mehr und mehr liberalisiert worden ist. 
Mehr und mehr heißt für die einen zuviel, für die 
anderen zuwenig.
(...) Hätte die Minderheit, weil überstimmt, die 
Kompromißlösung nicht akzeptieren und den Kampf 
gegen die Notstandsgesetze mit anderen Mitteln, zum 
Beispiel mit denen der Gewalt fortsetzen sollen?
Die überstimmten Bundestagsabgeordneten, auch 
die Gewerkschaften und mit ihnen viele, die in der 
Öffentlichkeit protestiert hatten, fügten sich dem 
Mehrheitsbeschluß, weil sie wissen und wußten, daß 
in einer Demokratie Konflikte nur durch den Kompro­
miß zu lösen sind. Ist damit gesagt, daß das Votum 
der Mehrheit richtig war? Auch falsche oder unzu­
reichende Lösungen können Konflikte beenden, bis 
die falschen oder unzureichenden Lösungen einen ,5* 
neuen Konflikt schaffen, der den alten neu aufwirft. '
The newspaper empire owned by Axel Springer and the 
methods of his papers was another area of controversy where 
Grass showed how his priorities now diverged from the extra- 
parliamentary left. He made an attack on the Springer press 
in September 1967, occasioned by reports in three Springer 
papers on the 9th of that month, which had alleged that the 
writer Arnold Zwelg had compared the GDR, where he lived.
to Fascism.
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Thia allegation had been taken from a false report. 
It took a fortnight for the papers concerned to half-heart­
edly retract it. Angered by this abuse of Zweig's reputation 
and the irresponsibility of the Springer papers, Grass found 
an avenue for condemning Springer journalists by introducing 
the television programme "Panorama" for the 25th of that 
month, which investigated the Zweig affair.
He made two demands: that the German Press Council, 
the Bundestag and the Constitutional Court should put a stop 
to "die zunehmende Schädigung der parlamentarischen Demo­
kratie durch die Zeitungen des Springerkonzerns", and that 
the newspaper-reading public should boycott all Springer- 
controlled publications. This second demand was immediately 
feasible, but extremely improbable. The first part of his 
protest would only be taken seriously if a sufficiently 
vigorous campaign got underway to exert pressure on parliament 
and the courts to do something about the power of this 
political and financial block within the press. Apart from 
that. Grass simply apologised to Zweig "stellvertretend für 
viele".26* He was evidently spoiling to spar with the Sprin­
ger press, but did not himself take an active role in a 
movement against the giants within the newspaper industry.
He used militant language but stopped short of any kind of 
militant action.
Nevertheless, this intervention initiated a more 
prolonged campaign against the Springer press and its in­
fluence than any other separate issue Grass ever helped
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provoke. This campaign threatened to become more radical 
than he was prepared to support.
Numerous newspapers took sides over the affair.
In DIE ZEIT Dieter E. Zimmer wrote several articles follow­
ing up the "Panorama" programme's exposure of the dubious 
background to the original report.27  ^ A number of Springer 
journalists began libel proceeding against Grass for accus­
ing them of fabricating reports worthy of fascists. Grass 
declared that he would be able to gather evidence to fight 
and win this case, but it was later withdrawn before it got 
to court. The head of the Deutscher JournalIstenverband 
complained that Grass had insulted the whole profession, 
but then some of the members of that association dissented 
from that view.2®^The toing and froing within the profession 
alone became voluminous enough to fill a book 
which documented the affair using Grass' statement as a 
29)starting-point. As is well known, this was only one of 
numerous collections of documentary and analytical material 
against the Springer empire which have continued to appear 
ever since, because Springer has remait.ed a festering wound 
for the left, especially amongst the intelligentsia. Grass' 
was one of the first shots fired in a long battle.
The original reports about Zweig to which Grass had 
taken exception were the catalyst of a much wider wave of 
concern amongst journalists. Springer's companies had a 
majority control of the press in West Berlin and a large
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holding in the press in the rest of the Federal Republic.
This added up to little short of a monopoly, flaunting the 
commercial realities which lie behind the freedom 
and independence of the press in a liberal democracy. This 
concentration of ownership scandalised many liberals as well 
as left-wingers because the Springer papers had such in­
fluence to spread repressive attitudes, in particular 
violent hostility to the students. Furthermore, the reports 
seemed to have malevolently tampered with Zweig's reputation 
as a writer who had been persecuted in the Third Reich. The 
case cast a slur over the profession's reputation and self- 
image. Mutual recrimination polarised the right-wing from 
the liberal wing of the press.
Other sections of the intelligentsia were also 
hardening their resolve to do something about Springer's 
power. At the time when the affair over Zweig blew up, the 
Gruppe 47 were holding a conference, and they decided to 
boycott every publication Springer controlled and to en­
courage their publishers to break off their connection with his 
organisation. At the same time the SDS wanted 
the writers to take up their demand that Springer's holdings 
in the newspaper industry should be expropriated. After 
some demonstrators burned copies of BILD outside the group's 
meeting, Grass threatened to withdraw his signature from 
the boycott resolution if the students were invited in to 
discuss the Springer problem, as had been proposed. Erich 
Fried, who witnessed this quarrel, complained that Grass
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was so determined not to take any action beyond boycott 
that he would not support a public tribunal on Springer 
which was proposed.30* He had said he would bring evidence 
to court on the fascism of Springer's papers, but he would 
not produce it for such a tribunal. The result was that he 
appeared to have betrayed the campaign which he had willy- 
nilly been midwife to. The reason for this desertion was 
that he did not want to be associated with this extra- 
parliamentary opposition any longer.
Profile of a moderate
Grass' disagreements with the extra-parliamentary 
left reconciled him to the SPD and to its collaboration in 
the coalition government. His problem then was what to do 
about the vacuum he found himself in, as he was neither 
part of the extra-parliamentary opposition nor a member of 
an established political party. For a short period he had 
been counted amongst the opposition to the Grand Coalition. 
But after he had crossed swords with the student left, he 
developed a self-consciously middle-of-the-road stance.
Four major speeches he made in 1968 were concerned with his 
view of himself as a moderate: 'Rede zum 1. Mai 1968',
'Die angelesene Revolution', 'Uber das Ja und Nein' and 
'Radikalismus in Deutschland'31*. Given that this same year 
was the high-point of revolutionary optimism for the New 
Left, it was unmistakably clear that Grass now stood on quite 
different ground.
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Indeed to the left It Inevitably looked like he 
stood on the other side of the barricades. It is true that 
he seemed to be almost taunting the student movement and 
making rather a parade of his moderation. However, it is only 
fair to say that he was also trying to make a constructive 
intervention between the student left and the SPD, between 
the generations. He had a fighting conception of where the 
median lays not just somewhere in the middle between the right 
and the left by default, or by spurning all contact with the 
left. That would mean that it was too weak to define itself 
and could be identified only through the hostility it met with 
from the left and the right. Grass thought that the ideas and 
values of reformists should be actively championed and developed.
It could be said that from this point the whole of 
his political evolution was informed by such a search for 
ways of developing the ideas and of strengthening the commit­
ment of reformists. This is why he got so closely^with the SPD 
that he was a close friend of the politicians by the end of the 
sixties. In his speeches in 1968 he talked about how important 
it was that liberals and social democrats should make their 
criticism of the radical left positive as well as negative, by 
ensuring gradualist change themselves:
Der Protest der Jugend hat die Unsicherheit unserer 
unzulänglich etablierten Demokratie offenbar gemacht. 
Dieser Erfolg ist zweideutig. Entweder veranlaßt er 
längst überfällige Reformen (...) oder es passiert, 
wie bisher, nichts; (...).
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Nicht rechts von eich , sondern dort, wo die Jugend 
hilflos und sich selbst überlassen protestiert, 
sollten die Sozialdemokraten ihre Verbündeten suchen.
He also tried to practise what he preached by making 
contact with various youth groups. His speech against the NPD 
in November 1966 was a beginning to this. In its published 
form it was entitled 'Rede an einen jungen Wähler, der sich 
versucht fühlt, die NPD zu wählen'33* and in it he had tried 
to reason with a potential young NPD supporter f*om the point 
of view of someone who had experienced the Nazi regime, the 
NPD's progeni tors.
Over the next few years Grass maintained this con­
tact with youth groups particularly during the campaigns for 
the Land-elections between the federal elections in 1969 and 
1972.34*This approach brought him into an unfamiliar area 
between the critical attitude to politicians which intellect­
uals usually upheld, and the established position of a polit­
ician. His stance was that of a mentor, and he took this up 
as an adult who had the right to speak from experience.
Taking his own biography as his brief in public engagements 
shows that he wanted to get away from the idea that as an 
intellectual or a writer he had some special birthright 
to political influence.
A number of experiences had taught him the lesson 
that the role of an intellectual in politics qua intellect­
ual was a no man's land which it was not worth tarrying in 
if he wanted to achieve something practical.
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Since his campaign speeches in 1965, when he had 
spoken of renouncing Germany's claim to the terriories east 
of the Oder-Neiße, Grass had been counted amongst those with 
a realistic attitude to the Federal Republic's problem with 
her east-European neighbours. So a couple of years later he 
was to be found making a speech to the Bonn Press Club in 
May 1967, in which he intended to substantiate his views on 
how relations with the GDR should be resolved after the 
Cold War. He argued against reunification of the two German 
states on the grounds that a united Germany had always been 
a disaster for the world.35* He proposed a federal association 
instead.
At the time reunification was still the govern­
ment's formal objective, being enshrined in the Basic Law. 
But the coalition agreement between the CDU and the SPD did 
not attach a lot of weight to it and instead stressed 
possible practical improvements between the two states.
This policy was closely associated with Brandt, who had 
worked this way as Mayor of West Berlin. These issues were 
still extremely emotive ones in West Germany, but Grass' 
suggestions were of no relevance to public opinion. It was 
much safer to tacitly ignore reunification than to throw 
it overboard, and those in power were doing the former. 
Kiesinger was the first Chancellor to admit that the country 
would not be reunited in anything like the near future.36* 
Grass' ideas were still-born in the light of the govern­
ment's policy. No single individual could pepper the debate
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any longer, because the work of establishing new bases for 
relations with the Conruinlst states, including the GDR, was 
being done by the diplomats.
Grass' active support for Israel brought him into a 
similarly ineffectual position. Initially he struck a 
popular chord, but he lost the public's interest when the 
dispute in the Middle-East became so serious that it threat­
ened international stability. Grass had declared his fervent 
support for Israel when war first broke out in the Middle- 
East in 1967. At that time he was very much in tune with 
the wave of support for Israel in West Germany.37  ^ The 
general enthusiasm for the Israeli cause smacked of surro­
gate repentance of the Third Reich. Grass' ambitions were 
deeper than that. He wanted to see the German nation genuinely 
atone for its atrocities against the Jews. Earlier in that 
year he had made an officially sponsored visit to Israel 
and had presented himself as an envoy to the Jewish people 
from a penitent German nation.3®^  He had appointed himself 
to this role and could not sustain it for long. For an 
individual person's endeavours paled beside the involvement 
of governments in this ever more complex conflict. As Israel 
39)remained close to his heart, he received a little public 
recognition when he was included in a large party which 
accompanied Brandt on an official visit to Israel in June 
197 3 .
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia40*, the 
dictatorship in Greece41*, dissidents in the Soviet Union42* 
and in other East European countries431 were further conflicts 
which he felt very strongly about. Time and again he let his 
views and feelings be known, but as he could do little more, 
his frustration only grew all the more. A means of trying 
to rectify this permanent powerlessness was to get involved 
in projects in the developing world . 441 But again, after some 
initial publicity that such a writer was getting something 
practical done, success in these projects was scarcely any 
more tangible than it had been in any of his initiatives at 
home apart from his electoral work.
These were all stages along Grass' route away from 
the general and ideal non-party politics of the intellect­
uals of his generation, towards the sort of para-party forum 
which emerged in the Voters' Initiative and which I shall 
discuss in its own right in the next two chapters. After 1968 
Grass increasingly concentrated on the SPD at home and on 
those things he could take a practical part in. His disillu­
sion with moral appeals and protests from figures within the 
intelligentsia who otherwise did little or nothing in politics, 
was particularly marked in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Then he felt that protest had proved 
to be so Impotent that for the layman the only card left to 
be played was to turn the politicians' monopoly of power to 
advantage, by delegating one's moral and political responsi­
bilities to the leaders one had elected into office.
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In the case of the Biafran civil war he proposed that it 
would be best to channel all public concern through Brandt:
Kein Protest hat den Vietnam-Krieg beenden können. 
Kein Protest vermochte die Sowjetunion und Ihre 
Verbündeten zu hindern, die Tsche 'hoslowakel mit 
Panzern zu überrollen. Die Geschichte weltweiter 
Gewaltanwendung ist gleichzeitig die Geschichte 
ohnmächtiger Proteste gegen die Gewalt (...) 
sprechen wir zuallererst eine Adresse an, die uns 
verantwortlich ist, also die Bundesregierung, be­
sonders den Bundesaußenminister Willy Brandt, der 
durch seine Rede in Genf bewiesen hat, daß ihm die 
Politiker der Dritten Welt zuhören; sein Aufruf 
zum Gewaltverzicht fand ihren Beifall.” )
Grass had moved from the typical intellectual 
position earlier in the decade which had been akin to the 
critic in the gallery, to a seat in the front row. From 
there he could either go on stage himself, which he
was to do in his campaigns for the SPD, or he could applaud 
his favourite politicians at work in the government:
Nicht nur Leistungen, auch Teilleistungen, selbst 
einen dreimal verwässerten Leber-Plan, nenne ich 
vernünftig und deshalb wert, verbessert zu werden. 
Die zähe und vernunftsbestimmte Arbeit eines Karl 
Schillers nötigt mir Respekt ab. Ich freue mich 
über die Kleinsterfolge in Sachen Demokratie.46)
' A t  this stage his applause sounded rather sycophantic. 
By discarding protest-politics he had fallen into the role 
of an ideologue for the SPD ministers. On the other hand, 
he had also dropped any pretensiors to a role which had been 
specific to intellectuals, for one which theoretically any 
other lay person could join him in.
What is more. good number of people did join Grass
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in the Voters' Initiatives. For this reason his experiences 
in the dissensions of the sixties illustrate some of the 
after-effects of that strife. By the time his sympathy with 
the major protest issues of the decade was exhausted, he 
had acquired a relationship with the parliamentary parties 
which was a major ingredient of the Voters' Initiatives.
They in turn can be seen as one of the alternatives which 
people from the middle classes and the intelligentsia ex­
perimented with once the unpolitical conservatism, which 
had dominated for so long, became unstable in the mid-sixties. 
In the next two chapters I shall try to show how Grass' 
political career was of course individual, but at the same 
time symptomatic of the period, because it matched many 
aspects of the SPD's own growth and progress.
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cha pter SIX
SPD AND 'ES-PE-DE'
Intellectuals and the SPD
The collection of essays edited by Walser In 1961, 
Die Alternative Oder Brauchen wir elne neue Keglerung,1 * 
made its appearance as the result of an agreement between 
the SPD and a number of intellectuals for the latter to show 
their support for this party. The book sold well, but what 
is such a book in an election campaign?
It represented the kind of support which was wel­
come to the SPD in its efforts to shift away from the working- 
class emphasis it had always had in the past. The SPD faced 
a Right wing which had stayed in government for over a decade 
and which had been able to exploit the SPD's historical place 
in the Socialist movement by associating it with the Communism 
of Eastern Europe. The SPD’s opponents had benefited from this 
in election after election. Representing a cultural elite, 
well-known writers and Intellectuals could add a little tone 
and colour to the new image the SPD was seeking for itself 
in order to break the hold of anti-communist demagogy. It 
wanted to be seen as a party of all classes, a progressive 
'Volkspartei1.
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This reorientation had begun as early as 1954.
Then the Party Conference had changed the wording of the 1952 
Programme for Action to declare: "Die Sozialdemokratie 1st aus 
einer Partei der Arbeiterklasse, als die sie erstand, zur Par- 
tei des Volkes geworden." This formulation grew into an en­
tirely new programme which was adopted at Godesberg in 1959.
At the beginning of the sixties it remained to be seen whether 
it would bring the SPD any more success in the elections.
In 1961 the task was to break through the absolute 
majority the CDU/CSU had gained in 1957. This entailed reach­
ing wider sections of the electorate, for the party's tradi­
tional working-class base was not of itself sufficient to 
bring it to power. The CDU government could still draw appar­
ently endless political credit from the recovery of the economy 
which it had steered since the foundation of the Federal 
Republic. In response the SPD had come to accept market 
economy principles in its own programme and policies. By the 
end of the fifties there was full employment and real incomes 
had increased, and whilst this favourable situation masked 
the exponentially unequal distribution of wealth between em­
ployers and employees2* class issues lost their attraction 
for most of the SPD. The market-economy was no longer funda­
mentally questioned. Social-democratic policy was for the 
government to have power to control distortion of genuine 
competition.3*
With this basis the SPD's campaign in 1961 did not
put forward any major alternatives to the goverment's eco­
nomic policies. Instead it stressed the objectives which 
both major parties held in common: increasing prosperity, 
uniting the nation and so on. It called for a spirit of co- 
ooeration in national politics. The party's candidate to 
become the next Chancellor was Brandt and when he presented 
the programme of the government he hoped to lead if elected, 
he spoke more about what kind of political spirit was desir­
able than about what actual policies were necessary. His 
outlook criticised trends towards an authoritarian state 
under the Christian Democrats in a way which took democracy 
very seriously, but which also made politics sound rather 
like a family affair:
Unser Volk braucht die Aussöhnung mit sich selbst. 
Dazu ist ein neuer Stil in unserer inneren Ordnung 
erforderlich. Die Verketzerung Andersdenkender, 
die Hexenjagd auf politisch Mißliebige und Gesin­
nungsschnüffelei müssen endlich aufhörenl Wir un­
terscheiden nicht wie gewisse Herrschaften zwischen 
Wahrheit, reiner Wahrheit und lauterer Wahrheit, 
sondern zwischen Wahrhaftigkeit, Lüge und infamer 
Lüge.
Die neue Bundesregierung wir£ dafür sorgen, daß 
ein neuer Geist durch unsere Lande geht, ein Geist 
der Achtung vor dem Nächsten und der Aussöhnung der 
Generationen. Wir Deutsche sind trotz allem eine 
Familie, Glieder einer Schicksalsgemeinschaft. Wir 
brauchen einen Staat, den jeder Bürger als seine 
wirkliche Heimstätte betrachten kann.
Die Verwirklichung dieses neuen Stils in der Politik 
muß oben beginnen. Die Freiheit des Staatsbürgers 
ist wichtiger als die Bequemlichkeit der Regleren-
The tenor of politics was to be about integrating 
all sections of society and conflict between the political 
parties was to be avoided. From 1961 this was to involve new
styles and methods of fighting elections, to find ways and 
means of improving the SPD's performance. Its policies were 
tailored to meet the broadest interests which had been identi­
fied in the electorate:
Nach Godesberg konzentrierte sich die SPD auf die 
Werbung neuer Anhänger. Moderne Informations- und 
Kommunikationsmedien wie Umfrageforschung und Fern­
sehen wurden in die politische Arbeit einbezogen. 
Dieser Trend zeichnete sich bereits auf dem Partei­
tag 1960 in Hannover ab, der ausschließlich Wahl­
kampffunktionen im Hinblick auf die 1961er Wahlen 
erfüllte. (...) Im Rahmen dieser Strategie kam es 
darauf an, in der Öffentlichkeit das Image einer 
Oppositionspartei abzubauen: Die Partei präsentierte 
sich als Teil des deutschen Volkes. So entstanden 
Parolen wie "Wir sind eine Familie". Auch eine Per- 
sonalisierung der Politik war Teil dieser Strategie: 
Mit den anderen Parteien setzte man sich weniger 
inhaltlich als mit der Aufrechnung demoskopisch 
ermittelter Eigenschaftsprofile der jeweiligen Par­
teiführer oder Spitzenkandidaten auseinander.5)
The Godesberg Programme laid the foundations for this trend.
Its analysis of West German society and the guidelines it set 
for reforms were so vague,that the SPD's overall objectives 
could be made to match features of Public Opinion which 
opinion-research agencies had categorised. Consequently, the 
SPD's propaganda aimed to sway the climate of an election in 
its favour, without challenging the means by which the Christian 
Democrats managed to dominate that climate, nor substantially 
challenging their policies.
At the beginning of the decade the post-Godesberg 
leaderhip faced the task of changing the language, style and 
method of the way the SPD presented itself. The Godesberg 
Programme had already rid it of Marxist remnants in its 
political theory. Brandt had been chosen as candidate for
186-
Chancellor in order to embody the new strategy as a new 
person at the head of the party.Obviously, whether writers 
demonstrated their allegiance to the SPD could hardly make 
the tiniest difference to extending its electoral support. 
But Brandt evidently believed that those of the intellectual 
community who were sympathetic to the left could back him up 
with new terms of reference for a reform-party beyond the 
Marxism which had been formally abandoned. The intellectual, 
rationalist values and standards the writers and intellect­
uals stood for could help provide the SPD with a political 
language which was neither sectional nor partisan. In his 
programme for the election Brandt had spoken of integrating 
intellectuals into a society which every German was respons­
ible for:
Dies meinen wir, wenn wir davon sprechen, daß 
unser Volk mit sich selbst versöhnt werden muß. 
(...) Aus der Vergangenheit sollten wir die Er­
fahrung mitnehmen, daß niemand abseits stehen 
darf, daß vor allem auch die gdstigen Schichten 
sich nicht aussperren lassen dürfen, daß die 
Besten unseres Volkes, wo immer sie im einzelnen 
stehen, mitwirken müssen. Kein guter Deutscher 
kann seine Verantwortung für das, was heute ist 
und morgen sein wird, leugnen. '
When he was campaigning he stayed as unprogranunatic as he 
could, in a bid towards undecided voters. His main appeal was 
for a kind of leadership for the country which was both 
equitable and cooperative based not least on intellectual 
values: "Das Geld darf nicht mehr über den Geist herrschen. 
(...) Ich werde dafür sorgen, daß sich die richtige Rangord­
nung der Werte durchsetzen wird."8^
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The introduction to Walser's book placed it precis­
ely in the critical but responsible, socially oriented but 
non-sectional, intellectual tradition which Brandt's political 
style drew on in 1961:
Die Schriftsteller, die hier ihre Stimme erheben, 
warnend, mahnend und sehr skeptisch (...) sehen 
sich in der Tradition Frankreichs, das von Voltaire 
über Zola bis Jean-Paul Sartre immer seine Manner 
der Feder auch als Gewissen der Nation wertete.
So verstanden soll dieser kleine Band nicht mehr 
und nicht weniger sein als ein Versuch zur Gewis- 
sensbildung.
Most of the contributors attacked the conservatism which 
dominated the Federal Republic: clerical power,9*
authoritarianism.10* Axel Eggebrecht, Hans Werner Pichter and 
Walser all actually criticised the SPD for accomodating 
to a government which had restored the kind of authoritarian 
ideology which liberal intellectuals such as themselves were 
sensitive to.11* All the writers but Grass granted the FPD 
only a negative advantage over the other major parties as 
the sole alternative to the continuance of the Christian 
Democrat regime:
Inzwischen weiß jeder: es gibt keine Opposition 
mehr. Anno 57, Erich Ollenhauer und seine SPD, 
das war die beste Opposition. Es war wie in einer 
Demokratie.12)
But this was essentially a rationalist critique, from the 
liberal to the radical-democratic, which was compatible with 
Brandt's language and which said nothing about socialism or
Marxism:
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Das Problem der Bundesrepublik heißt also nicht 
Kommunismus von außen oder Kapitalismus im Innern, 
es führt den guten alten Namen Klerikalismus 
Wir leben in voraufklärerischen Verhältnissen.
Günter Grass' contribution to this book was some­
thing of an exception. As the foreword indicated, most of 
the writers here were at least tacitly working with the 
traditional liberal-rationalist view of a public of enlight­
ened men to whom each writer addressed his critique. By 
contrast Grass' essay was emotional. It would have been 
sentimental if it had not been steeped in his irony as well. 
He had no criticisms to make of the SPD. He identified him­
self with it personally and emotionally, "die Tante SPD, 
mein schlechtes Gewissen, mein Xrgernis, meine schwach be­
gründete Hoffnung SPD".14  ^ He addressed himself to people 
whom he assumed already voted for the Social Democrats, or 
needed only a little tongue-in-cheek encouragement to do so. 
And he then endorsed their choice with a little paternal 
approval. So he did not share his colleagues' more in­
tellectual approach and their fondness for the model bour­
geois public. He was talking to a quite different political 
public, a wider public, a more petit-bourgeois public, one 
which would not be reached through a book alone.
The same point can be made about the second book 
by literary intellectuals supporting the SPD which was 
produced for 1965: Plädoyer für eine neue Regierung oder 
Keine Alternative.^^ In fact its contributors were nearly 
all different from those who had produced the book in 1961,
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and this time they had abandoned their reservations about 
the SPD and now wholeheartedly supported its leading politicians. 
They adapted their essays to its non-programmatic approach 
by concentrating entirely on portraits of individual person­
alities, not on politics or issues at all. They were now 
offering a direct, if limited, service to the SPD; just as 
they did in the 'Wahlkontor Deutscher Schriflsteller' which 
was organised in Berlin, where a handful of writers were put 
to work to polish the style of speeches to be made by leading 
Social Democrats in the campaign, the content of which was 
determined by the party-managers. For his contribution to 
the book Grass stuck to a literary format with a one-act 
play. Its protagonist was a politician who remained anonymous 
and who was clearly meant to be Brandt. The anonymity keeps 
Brandt away from any direct publicity. The literary form 
Grass chose here indirectly makes a political point. It 
emphasises that a publication such as this book, which would 
reach a numerically and socially limited audience, was an 
anachronism. If intellectuals were going to stick like this 
to a medium that was familiar to them, then in the end 
result there would be no practical difference between the 
literary presentation Grass used in the book and the more 
immediately accessible prose essays which all the other 
contributors provided.
In 1961 Grass had attended Brandt's campaign. For 
the next federal election he launched one of his own. He 
thus pioneered ways and means in which an intellectual could
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help the SPD's efforts to broaden its social base. His 
approach was much more effective than either of the books 
could have hoped to have been. It was an innovation which 
he hoped would rouse the curiosity of people who previously 
had shown little or no interest in the SPD.16* That is to 
say, middle-class people who were drawn by Grass' literary 
reputation to come and hear what he had to say. He talked 
about the SPD in a general fashion as a democratic party 
for all people. This was the kind of image the SPD needed 
amongst middle and upper strata. An outsider like Grass 
could be useful if he could help the party get over the 
barrier from being seen as a Klassenpartei to being accepted 
as a Volkspartei;
Im Verlauf mehrerer Gespräche mit dem damaligen 
Regierenden Bürgermeister von Berlin wird deutlich, 
daß die SPD zwar Stammwähler, aber kein beackertes 
Vorfeld hat. (Zwar nennt sie sich seit dem Godes­
berger Programm von 1959 'Volkspartei', doch be­
nimmt sie sich konservativ verharrscht wie eine 
introvertierte Klassenpartei).'''
However, Grass' political activity in the sixties 
gained a place in West German party-politics which no other 
intellectual achieved to the same degree, because he made a 
contribution which was not just limited to servicing the 
SPD's image. Whilst such a service was what some people 
in the party were looking for above all, Grass' 
own aims were to try and democratise conventional politics.
He wanted to democratise the way elections were conducted 
by seeing the electorate play a more active and vocal role 
in campaigns. He said that he spoke for the voters.16* This
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could partly have been to give himself credibility, lest the 
public see him as nothing but a literary curio. But that is 
hardly the whole story. The hallmark of Grass' ideas was 
their link to Brandt's. His view of a popular participatory 
spirit in elections corresponded to Brandt's avowed intention 
to ensure that the government which was elected in 1969 would 
effect a range of administrative, legislative and social re­
forms in a democratic spirit, as he declared when he became 
Chancellor:
Wir wollen mehr Demokratie wagen. Wir werden unsere 
Arbeitsweise öffnen und dem kritischen Bedürfnis 
nach Information Genüge tun. Wir werden darauf hin­
wirken, daß nicht nur durch Anhörungen im Bundestag, 
sondern auch durch ständige Fühlungnahme mit den 
repräsentativen Gruppen unseres Volkes und durch eine 
umfassende Unterrichtung über die Regierungspolitik 
jeder Bürger die Möglichkeit erhält, an der Reform 
von Staat und Gesellschaft mitzuwirken. (...)
Meine Damen und Herren, in unserer Bundesrepublik 
stehen wir vor der Notwendigkeit umfassender Refor­
men . (...)
(— ) Diese Regierung redet niemandem nach dem Mund. 
(...) Sie setzt konkrete Ziele. Diese Ziele sind nur 
zu erreichen, wenn sich manches im Verhältnis des 
Bürgers zu seinem Staat und seiner Regierung ändert. 
Die Regierung kann in der Demokratie nur erfolgreich 
wirken, wenn sie getragen wird vom demokratischen 
Engagement der Bürger. Wir haben so wenig Bedarf an 
blinder Zustimmung, wie unser Volk Bedarf hat an ge­
spreizter Würde und hoheitsvoller Distanz. 19)
Grass' innovation in 1965 was to grow over the 
following two legislative periods into a success, because 
he brought his support to the Social Democrats at a time 
when the SPD needed to diversify its social base and its 
political image, and when at the same time the political 
spirit it represented was requisite as a force for bringing 
about reforms which had become necessary after nearly two 
decades of economic boom. Grass pioneered work which played
a part in juat auch an "Aktivierung eines neuen BUrgergeiatea 
as Brandt called it.
1965s T e s t in g  h i s  a u d ie n c e
I now want to describe more closely just how 
Grass built up his electoral work.
In the campaign which he conducted in 1965, his 
presentation of the SPD may not have been exactly what many 
Social Democrats had in mind themselves, but it was certainly 
something different.
In a total of just over fifty rallies Grass spoke
2 1 )to some 80,000 people in this campaign. He was backed up 
by the Sozialistischer Hochschulbund and the Liberaler Stu­
dentenbund Deutschlands (SHB & LSD) . This gave him organis­
ational autonomy from the party and its campaign managers.
One or two other intellectuals were prepared to support 
him, notably Hans Werner Richter, Reinhard Baumgart and the 
composer Hans Werner Henze. The campaign was well planned 
and generated a great deal of publicity,22^publicity 
which the team stimulated through press conferences. This 
was obviously desirable to test how big a response Grass' 
novelty-value, "Das Erstaunen, daß ein Literat von seinem 
Parnaß heruntersteigt und sich in die Niederungen der Politk 
begibt"23 ,^ could produce. From this point of view, the 
more cliches the project was met with the better!
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Grass had no financier and so he charged an entrance 
fee to his meeting. This budgetary problem also had a calcu­
lated effect on the image he projected. It served to Btress 
organisational autonomy from the established political bodies 
and to make the otherwise probably suspect picture of a writer 
who might just be after publicity for himself look respect­
able, by putting some of the proceeds into libraries for the 
soldiers of the West German Army!
Grass assured himself of an audience by taking the 
first part of his campaign through fourteen university towns 
from H¿unburg to Munich, where his own reputation and his 
student backers could be sure to pull some weight. In the 
event the halls were full to overflowing, drawing audiences 
easily as large as those who turned out for professional 
24)politicians. The publicity generated from this round of 
meetings carried him through his second round of visits to 
places away from the universities, where he continued to get 
very large audiences.
Grass' speeches could be seen as both a help and 
a hindrance from the SPD's point of view. Two of them in 
particular, entitled "Loblied auf Willy" and "Des Kaisers 
neue Kleider"25 ,^ helped compensate for one or two weak points 
within the SPD's own publicity for Willy Brandt. Brandt's 
personal and political background and his failure to match 
Erhard's charisma still detracted from his image. The main 
impression Grass' speeches left was the very high esteem
in which he held Brandt and the very low one in which he hold 
Erhard.
However, one of the more specific points he made 
was to criticise the refugee organisations' nostalgia for the 
territories which had been lost since the war.26* When he said 
that Germany had lost these through her own fault, he clashed 
with the SPD Refugee Council in Bavaria.27* There was some 
further dissension about whether it was tolerable to have 
Grass associate himself with the SPD and then make remarks 
which diverged from the party's own position as of that time.28* 
The whole subject which Grass had touched upon was one which 
the SPD had planned to play down in this election because it 
was likely to give its opponents the advantage.
From Grass' point of view, such a discrepancy bet­
ween what he said and what the party wanted him to say actually 
suited the purpose of his campaign. He aimed to set up a 
"Dialog zwischen der Partei, auch zwischen den Wählern der 
SPD, die nicht zur Partei gehören, und mir".29* If there was 
a taboo about an uncomfortable problem like this one, then he 
wanted to undermine it:
Nehmen Sie das Thema Wiedervereinigung. Im Wahl­
kampf wurde es ja leider von den Parteien ausge­
klammert, aber besonders für die jungen Menschen 
ist es ja ein wichtiges Thema. Deswegen habe ich 
es in den Vordergrund gestellt (...). Ich halte 
mich bewußt an Dinge, die sonst im Wahlkampf kaum 
Vorkommen.30>
Consequently the objections which were made to what 
he said confirmed his intentions and contributed to his autonomy
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from the SPD's propaganda. This was desirable to gratify the 
ambivalent attitude which the people he aimed to address had 
towards the SPD, "Neuwflhler, Unentschlossene, Bildungsbllrger, 
die selten in Wahlversammlungen gehen".31^
Altogether, there was no evidence that he had any 
substantial political differences with the SPD. The general 
aim of his experiment was to arouse the interest of sections 
of the electorate who were usually politically Inactive and 
to dispose them favourably towards the Social Democrats. This 
really precluded any marked political independence. His enter­
prise substituted organisational autonomy and innovation for 
political criticism. The only occasion when Grass advocated 
a policy which differed completely from the SPD's was in the 
speech he made on reunification in Bonn in 1967. Significantly, 
this speech had nothing to do with any election campaign.
Given its eagerness to diversify its appeal, the 
SPD could be expected to tolerate a freelance campaign like 
this one, even if it did not like everything Grass said. In 
the 1961 campaign one of the tactics which the SPD tried in 
order to escape from its own past had been deliberately to ignore 
that past. Brandt's campaign was designed to keep him as aloof 
as possible from the supposedly inhibiting connotations of 
the SPD's traditions. He always referred to himself as the 
Lord Mayor of Berlin or as 'my party's candidate' to be
32)Chancellor and avoided using the party's title. ' Four years 
later Grass inscribed his banner not SPD but 'Es-Pe-De',
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echoing a touch of Brandt's tactical aloofness in the previous 
election.
The value of Grass' work to the SPD at this stage 
could not have been detected in the poll. Nevertheless it was 
useful as a vivid example of how the SPD was on friendlier 
terms with the intelligentsia than was the CDU. In an analysis 
of the Social-democrat campaign in 1965, Günter Struve goes so 
far as to say that the support of figures in cultural life 
was solicited for strategic reasons, in an effort to add de­
finition to Brandt's image, which compared poorly at the time 
with Adenauer's and Erhard's popularity. Inviting access to 
the SPD leader from people involved in cultural affairs was 
meant to emphasise Brandt's own cultural and intellectual 
interests and to suggest that in contrast to Erhard's con­
servatism, Brandt was a younger, go-ahead, culturally attuned
Erhard had certainly spoilt his chances on that score. 
It was in July 1966 in the midst of the election campaign that 
he made his ill-judged remarks about the political in­
competence of some of the country's writers and intellectuals 
- notably Rolf Hochhuth and Grass. This abuse from Erhard 
emphasised the SPD's comparative attractiveness to much of a 
cultural intelligentsia which was offended by the philistine 
attitudes the incumbent Chancellor had displayed.
It was hardly the case that the SPD stood to gain
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any votes from the sympathy which a number of Intellectuals 
were prepared to show for it In the campaigns of 1961 and 
1965. The point was that as a spin-off their support could 
help fashion the SPD's new apparel after Godesberg by asso­
ciating it with different social groups and new terms of 
reference.
By 1969, there was less use in Social-democrat 
politics for intellectuals as a distinct group. For by then, 
many of them had become rather too politically radical to have 
as a group any social or intellectual resonance which would 
be useful to the SPD as it was heading for government. This is 
why Grass in particular came to the fore, for he had already, 
begun to seek a wider political public. This led him to a 
kind of electoral work in which intellectuals as such played 
only a token role, one of stimulating an audience amongst a 
wider spectrum of the professional middle-classes. Thereby he 
and the people who joined him could find a place in West German 
politics both because the SPD was immersed in a lengthy process 
of recasting its appeal to further social groups, and because 
broad support for a new spirit of reform was necessary in the 
post-Economic Miracle period. It was because this combination 
of conditions did not last forever, that, as the next chapter 
will show, such a place in politics could not be kept open for­
ever.
It was a place which was much more closely identi­
fied with the SPD party organisation than had been the case 
before 1969. Although there were differences in the way Grass 
and his associates prepared for the elections in 1965 and
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1969, their close cooperation with the party in 1969 came as 
no shock. For the signs were already there in 1965 that the 
autonomy Grass proclaimed was effectively more of an organis­
ational than a really political independence. And that kind 
of marginal independence was sufficiently compatible with 
the SPD's own view of its interests for the party executive 
to approve financial backing for Grass' new project in 1969, 
the 'Sozialdemokratische wahlerlnitiative'.
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cha pter SEVEN
PARTY POLITICS FOR THE MIDDLE-CLASSES
The making of the *Sozlaldemokratlsche wahlerinltlative'
In 1965 Grass had already set himself the task of helping 
to prevent elections falling further into the grip of the 
major political parties to the exclusion of the electorate 
themselves. He wished to be taken seriously as an example of 
how people could break the political parties' monopoly, break 
it by simply joining in themselves. On the other hand, he 
could hardly pretend that he had done so himself entirely 
unasked. As the scale of his enterprise was already ambitious 
in 1965, he had needed backers and had received the support 
of friends of his amongst the SPD leadership such as Brandt 
and Karl Schiller. Even so he remained an isolated novelty. 
Apart from the grandiloquence of his speeches he had little 
to rely on to make people act themselves. And then the 
Grand Coalition had dashed hopes that the SPD's electorate 
had any control over the decisions the SPD took. As long as 
he remained as much of an outsider as he had been in 1965, 
he had no hope of affecting either the SPD or its electorate. 
Organisation was required for popular participation to grow. 
Whilst still staying on the edge. Grass aligned his work 
more closely with the SPD's.
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This position became a contradiction. In 1965 his 
unusualness had been his political capital. A voters' organis­
ation needed a wider appeal than that alone. It would also 
have to assert itself more vis-d-vis the SPD if it was really 
going to be a popular movement. These two conditions gave rise 
to mutual constraints. However much the 'Sozialdemokratlsche 
WShlcrinitiative' (SWI) had opinions of its own and wished 
to represent views from outside the party organisation, its 
own genesis in the federal election campaign in 1969 virtually 
precluded this. Its primary raison-d'etre in 1969 was to help 
get an SPD-FDP coalition into government and consequently it 
had to base most of its arguments for this on the respect­
able aspects of the social-democratic record within the Grand 
Coalition. This constrained its scope for expressing independent 
opinions. The problem was magnified because the two conditions 
of the SWI's strategy could only be reconciled, in so far as 
they could be reconciled at all, through the person of Grass 
himself. Mobilising the first voters' organisation of this 
kind required a massive personal commitment from him. This 
meant that in the efforts the SWI made to assert iself as a 
serious autonomous organisation. Grass personally overshadowed 
all the local groups which the SWI had gathered together. In 
turn, the effect of this was that contacts between the SWI 
and the SPD -supposedly between the non-member voters and the 
whole party- were very largely restricted to contacts with 
individual members of the SPD leadership.
The idea of a Voters' Initiative came from three
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intellectuals' experience of assisting in the SPD's campaign 
for the Schleswig-Holstein Land election in April 1 9 6 7 . These 
three were Grass, Prof. Hartmut Jäckel and Siegfried Lenz, with 
the assistance of the SHB. This was at a time when the SPD was 
beginning to have trouble with its student association, whose 
executive had issued a declaration condemning the Grand 
Coalition in January 1967 and had decided to support the Extra- 
parliamentary Opposition given the party leadership's role in 
government. The party immediately sanctioned this resolution 
by withdrawing its financial support.2^
In Schleswig-Holstein Grass, Jäckel and Lenz held 
their meetings in support of Jochen Steffen, who was regional 
chairman and on the left of the SPD. So the part they played 
on this occasion was associated with groups on the Social-demo­
crat left and hence with groups critical of the Grand Coalition.
This could no longer be said by the time the Voters' 
Initiative was organised in 1969. The SWI's appearance in the 
election campaign that year was prepared by a small group of 
intellectuals - academics and journalists rather than literary 
figures - whom Grass drew together in Berlin from December 1967. 
Erdemann Linde, who was chairman of the SHB at the time, was 
amongst this group, but the others (for example Professors 
Arnulf Baring and Hartmut Jäckel, and Günter Gaus) were certainly 
not left-wingers.
It was Grass who liaised with the party-leader­
ship. 3 )
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Their approval was actively solicited (unlike In 1965) which 
meant that the SWI campaign was to be closely associated with 
the SPD's. It was agreed that the SWI was to create a lot 
of little imitations of Grass' activity in 1965 with the help of 
people who had some public name.4* The credentials of formal 
independence, upon which such stress had been laid four years 
before, were no longer required, for the SWI's speakers were 
going to base their public brief on their personal professional 
stature and present themselves to voters as extra-party but 
not non-party mediators between the voters' and the party 
organisation. It did not matter whether the speakers were 
themselves SPD-members or not, and some of them were, so 
long as they had not made their reputations primarily in 
connection with the SPD, and not in politics so much as in 
their profession.
The emphasis on professional status meant that this 
was a middle-class affair. Those intellectuals who were 
associated with the SWI found their place within this middle- 
class scheme. It was consequently desirable for them not 
all to be writers.5* As members of the intelligentsia they 
represented high social strata. On the other hand the organ­
isation did not want to remain an elite affair; it wanted to 
be seen to have diversified out of the literary intelligentsia 
into a wider cross-section of professions. A whole host of 
contributors joined well-known writers to pen the articles 
published in the two copies of an election magazine called 
dafür, which the SWI produced for mass circulation. It aimed
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to extend Its catchment beyond the sphere in which literary 
intellectuals could expect any resonance.
It became clear that professional people and academics, 
rather than the student groups who had been behind Grass in 
the last election, firmly and respectably made up the back­
bone of this enterprise, when the SWI's existence was formally 
announced in Bonn in March before the election campaign began. 
Furthermore, its unequivocal association with the SPD was 
illustrated by Professor Kurt Sontheimer's speech on behalf 
of the SWI at the SPD election conference in mid-April. The 
1969 election took place in the wake of the strife of the 
previous three years over the Vietnam War, the Grand Coalition, 
the Emergency Poweis Laws etc.. Consequently at such a point 
in time the Voters' Initiative, in its bid for respectability 
and its distance from the now radicalised student groups, 
inevitably appeared in the centre of the main political 
parties. Grass' speeches®^which continued to constitute the 
largest part of the organisation's output,7  ^ were politically
8 )unpolemical and praised the SPD's policies in the coalition 
government, apart from the fact that Grass' criticism of 
Chancellor Kiesinger was as scathing as ever.
Grass' own activity was part and parcel of the SWI 
as it was emerging in local groups. This successfully turned 
a shadow into a reality, for these local groups hardly existed 
prior to his own interventions.
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It was he who rallied contacts whereever he went on 
his campaign, so that by the end of the itinery in late 
September there were over 3,000 people behind him as active 
participants covering 100 constituencies.9* They made a 
little local impact primarily through sponsoring advertise­
ments to vote SPD in their local newspapers. In addition one 
and a half million copies of the two editions of dafür were 
produced for distribution.
The material produced and the personnel directed by 
the SWI central organisation were politically assimilable 
into the SPD's general strategy. The arguments in the dafür 
magazines, for instance, did not stray beyond the boiinds of 
moderate reforms. They could all be clustered around a 
motto like 'we need a change', which made little demand on 
making choices between policies or programmes put forward 
by the parties. There was scarcely a hint of radicalism . 
Rather the opposite in fact. Some space was devoted to dis­
cussions which showed that the SPD solidly supported existing 
society and its economy and that likewise solid citizens like 
respectable industrialists supported the SPD and the sort of 
modifications it proposed.10*
The middle-of-the-road political tenor plus the pro­
fessional middle-class bias of the SWI enabled it to build 
up an audience amongst social groups previously outside the 
SPD's own electoral catchment. In particular, apart from 
the unusual proportion of professional and upper-middle-
class people whom Grass' meetings attracted, they also drew 
In more women than was usual in party-political activities.11* 
This continued to be the pattern of SWI activists over the 
next few years, and it was this social ambience which the 
party's own management welcomed as the SWI's distinctive con­
tribution to the SPD-cause. By 1972 the SWI as a whole had 
certainly extended its influence outside the cluster of elite 
people it started off with. But the SPD's official report on 
the campaign said that the SWI meetings which were led by 
eminent personalities were more important to the party than 
the activities of the humbler ranks, because the former attract­
ed an audience the SPD's own rallies would have left largely 
untouched.12* This report honoured the SWI's contribution to 
the widening of the SPD's appeal, but was hesitant to attrib­
ute any identifiable electoral gains to its work.
Brandt, as I have said, was always a supporter of 
the SWI. In March 1973, it held a conference following the 
peak of its success, in the 1972 election campaign, which 
Brandt attended. He acknowledged the SWI's part in politic­
ising the professional middle classes. He said that it had 
broken through prejudices “des deutschen BlIdungsbUrgertums 
- sollte man sagen: des Bildungsspießertums? - daß zwischen 
Geist und Politik eine Kluft sein müsse"13*. He warned that 
the SPD would not cede any other role to the SWI than this, 
that its "Rolle nicht die einer Ersatzpartei sein kann",14* 
a warning reiterated by two other men in the leadership, the 
party manager Holger Börner and the deputy chairman Helmut
Schmidt. But the credit which Brandt gave the SWI for hav­
ing mobilised a particular social group did not render it 
indispensable to the SPD. For this trend scarcely depended 
on the SWI's existence. It was part of a general drift in 
support amongst middle-class strata towards the SPD, which 
can be shown in both party membership and in voting patterns.1®' 
This in turn kept pace with the proportional growth in white- 
collar and public-service employees within the whole social- 
structure. As Joachim Bahke shows17', the SPD kept pace 
with these developments in terms of the correspondence between 
the social structure of the SPD's electorate and the social 
structure of the population in employment as a whole, and 
increasingly outpaced these trends in terms of the social 
structure of the SPD membership. Thus despite Brandt’s 
tribute, the SWI could not establish any firm and permanent 
influence on the EPD's electoral fortunes, let alone on its 
internal and governmental politics.
Rise and Fall
Having embodied the SWI front-line in 1969 Grass and 
some other literary figures played just a supporting part in 
local SWI activities during the Land elections from 1970 to 
1972. Local Voters' Initiatives were active to a greater or 
lesser extent in the campaigns in Nordrhein-Westfalen and Bava­
ria in 1970, Schleswig-Holstein, Rheinland-Pfalz, Berlin and 
Bremen in 1971, and Baden-Württemberg in 1972. By
the 1972 election campaign Grass' publicity value to the 
organisation was matched by Böll's, who had decided to join
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the SWI actively and who became one of its major public 
spokesmen, being, for example, its representative at the SPD
1 8)conference that year.
"BUrger fUr Brandt" was the SWI's motto for this short and 
fierce campaign, which had been called into being a year 
prematurely to resolve the Brandt government's parliamentary 
difficulties. These had come to a head over the ratification 
of the detente treaties which Brandt's ministers had negociated 
with a number of Eastern European states and with the Soviet 
Union. The SWI slogan suited the rising political 
fervour which had been ignited by the government's 
difficulties with its policy for detente in Eprope and which ■ 
was concentrated around Brandt's personal reputation. The 
momentum of the election campaign derived from these content-
19)ions. It mustered hosts of people. The SWI's central 
figures were joined by much more popular characters than the 
writers and intellectuals of previous years - actors, singers, 
footballers and other media-personalities. Even though Grass' 
own commitment was very substantial - 129 meetings in 8 weeks 
which rivalled Brandt himself - it only made up a quarter of 
all SWI local and national activities, and all the stars to­
gether made up less than a third. Thus grass-roots participation 
in the Voters' Initiative had significantly increased 
compared to 1969.
Centrally organised promotions were concentrated in 
between 70 and 80 constituencies where the CDU/CSU had an 
absolute majority or where the SPD stood a chance of winning
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a direct mandate for the first time. The reason for working 
in the first of these groups was to encourage the local SPD 
and draw some bigger crowds where it was fighting an 
uphill battle against animosity or apathy. In this respect .
the SWI was a psychological support group for the SPD. 
However locally there was a short-lived flowering of political 
self-activity in support of Brandt and his government. When 
Grass and B011 closed the SWI campaign in mid-November in 
Berlin, there were according to them 338 local groups active 
in 174 constituencies, a growth during the campaign itself 
of over 100.2°* The rapidity of this growth indicates how 
specific it was to this particular election over these highly- 
charged issues. By the time the SWI held its first general 
conference in March 1973, the number of groups surviving had 
shrunk to 133.21^
The SWI was not able to establish a permanent local 
base because it could not overcome reservations held by the 
SPD about the existence of 'a group outside thè party 
organisation. Assistance in establishing a social-democratic 
presence amongst the professional middle-classes was welcome, 
but that was all.
The SWI helped the SPD in a particular way. As 
Kaltefleiter has summarised them, the tactical objectives of 
a political party in an election campaign can be schematically 
described as: a) to secure its own supporters, b) to hold 
doubters against the propaganda of the opposition, c) to gain 
doubters from the opposition.22  ^ Banal as they may sound,
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these three objectives require different kinds of agitation, 
taking up issues differently according to the varying emphases 
appropriate to these categories. A political party, however, 
has difficulty in differentiating much amongst its audience, 
difficulty in focussing on specific groups due to the very 
mass-consumption of the mass-media it is predominantly dependent 
on. Conventional canvessing directed at particular groups of 
potential voters is of course a means of reaching special in­
terests, but very small in scale. From this point of view, 
activity like the SWI's is an extra to options open to the 
party organisation. The SWI self-consciously sought an extra­
party reputation for itself, professional but not sectional, 
and made a direct appeal to the non-aligned or hesitant voter. 
Its success here was likely to be intangible. Such a 
blanket-approach to the "floating-voters" makes it 
difficult to know whose recipe it was that worked and why, 
or how big a part' entirely extraneous 
factors played. Thus the credit which the SWI 
might claim amongst floating voters was rather insecure, but 
it was a plus within the tactical planning of SPD propaganda.
In all the elections which have been held since 1972, 
including the federal election in 1976, SWI work has been on 
a smaller scale. Some of its originators,including Grass, 
still made appearances in the SPD publicity campaigns, but no 
one made any journeys of anything like the scale of those 
with which Grass had pushed the SWI ahead.23  ^ The lack of any 
kinds of publicity of those proportions was one of the
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reasons why the SWI's impact in 1976 was nothing compared to 
before. It had not been able to find a permanent role nor to 
maintain its size because many of the people it had brought 
into political activity had actually joined the SPD since 
1972.^*^They had departed from the model of a voters' 
initiative, whose basis had been that its supporters should 
not be party-members. This implies that people found this 
model frustrating. Their frustration should be seen in the 
light of the economic and political difficulties which became 
apparent almost as soon as the fanfares for the SPD's victory 
in 1972 had faded.
Between moderation and ambition
At the time the SWI emerged left-wing groups were 
very active, and I have already suggested that because the 
SWI was more interested in mediation than in any militancy 
of its own, it distinguished itself sharply from the left and 
consequently found itself in the centre. With a social and 
intellectual composition which marked it off from the left, 
the SWI's own political development stalled where it had started. 
This meant that its political character could be absorbed into 
the mainstream of SPD politics at a time when the SPD was 
consolidating its position in government.
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The momentum it had shown in 1972 as a force which 
might have set a really popular movement afoot, could not be 
sustained thereafter. This was because it had been 
launched from amongst professional elites. Such a social 
starting-point meant that it could only fuse itself into 
something akin to a popular mass movement when one arose 
from the outside. That had occured in 1972 because a combin­
ation of issues produced tremors which shook virtually the 
length and breadth of the West German public and whose force 
became gathered around the fortunes of the Brandt government.
That government's detente-policies abroad caused 
considerable tensions at home, because they symbolised a final 
farewell to the Cold War and at least to the most virulent 
forms of anti-Communism, whose usefulness to conservative 
ideology made them unsuitable for Social Democracy in its 
endeavours to achieve political authority. For it was asking 
to be given this authority precisely because changes were 
necessary. The push for change at the beginning of the 
seventies engendered ideological contentions which reached 
the point of threatening the existence of the SPD government. 
Whilst the opposition could raise the emotional fervour over 
the agreements which had been made with some of the Communist 
states, its ideological offensive threatened a government 
which working-class people in particular identified as their 
government and which for wide strata of the population was 
identified with social reforms.
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For Brandt's government had come to power with 
proposals for a flood of reforms to improve living conditionsi 
such as, equal opportunity promised through educational reform, 
environmental, traffic and transport planning, tax-reforms, 
redistributive profit-sharing and co-determinati-n for workers 
in industry.25’ Thus when Brandt's position was directly 
challenged by the Opposition over a vote of No Confidence 
in the Bundestag there were spontaneous political strikes and 
protest marches involving over 100»000 workers in his support. 
In the election campaign which ensued later that year after 
all, the trade unions swung behind the SPD.
These social reforms had been heralded when the 
Brandt government first came to power in 1969 but they began 
to find themselves in trouble in the seventies. The Voters' 
Initiative failed to find convincing ways of responding to 
these troubles, cramped its own political identity because 
it could not exercise any tangible influence over policy and 
consequently lost its chance of sustaining the interest of 
most of the people it had attracted. All this happened partly 
as a result of two genetic conditions of its own and partly 
because of economic crisis in its society.
The fact that it was bound to a kind of image­
servicing which was largely restricted to elections kept its 
overall political character in the centre. This became a 
serious inhibition on its credibility given the onset of 
structural crisis in the economy from 1973/4, and with this
-2 1 7 -
the crisis of the government's programme of social reforms as 
finance of that programme faltered. Wolfgang Nitsch has 
calculated that provision of public services in the Federal 
Republic has in fact been shrinking, not growing, since 1971, 
as has public investment in the public sphere with the except­
ion of road construction and the educational system.26*
Consequently, it was not the Voters' Initiatives 
which grew in response to state policies and to their effects 
on living conditions, but the Bürgerinitiativen.27*These are 
local and national campaigns which have emerged in the seven­
ties to fight over specific issues which generally directly 
affect the people who form these groups. This happened 
precisely because the effects of crisis in the economy and 
in state policy were felt too close to home, to everyday living 
conditions, to be confined to either national or regional 
election times. In 1972 the political tremors felt amongst the 
public coincided with the government's parliamentary diffi­
culties and caused an election. Thereafter the cycle of the 
electoral process was no longer .in step with the general 
public's moods, which had benefited the SWI in 1972 and 
to which it had also helped give expression.The'SPD-FDP coalition 
felt safer and could do., without the activism of voters. The CDU- 
CSU bid a similar fight in the next federal election in 
1&J6, but its polemic ’Freiheit statt Sozialismus’ proved 
to be only a parody of the issues which had been at stake in 
1972, and the Voters' Initiatives were but a pale shadow of 
their previous selves.
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It must not be forgotten that conducting publicity- 
campaigns for the Social Democrats was by far the biggest 
field of SWI activity at any time. However, it is difficult 
to imagine how it could have launched any credible publicity- 
campaigns alongside the SPD's own ones, if it had not also 
had political reasons for existing outside the 
party. In his campaigns Grass' aim was to persuade people to 
take an active part in elections to further their own political 
interests. If this involvement was to grow, there needed to 
be some link in activity between one election and the next. 
Grass' original idea of the purpose of his work 
grew into proposals to introduce the public into party 
politics altogether. This meant trying to bring some influence 
to bear on the SPD's decision-making.28  ^ The trouble here was 
that there was no formal way the Voters' Initiatives could 
pursue this aim as a whole group. They had to have 
recourse to those individuals who had influence to persuade 
some levels of the SPD to give the SWI audience. At first 
this was Grass, and later he was joined by some of the other 
top personalities in the organisation like B511.
The first time Grass spoke to the SPD on behalf of the 
SWI as a new interest group was at the SPD Conference in May 
1970, which was his own first opportunity to speak in the 
29)plenary session. But outsiders do not have much of a role 
assigned to them at party conferences except perhaps to add 
some extra publicity value for the media. A first sign that 
the SWI's representatives would inevitably pass over the rank-
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and-file was -when Grass arranged with Herbert Wehner 
to address the parliamentary party nearly a year later in 
March 1971. The main purpose of his address was to remind the 
SPD of the continued existence of its self-proclaimed partners 
in the Voters' Initiative, speaking "im Auftrag der Sozialde­
mokratischen Wählerinitiative und aus der Sicht des Wählers".30*
It is difficult to credit Grass as a representative 
ordinary voter. This discrepancy between the claims to be 
representative of ordinary people made by the SWI’s leading 
figures and their elite stature in reality, distorted the 
SWI's attempt to gain a political identity of its own. It 
was three years before it gained access to the parliamentary 
party for the second time, and then again it had to do so 
through Grass himself, who was accompanied this time by B011, 
and ThaddMus Troll. All three were caught in the double-bind 
of having to speak for the ordinary voters, whilst actually 
owing this opportunity to speak officially to the SPD Fraction 
at all to their own far from ordinary public stature:
(Böll) - Versuchen wir zunächst, uns von dem dummen 
Klischee zu befreien, wir, Intellektuelle und Schrift­
steller, wären die Moralisten oder das Gewissen der 
Nation. Wir sind nichts weiter als in diesem Land 
arbeitende und Steuer zahlende Staatsbürger.
(Troll) - Weg mit dem verbindlichen WIR und keine 
Rede von IM NAMEN VON. Ich mag hier nicht für andere, 
ich mag auch nicht als Schriftsteller sprechen, le­
diglich als ein Bürger, dem der demokratische Sozia­
lismus als bestmögliche form gesellschaftlichen Zu­
sammenlebens erscheint.’1)
It was a paradox for such intellectuals to say they were 
just ordinary voters. For their function in the Voters'
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Initiative depended on their preeminence, and in turn the 
Voters' Initiative factually depended on them.
This paradox bedevilled the political character the 
SWI was seeking for itself and threw it back into its 
instrumental function of organising publicity-campaigns. The 
political rationale it sought in popular democracy at every 
level of party politics ended up as a very secondary consider­
ation. when Grass spoke for the SWI in 1971, he took up poli­
tical issues: education, environmental policy and schemes 
for increasing workers' -share of national wealth. But he 
went on to stress more firmly the SWI's worries about the 
dissension between the wings of the SPD and within the 
cabinet at the time, which he felt threatened the SPD's public 
image, that image being the main focus of the SWI' s work.
Looking in from the outside, the party's internal 
confrontations appeared to be a menace. Grass appealed for 
moderation. Such a call for appeasement led him to seek moral 
and political authority at the party's centre:
Einzig Politiker wie Brandt und Wehner sind offenbar 
in der Lage, im Streit um die Schrittfolge die ver­
zweifelte Komik einer notwendigerweise vom Wider­
spruch lebenden Partei zu erkennen: die Weite ihrer 
Toleranz und Intelligenz läßt Spannungen zu, denen 
die linken und rechten Ausschließlichkeitsfanatiker 
nicht gewachsen sind.32)
As an outsider, speaking on behalf of an organisation outside 
the party, he was obliged to approach inner -party politics 
through the dominant figures:
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... nur dank der Integrationskraft eines Willy Brandt 
war und ist es möglich, die im mißverstandenen Sinn 
einer Fortschrittspartei auseinanderstrebenden Krifte 
der SPD zu binden und an einem gemeinsamen Ziel (...)
zu Interessen.33)
However fair and reasonable a view this is of the loyalty 
Brandt inspired within his party, emphasising personalities 
like this side-steps the ideological conflicts were were 
really at issue. It is an emphasis which arises because out­
siders like Grass and the SWI were preoccupied with how the 
party appeared to the electorate. For a party's image in the 
eyes of the public can be kept together by its leaders if 
they are popular, and by the beginning of the seventies Brandt 
certainly was popular. Under Grass' guidance, the SWI de­
liberately kept itself clear of the SPD's internal dissensions. 
In its efforts to extend the SPD's appeal, it did not want 
to be tarred with the brush of these conflicts.34* As a result, 
the critical intentions which were supposed to be part and 
parcel of the whole concept of a Voters' Initiative became 
pretty bland. To have fulfilled these intentions more 
substantially, the SWI could not have remained so aloof from 
the SPD's troubles. This weakness rendered the three 
appellants to the SPD Fraction in 1974 practically and con­
ceptually at a loss about what kind of politics they wanted 
to sees
(Grass) - Ratlos macht mich die Einsicht, daß es 
wenig Sinn hat, Kritik, die sich in Einzelheiten 
verzettelt, und Ihnen ohnehin bis zum Überdruß 
bekannt ist, zu wiederholen. (...) Ratlos macht 
mich die Erfahrung, daß zur Zeit Worte wenig ver­
mögen: zwar sprechen viele gleichzeitig, doch wer 
hört noch zu?
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(Troll) - Der Wähler möchte nicht als Alternative für 
eine konfuse Opposition eine diffuse Regierungspartei 
haben. Er hat ein Recht darauf, auf Fragen wie Steuer­
erhöhung oder -ermäBigung, Postgebühren, Energieein­
sparung, Tarifverhandlungen, Maßnahmen gegen die In­
flation und Tempolimit eine klare, verständliche Ant­
wort der Bundesregierung zu bekommen.
In his address in 1971 Grass had mooted an idea 
about how to open up party politics which the SWI took up as an 
organisation. It proposed that the SPD's proceedings to select 
its parliamentary candidates should be open to the public.
This demand never came to anything. It was not very credible 
because the SWI lacked the means to approach the party as a 
whole in a democratic way as long as it was bound to
the upper echelons. Working from the outside, it turned to 
the SPD's professional, established politicians rather than 
to its rank and file. When it sought some political commun­
ication, the professional politicians were the only avenue 
open. The SWI's central planning of campaigns and the support 
it received from the SPD was always mediated through contacts 
with people in the party's upper ranks. Brandt had already 
given his support in 1965. Wehner and the campaign-managers 
did so in 1969. The support of the party leadership was 
essential to this brand of extra-party but not non-party 
campaigning, if it was to be credible and respectable. For 
the SWI wanted people to see it as something different from 
the political parties, but also to recognise its clear 
message of support for the SPD. Grass' freelance venture in 
1965 was too ambiguous to meet both these ends. He had re­
mained little more than a cultural attraction and as such
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could pull no weight with the SPD for his own ideas. The SWI 
used the SPD leadership to gain the stature as a serious 
factor in party politics which Grass had lacked on his own. 
The drawback to this was its consequent dependence on the 
good grace of the leadership. The SWI had to be wary of not 
overstepping the threshold of interference in its affairs 
which the party would tolerate. If it did get too ambitious, 
it was rebuked, as I mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter.
Given this dependence on the support of people in the 
SPD leadership, one simple reason for the SWI's relative demise 
after 1972 was that the party's leaders changed round when 
Helmut Schmidt took over the Chancellorship from Brandt in 
May 1974. But the problem also went deeper than that. The 
transition from "the peace and reform chancellor Brandt to 
the law and order chancellor Schmidt"35*was itself a sign 
of the change in the character of the government. Given the 
economic recession and the political stalemate within the 
SPD-FDP coalition over reform-legislation, the Socialdemocrat 
leadership now had to take in hand "a phase of somewhat in­
tensified demarcation regarding relations with the GDR and a 
concentration on internal security, stability and income po­
licies, involving the abandenraent of nearly all the announc­
ed reform programme".36* The credit the government had had 
under Brandt for being a really progressive alternative to 
the conservative bloc, was reduced. With this reduction in 
the government's political credit, the popularity of the 
Voters' Inititative ebbed as well. The SWI had seen itself
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as an alternative mode of political behaviour for people 
who supported a Social Democracy which promise]alternatives. 
Its own credibility as an alternative depended on the govern­
ment's. When that faltered, the SWI found itself doing so too 
in the absence of further alternatives.
In 1974 Grass, B811 and Troll were lost for
what to say to the SPD Fraction. Their recourse was to talk 
about what alternative kind of society social-democratic 
politics should offer in intellectual more than practical 
terms. As Grass put it:
Deshalb bitten wir Sic, sich deutlich -und wenn es 
irgend geht- sich öffentlich eindeutig zu machen.
Der demokratische Sozialismus darf nicht weiterhin 
aus der Klamottenkammer der Kommunisten und aus dem 
Fundus unserer Konservativen wechselseitig zum 
Schreckgespenst aufgeputzt werden; vielmehr sollte 
es Ihr offensives Bedürfnis sein, den demokratischen 
Sozialismus den Bürgern faßbar zu machen: als Alter­
native zu den zwei konservativen bis reaktionären 
Ordnungen, zum kommunistischen Staatskapitalismus 
- zum westlichen Kapitalismus der Privatkartelle ...
So könnte den Bürgern als Arbeitnehmern die Mitbestim­
mung in ihrer Doppelfunktion begreifbar werden. Gerade 
in Zeiten der Entspannungspolitik, die ja den fried­
lichen Wettstreit der Gesellschaftssysteme möglich 
machen soll, ist die Mitbestimmung besonders geeignet, 
den ideologischen Nebel zu spalten und das geknickte 
Selbstbewußti-ein der Sozialdemokraten wieder aufzu­
richten; umgeben von kapitalistischer und kommunisti­
scher Reaktion gibt es Gründe genug, selbstbewußt und 
entschieden zu sein.37)
But the SPD government had failed to show that its policies 
really did amount to social and political alternatives. The 
rather inflated fashion in which Grass talked about social- 
democracy as the alternative to Capitalism and Communism on 
a global scale was a sign that it had failed to come up with 
the goods at home.
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The style and character of SWI publicity
To recapitulate thus far, my main point is that the 
Voters' Initiative suffered from a split personality because 
it tried to combine its instrumental campaigning function with 
certain political aspirations to make the SPD change itself. 
This duality was its doom. Each of the two aspects of the 
organisation had its own problems and limitations, and they 
each amplified the artificiality of the other.
The dichotomies at the heart of the idea of such a 
Voters' Initiative were the dichotomies of the age. The SWl's 
crisis was the crisis of the party with which it associated 
itself. The SPD's disappointing record from a socialist point 
of view was in turn contingent upon the crisis in the domestic 
economy and the international trade-recession. The change of 
Chancellor signalled a stalemate in the reform programme the 
SPD had promised. It had increasing difficulty getting its 
reform legislation through the nets of first its FDP coalition 
partners and then the Christian Democrat opposition. For 
instance, four major pieces of potentially progressive legis­
lation caused long drawn-out struggles in cabinet, in parliament 
and in the Constitutional Court: the extension of parity co­
determination to all large firms (which is still being disputed 
in the Constitutional Court), more liberal laws on abortion and 
divorce and an improvement of the legal rights of married women, 
and reform of the tax-system.
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In my view the SWI's credit as an alternative mode 
of political participation depended on the open climate of 
the first four years of the Social-Liberal government, and on 
the latter being seen to be a progressive force. When the 
latter faltered, widespread commitment to this kind of activity 
did not make sense, because such voters' organisations were 
obviously quite unable to affect the government's decisions. 
"People's Politics" moved from the WMhlerlnltiatlven into 
the Bürgerinitiativen> leaving the SWI with its original 
tactical concern with the SPD's image. This concern itself 
further inhibited its political claims on the party. 
Representations to the SPD that the voters be allowed to 
play a part'in the party's decisions could'achieve little as 
long as the Voters' Initiative was unable to 
present itself to the party in a democratic way. The problems 
of going through the leadership became clear when a 
political challenge to the leadership arose from within the SPD. 
The critical role which was supposed to be part of the whole 
idea of voters' Initiatives paled by comparison with that 
vigorous internal criticism.
Nevertheless some questions still remain to be aired.
Did the SWT at least succeed in widening the scope of 
electoral agitation as it intended? And if so, how?
It isa question of weighing quantity'against quality.
The voters' initiatives broadened the spectrum of styles and 
methods of campaigning, but this did not really raise the 
standards of propaganda. They brought some drama back to
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elections and to some extent put campaigns back into the 
hands of the people away from the party-machines. But in 
content, this propaganda was largely tied to patterns set by 
the party's publicity.
In the first place, the SWI did find alternatives 
to two related trends which had increasingly dominated 
campaigns for twenty years or more and which were designed 
to influence the atmosphere surrounding an
election. Opinion-polling was a growth industry and was used 
by the political parties to tailor policy to prognoses of 
their respective electoral chances.3®^  To give an example 
of this - for the federal election in 1961 opinion-research 
conducted for the SPD established that people believed in 
the 'economic miracle' of post-war recovery, but saw that
39)the benefits of affluence were unjustly distributed. This 
popular feeling was consequently translated into one of the 
SPD's main slogans "Wohlstand ist fUr alle da", and into 
promises of more equitable policies if it got into power, 
without substantial changes in the general course of economic 
policy. In the scramble for votes, this conflation of political 
ends with electoral expediency made the SPD accomadate more 
and more to trends in the style and content of propaganda 
set by the conservative parties, because throughout the 
fifties the CDU/CSU had so successfully dominated the will 
of the public.40  ^ Issues were tailored with a mind to the 
prognoses which had been made from the polls, and the next 
step was to put the guidelines thus produced for a campaign
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into the hands of commercial advertising agencies.«-It 
became the practice of all three major parties to commission 
agencies to design propaganda. This swallowed larger 
and larger sums of campaign funds in 1969 and 1972.
By contrast, the members of the Voters' Initiative 
produced materials from their own skills and ideas. Those 
SPD policies and politicians they promoted were the ones they 
were individually or professionally interested in and 
not an c*malgftm of common - denominators. The two editions 
of dafür in 1969 covered a range of Issues from women's rights, 
and workers' rights in industry to the Bundeswehr. The only 
tactical slanting which is apparent here is simply 
that they offered something for everybody?lmd no doubt some 
care was taken about what would and what would not meet the 
general interest.
In this respect SWI activities went against 
those trends which threatened to make the electorate ever 
more passive by flooding them with pre-packaged propaganda.
The most noticeable achievement of the Voters' Initiatives 
was to help revive direct, conventional forms of campaignings 
rallies large and small, spectacular and modest.
One of the most tangible aspects of a major party's 
image is the stature and personality of its leader. This had 
been particularly true in the Federal Republic under the CDU.
The appeal of Adenauer and Erhard had been exploited in 
every election, an appeal deriving not least from the very
fact that they were the successive incumbent Chancellors. This 
pattern gave rise to particularly emotive propaganda 
which contrived to subsume the political positions at issue 
in an election under the personalities of party leaders. The 
SPD did not fail to compete with the CDU/CSU at this from 
1961 on. At either end ofthtdecade, for instance, Brandt 
was made the centre of the SPD's printed propaganda material 
in 1961 3*and again in 1972. In the latter year one of its 
advertisements epitomised in slogan-form the lengths to which 
this personalisation of politics could be taken:
Es gibt
zwei gute Gründe 
SPD zu wählen:
Willy Brandt
und Franz Josef Strauß.
As the SPD's own report on its campaign put it: "Die Werbung 
im Wahlkampf mußte im Erscheinungsbild Sicherheit und Ver­
trauen ausstrahlen. Das wurde vor allem durch die Person 
Willy Brandts gesichert."44  ^ Between being leader of the 
opposition and the Chancellor, Brandt's image was retailored 
from the youthful, energetic character projected in his 
campaign in 1961 45*to the father-figure (modelled on the 
paternal charisma of Adenauer and Erhard) of 1972 in such a 
poster-caption as "Kanzler des Vertrauens". The value of 
subsuming political concerns under personalities was evident 
in 1972, when the image built up for Brandt could straddle 
the ideological tension of the period and of this campaign
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in particular. As another caption expressed it, he combined 
continuity and change: "Willy Brandt:Wer morgen sicher leben 
will, muß heute für Reformen kämpfen."46^
ln every general election which the SWI participated 
in under Grass* guidance, their publicity material was based 
on the same personality-principle the SPD used. In 1965 there 
had been Grass' own panegyrics to 'Willy'. In 1969 the SWI 
based its support on individuals who were identified by their 
profession. In 1972 the same principles were harnessed for a 
personality cult whose cry was 'Bürger für Brandt'. Thus from 
this point of view, the SWI's work extended the personalis­
ation which the parties used themselves. The people in the 
voters' organisation really only extended the scope of the 
SPD's own methods, and did not find a qualitative alternative 
to its patronage of the electorate.
The SPD executive approved the plans drawn up by 
Grass' group for 1969 because it needed and welcomed all the 
extra support it could get. For the same election the 
party-managers followed the example the CDU had set .in 1965 
to employ a commercial advertising agency to design its 
materials. Once the much better funded CDU had set the pace 
with such contracts, the SPD had to run twice as fast to keep 
up. In 1972 the campaign was devised to get people to express 
support for Brandt with stickers and badges etc., as the only 
way the SPD could compete with the amount of advertising which 
the CDU/CSU could afford.47^Here was where the SWI was able 
to broaden the SPD's own efforts. Nationally and locally
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it was an umbrella organisation in whose name individuals and 
groups sponsored their own advertisements in the press for the 
Social Democrats. This sort of thing, and the extra publicity 
which all their activities generated, helped redress the im­
balance between the SPD and its opponents.
In 1972 enough people took some kind of part in the 
campaign for the party of their choice, in voters' initiatives 
for the other parties as well as for the SPD, for Grass to be 
able to say: "Die Bürger traten aus ihrer Anonymität und stell­
ten sich vor: mit Namen, Beruf, Interesse."48* Nevertheless, 
this is not the same as people making their own political 
demands on the parties. In the voters' initiatives the political 
will of the participants,however much more vocal they made it, 
remained essentially dependent on the ways the parties defined 
and presented issues in elections.
The way election campaigns were conducted and direct­
ed by the political parties drew less and less attention to 
substantial issues and gave emotional catalysts - personalities, 
slogans, gags of all kinds - an ever greater part in a kind 
of propaganda that looked more and more like a commercial 
publicity-campaign. In other words, content was lost for style. 
Nevertheless, the 1972 election in the Federal Republic became 
a by-word for a really enthusiastic and popular campaign. And it 
was felt to be one of the most political elections fought 
for over a decade. An unusual degree of active interest amongst 
the electorate was evident, even though the number of people
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Involved in voter»' initiatives was still limited in relation 
to the electorate as a whole. The contrast between the general 
trend and the exceptional picture of that particular campaign 
must be seen in the light of the whole process of political 
change which had been going on since the mid-sixties.
As an electoral machine, the SPD always had to 
meet the CDU/CSU on it» own ground. It was dealing with 
abusive and inflammatory propaganda from its opponents: the 
prejudices used to defame. Brandt' s character in 1961, the cold- 
war slogan which thé CDU/CSU found in 1976. The SPD repliédin 
kind: isolating Franz Josef Straufi as its target in 1972.
This was a depoliticising factor, but one which was caught 
up in a period which saw dn increase in political activity 
and awareness amongst the West German public.
As the party of government since the mid-sixties, 
the SPD had to steer through modifications of the state's 
role in the .economy and concomitantly in
the social infrastructure. In a society where market ideology 
had been propagated so hard in the fifties and early sixties, 
the state's assumption of an interventionist role in the 
economy needed some justifying, the attitudes which had 
been encouraged now had to be reformed. For the more the 
administrative and political authorities take charge of 
effecting changes in living conditions through economic 
and social policy, and the more they are seen to do so, 
the more it becomes clear that increasingly large areas of
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social life are determined by these authorities, whilst 
nevertheless they remain beyond direct popular control. This 
contradiction creates what Claus Offe calls "a structural .
49)problem of legitimation". It means that compared with 
market ideology which purported that the state hardly inter- 
efered at all, "democratic legitimation" of the now much more 
ostensibly powerful hand of the political authorities has to 
be re-established on a new basis.
To do this, the party of government ideally has a 
political movement behind it. Because of its traditions in 
over a century of the labour movement, the ideas it has stood 
for and the strength of its organisation, the SPD was much 
better equipped with a whole political movement behind it 
than the conservatives or the liberals. The opening up of 
political debate associated with Brandt's leadership of the 
SPD and his call for 'more democracy' helped fashion a new 
political consensus that brought the SPD to power. In the 
late sixties what the SPD stood for as a political movement 
had to be linked to what it needed as a party aiming 
for government. Bruno- Friedrich makes this point in 
a paper published in 1969 as part of the political debates 
which were gathering pace within the SPD. He talked about 
opening up political debate with the public because he thought 
that to persuade the electorate to think of voting SPD after yea 
of allegiance to Christian Democracy it was necessary to raise 
the general level of political awareness, to make the public 
think again. He used the same sorts of terms of reference as 
the SWI did for itself, but envisaged the impetus coming from
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within the party membership« rather than from outside it:
Nicht Aktivität als bloße Beschäftigungstherapie der 
Mitgliederpartei« sondern die Fähigkeit, neue Dialog-, 
Gesprächs- und Diskussionsformen zu entwickeln, ist 
im Wahlkampf ausschlaggebend.50)
He quoted to this end a resolution which had been passed at 
the SPD conference in 1966, which shows that the SWI's ideas 
were not raised unilaterally, but came from the party itself 
in its struggle for power:
Massenmedien und Verbände (...) sind für die Meinungs­
und Willensbildung zwar eine Ergänzung, doch kein Er­
satz für das direkte Gespräch einer Partei mit dem 
Bürger, (...).
Die FUhrungschance der Sozialdemokratie hängt entschei­
dend ab von der Politiserung der Sachfragen in der Öf­
fentlichkeit, das heißt davon, wie viele Menschen po­
litisch mitdenken. (...) Träger des ständigen Gesprächs 
mit der Gesellschaft muß die Mitgliederpartei werden. 
(...) Wenn sich die Parteiorganisation als Träger und 
Initiator des demokratischen Dialogs in der Gesell­
schaft erkennt und danach handelt, wird es ihr mög­
lich sein, die Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik im 
Sinne des Godesberger Grundsatzprogramms zu politi­
sieren. 51)
Thus if we think of the SPD in the decade from the 
mid-sixties to the mid-seventies in terms of its three differ­
ent guises, so to 3peak - electoral machine, both potential 
and actual party of government, and political movement - we can 
see how it carried within itself both a depoliticising and a 
politicising momentum. In its first capacity, the SPD geared 
itself tactically to meet the CDO/CSU on their ground. Styles 
and forms of party propaganda were evolved which tended to 
empty issues of their political content arri replace that with 
stimuli which would raise the emotional temperature of the 
campaign. In its last capacity, the SPD in a way did the 
opposite. A general move for 'more democracy' became identified
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with its path to power and with the changes in government 
policy, planning and ideology which it initiated, par 
from taking substance away from the SPD's policies, the 
emphasis on participation-actually raised the level of 
interest in politics.
As a political party which succeeded in getting 
into power with its Janus-like character, the SPD could look 
in both political and unpolitical directions and still move 
forward, up to the time of the economic crisis in 1974, which 
then became the drag-chain on its legislative progress. But 
for the SWI on the other hand the disparity between these 
dual trends which it played a part in grew into a dilemma, 
on whose horns it ultimately found itself stuck. For whilst 
in character it diversified, in content the Voters' Initiative 
did not succeed in qualitatively wresting control of electoral 
propaganda from the party’s campaign-management. This meant 
that it could not integrate its instrumental function as 
publicity-creator with its political aspirations, and instead 
each of the two aspects of its work increasingly exposed and 
amplified the difficulties of the other.
The years 1969 to 1972 in particular brought out the 
SPD's multi-functional character for the era as a whole. The 
way it mustered support in a style that was in so many ways 
outwardly a-political, but which actually had a very political 
basis to it was shown in the 1972 election. It is this com­
bination which explains both the exceptional breadth of
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active interest shown then, and the ambiguity 
the ways in which this interest was expressed, 
the voters' initiatives reached such a peak of 
which was as heady as it proved to be passing.
of
That is how 
popularity
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C O N C L U S O N
Social position, political attitudes, literary work
Publishing and marketing books,Including creative 
literature, has grown into a large-scale business within the 
modern capitalist economy. Professional writers are functionally 
speaking adjuncts to an industrial process. Only a relatively 
privileged minority can work with full creative independence. 
Literary work is becoming ever less a private affair and most 
professional writers work for the media and the press as well 
to make a living. This means that they are in an ever more 
dependent position. Broadcasting and film-corporations, the 
publishing and newspaper industries are on the one hand 
simply the institutions which create and distribute the arts, 
on the other they exist as a branch of the economy. Smaller 
publishers, independent journals and newspapers are being 
taken over piece by piece by a few large corporations 
(Springer, Bertelsmann). That being so, it is clear to see 
that more and more people in the literary profession work 
literally for an industry.
These economic trends became apparent to West 
German writers in the sixties and stimulated a change in their 
political attitudes. Writers suffered a crisis of political 
identity hand in hand with a crisis of their social identity 
as a profession. The practical outcome of this was their 
entering a trade union in the early seventies. The Gruppe 47
generation had had a sense of themselves as guardians and tutors 
of the new democracy in Germany. By the mid-sixties they 
were accused of having grown too fat and self-satisfied on 
their literary success. The social function and utility of 
literature was debated again with renewed vigour. Writers 
questioned their own position as creative artists because 
literature had been brought face to face with social and 
political concepts through the economic realities of its own 
production and distribution.
Throughout this thesis I have aimed to set the 
position and development of GUnter Grass in the context of 
the common experiences of intellectuals and writers in the 
sixties and seventies. As a member of the literary profession 
Grass was alert to the economic pressures on writers as a 
whole, but was himself relatively free of constraints on his 
work and threats to his security. I interpret this combination 
of circumstances as helping to sustain the basic liberal- 
democratic values which inspired his political commitment.
The individualist view he had of himself as a social and 
political being was not directly threatened because he was 
by far one of the most successful amongst West German writers. 
There were no obvious restrictions on the professional and 
political choices he could make. Rather than thinking about 
political commitment in terms of his own social and economic 
interests. Grass could afford to see it as a moral choice to 
work for the values which he held dear.
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As individuals all tend to articulate our
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attitudes this way because we think of ourselves as subjects 
not objects. Grass' peculiarity is that he maintained an 
unqualified sense of himself as a subject who was sovereign 
in his choices.
Naturally enough, how he saw himself as a political 
activist also reflects his understanding of political affairs. 
For him, people make society political, rather than social 
conditions making people political and forming their interests. 
He always talked about political matters and attitudes as the 
affair of individual subjects rather than as part of social 
life where people are themselves determined by social 
processes as well as being active determining agents of their 
own environment. This one-sided attention to the subject 
distinguishes his political attitudes. By contrast, colleagues 
of his like Walser and Btill developed a sense of writers as 
objects of an economic dynamic which was transforming their 
position as creative subjects.
Grass' moral approach to politics meant that political 
ideas came to literature from the outside for him. This changed 
the character of his fictional writing. The more overtly 
self-conscious about his political ideas Grass became in the 
course of his career in political affairs, the more his own 
attitudes intrude into his novels and the less they are 
mediated by being transformed into fiction. His values 
increasingly . crystallise like a foreign or external element 
from outside, not from within the world depicted. No doubt 
this was a deliberate change. Grass' political career is 
reflected in his evolution as a writer of fiction, in that
his novels show us less and less of the ideological texture 
of the society and the period they are set in, and tell us 
more and more about the author's own ideas. Eventually this 
becomes quite explicit in the last two major books he has 
published, Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke and Per Butt.1^
In the latter, his latest novel, Grass has brought a social 
view of history back into his writing. Per Butt contains 
lengthy accounts of what social and economic conditions were 
like, about the lives of classes and groups from one period 
to the next. At the same time, the book pokes fun at a 
diachronic treatment of its general subject, which is the 
social and personal relations between the sexes as experienced 
by the male narrator. Taking liberties with sequential time, 
he is reincarnated through every epoch and through all classes 
and communities, appearing altogether in just about every 
possible social position.
It is now quite clear that this author can see little 
or no progress in history. The narrator harks back to a 
primeval matriarchy. Ostensibly the novel pays tribute to 
progress through the improvements in nutrition and cuisine 
which each of the successive heroines introduced in their 
time. However, this has done little or nothing to improve the 
state of relations between men and women, or their ability to 
satisfy each other emotionally and sexually. The male who is 
the real protagonist of the novel and who casts his shadow 
over the stories of the ostensible heroines remains sexually 
and socially eternally nostalgic.
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Equally the political feeling in the narration is 
one of looking back over one's shoulder. We gain only a weak 
sense of where society is moving to; it has not quite turned 
its face to the past, but it cannot set its sights for the 
future either. This disposition is certainly characteristic 
of Grass himself . The political feeling of the novel 
can now justly be identified with the author's own sensibility. 
It would seem that Grass' political experiences have made him 
more aware of his own Weltanschauung, to the point where he 
now self-consciously assimilates his own philosophy into his 
imaginative ideas and makes himself his own subject.
Moral and political philosophy
The second part of this thesis examines Grass' 
political thinking in the mid- and late sixties. This was a 
period of change of gear of government in West Germany. The 
middle of the decade was the watershed of the epoch of post­
war reconstruction. There was a halt in the rapid economic 
growth which had taken place under the favourable conditions 
for expansion after 1948. This was the occasion for the emphasis 
of the 'social-market-economy’ to be recast from the market- 
to the social-, that is to say, for the political hand of the 
state to reach further into the economy. The recession in 
1966 and 1967 made manifest that the economy needed to be 
taken in charge by a more consciously interventionist state.
The government began to answer this need when the SPD
entered the Grand Coalition.
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Fresh ideological justification for state inter­
vention on the scale which followed was called for, so that 
people should believe the government was acting in their 
interests. For anti-socialist, neo-laissez-faire doctrines 
had been robust for nearly two decades and had been honoured 
by the economic recovery and expansion of the fifties and 
early sixties. The will for social reforms had to be revived.
Thi was the political problem of the second half 
of the decad . The student movement certainly played a part 
in ushering in the period of reform which followed under 
Brandt's government. It revived a will for reform even in 
its extremism, which caused social democrats and liberals to 
reply: revolution no, but reform yes. Coming to terms with the 
far left stimulated ideas for reforms, the will for reforms, 
strategies for reform. This was evident within the SPD with 
the resurrection of a socialist fraction in the party such as 
the Jungsozialisten incorporated after 1969.
Grass did not start out in any kind of socialist 
movement, and his ideas were shaped by the influence and con­
flicts of the times more than he fashioned them of any 
theoretical keenness of his own. His political thinking 
evolved between different sets of ideas about what reforms 
could or should mean. The radical student movement and the 
left of the SPD were the negative and positive poles respective­
ly of the spectrum within which he struggled for his own ideas.
His basic values always comprised a faith in the
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institutions of parliamentary democracy combined with a faith 
in the SPD to live up to the latter. When both these credos 
were shaken over the political crisis of the mid-sixties, he 
remained convinced that the one could never be restored 
without the other,for they jointly and mutually formed his 
premises.
For this match to be remade again after 1966, it 
had to be remade at a higher level. Grass' conception of demo­
cracy was necessarily deepened as a result of the crisis he had 
seen it in. Under the influence of policies for social and 
industrial democracy which the SPD and the trade union movement 
had worked out, he recognised that democracy had to mean more 
than constitutional political democracy. From the conflicts and 
debates of these years he incorporated new ideas into his 
ideology. However, his views did not move beyond the positions 
raised by groups he supported s the trade unions, the 
Jungsozlalisten. He had no theoretical originality in his 
politics, although he did show a good deal of practical 
originality when it came to election campaigns. Probably the 
basic ethical inspiration of his political principles was too 
firm and fixed to yield any programmatic or strategic 
novelties. Grass' political-intellectual development has been 
in many ways a constant process of defining and redefining 
basic principles.
On certain issues he produced his own blend of 
proposals, but taken as a whole he did not add an new
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ingredients. He drew his ideas from the mixed bag of programmes 
and theories which had been thrown up during and in the aftermath 
cf the political turbulence of 1965 to 1969. The kind of 
references he made to Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and even to Marx 
bear witness to this. So does the way he identified himself 
with the concepts of Revisionism and Democratic Socialism 
in order to take a stand against revolution. These were 
concepts and traditions which he took up to fight off the far 
left, who appeared to be threatening the SPD's road to power.
But once he had adopted them, he could not just drop them 
again when the SPD was elected in 1969. They had in fact made 
him formulate his priorities in more theoretical and 
programmatic terms. They were his terms of reference for 
scrutinising the SPD's performance as a government.
The main principle of democratic socialism in his 
view was power-sharing, co-determination was the key to a 
democratic future. But he had nothing to say about strategies 
for gaining this share of power or about whether it would prove 
to be an effective form of democratic control, be it over manage­
ment or over government and administration. I suggest this 
neglect is characteristic of his political thinking. It is 
clear from the way in which his political ideas progressed 
that his ideological affiliation to Social Democracy came 
before his idea of what kind of society it could promise. It 
is never he who makes that idea concrete and he never asks 
himself what would be effective, but leaves that to others 
to work out. He did not touch strategy or ends; his priorities 
are means and basic principles.
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Thus Grass' individuality lies not in the content 
of his ideas but in the spirit of his intellectual development. 
There is nothing remarkable about the proposals he has made 
for reforms. What distinguishes him is the literalness of a 
basic liberalism which carries right through his ideas. By 
this 1 mean that behind his conception of democratic socialism 
lies a concern first and foremost with democratic consciousness. 
Whether policies which he supports can lead to economic re­
structuring is for him an entirely secondary question compared 
with people's attitudes and awareness. Again the balance of 
his priorities favours the subject not the objective effects 
of social and political processes. That is why he accepts 
very partial answers to policy questions.
The socialism which Grass had erected on top of his 
fervour for parliamentary democracy was ultimately nourished 
by a moral impetus. Indeed it had to be because of its con­
ceptual weaknesses. The problems he had in manipulating his 
own ideology to meet the changing debates of the period between 
1965 and 1974 caused him to fall back on rhetorical solutions 
to intellectual problems. On the other hand, these weaknesses 
were themselves in part the outcome of his moral temper. For 
I imagine that his moral temper robbed him of a theoretical 
will. It is very likely that he lacked such a will given that 
moral choices and actions were always more important and 
urgent to him than considering problems analytically.
Most people bring moral feelings to politics, but
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in Grass' case these feelings are more than just a basis to 
his views. They bear the weight of prescriptive criteria and 
colour the way he formulates political concerns. His ethics 
are linked to a bourgeois view of social and political 
behaviour. Individuals determine social and political affairs 
and social structures and institutions hardly play a part in 
the model from which Grass derives the moral moving force in 
his politics. In turn this individualism reinforces the 
moralism.
We can also detect this moral impetus in a number of 
rhetorical patterns in his political speech which structure 
the way he considers issues. His moral language shaped the part 
he played in public affairs. For instance, in the sixties he 
differed from the extra-parliamentary opposition over what to 
do about the Vietnam war because he insisted that any protest 
against the war must itself affirm the values of liberal 
democracy ; hence he refused to support the Vietcong. To 
criticise the very concept of democracy along with the war which 
was being waged in its name was at best useless and at worst 
shocking to him.
Grass had a way of making statements which paid 
little or no regard to changing conditions in international 
politics in order to emphasise moral norms.He criticised others 
for extreme views which failed to see the different sides of 
problems, but his idealist standards often made his own 
judgement almost totally black and white. Cases in point are 
the Arab-Israel conflict and the civil war in Biafra. The
polemical effect came from his habit of substantiating his
position experientially and of not even trying to be objective. 
Indeed, his political philosophy is effectively an experiential 
one altogether. If he was not justifying his arguments by his 
own experience of the nation's past, then invariably he would 
be talking about someone else's experience.
Grass built his politics around persons as a way of 
translating moral choices into tangible and practical political 
choices which the public could make. The view of history which 
informs his speeches makes personalities the constants and 
time and place the incidental variables. This maxes melodrama 
out of political history and on a number of occasions made 
his arguments historically insensitive.
It is important that moral sensibilities played 
such a big part in Grass' rhetoric, because these sensibilities 
are based on an individualism which acquired a political 
function in the kind of propaganda which the Social Democratic 
Voters' Initiatives made for the SPD and in how they 
mustered support. For they built their appeal around public 
personalities in the same way as Grass was wont to let 
persons stand for ideas in his speech.
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The Brandt-Era : opportunities and limits for a writer in 
West German pol<tics
The final part of the thesis describes the role
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Grass played in politics both within and without the SPD, 
concentrating on those issues which seem to have been forma­
tive for him. His association with the SPD through the SWI 
can be seen as a result of his frustration as an intellectual. 
For Grass was Ljmeone who wanted to see results. His friend­
ship with Willy Brandt gave him the chance to coordinate his 
own search for new waters with the efforts of the SPD to 
recast its appeal to further social groups.
Left-liberal intellectuals had been used to an 
oblique political role which was not adequate to the demands 
of the sixties. The quality of their political commitment 
changed and its tempo was recharged during the years from 
roughly 1966 to 1974, that is between the two major political 
crises which the Federal Republic has known. The first of 
these concluded the era of post-war boom, the second that 
of social-democratic reforms. The climax to both crises was 
the resignation of the respective Chancellors : Erhard and 
Brandt.
In between the Federal Republic experienced an 
ideological rejuvenation followed by a flourishing of civic 
confidence. People could feel they were insiders to the whole 
political process and culture, to the political struggles 
which were taking place and to the way political decisions 
were taken. This insider feeling was epitomised by Brandt's 
personality as a progressive democratic leader. For the time 
it embraced many writers and intellectuals as well. It is 
noticeable that a high number of them considered in what 
form they should participate directly in the democratic
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process : as members or associates of political parties, of 
voters* initiatives, of Bürgerinitiativen, of trade unions. 
Their political disposition matured from passive critique 
to active civic commitment.
Grass is a pertinent figure to take as a case 
history because he was the one who first broke away from the 
self-centred terms of writers' debates about their social and 
political role. The image intellectuals had had of themselves 
up to the mid-sixties had been fashioned from a faith in the 
place of social criticism and intellectual critique in the 
life of a democracy and in the possibility of reform. This 
model of the intellectual as watchdog faltered when the 
liberal democracies of the West ceased to appear to them to 
be pluralist in their social and institutional make-up. Grass 
went through this disintegration of faith to come out with a 
new pressure-group in the voters' initiatives, which he 
believed brought the first signs of reinvigorating democracy 
in West Germany.
The hour of the Wählerinitiativen came from the 
SPD's own need to tackle gaps in its catchment and from 
Brandt's interest in opening up the political process. The 
problems which faced the party in its bid for power were the 
objective basis upon which the voters' groups could flourish 
with party blessing. The first SWI was also the culmination 
of Grass’ individual political development, the child of 
his political maturity. However, there were contradictions 
in its beginnings which bound its growth. Its rise and fall 
was linked to the changing character of the SPD-FDP govern-
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ment i a change from reform to crisis-management in the 
economic recession which became apparent in 1973/4.
My contention is that the SWI was bound to falter 
as a new form of civic political participation, because it 
could never remain consistently popular and independent. It 
was hampered by its ties on the one hand to the party of 
government, on the other to people of high cultural and 
academic status. The SWI's work had the virtue of making 
people aware of their right to play an active determining 
part in elections. Its weakness was that its propaganda was 
in many ways as emotive and uncritical as that of the 
political parties. The combination of politicising and 
depoliticising qualities in its approach brought the SPD to 
power but thwarted the SWI, despite its success in the 
federal election in 1972.
Since the federal election in 1976 the social- 
democratic voters' movement has become a spent force, and 
Grass has played no more than a sporadic part in West German 
politics and public debate. There is no reason to assume that 
he has retreated permanently from active involvement, never­
theless I believe that this study has shown that his career 
in politics between 1960 and 1974 should be regarded as a 
unified and contained whole, precisely because it corresponded 
to a transitional period in the political and economic history 
of the Federal Republic. This period came to an end with the 
period of uncertainty which we still face today under the
international recession.
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Happily someone who supports my appraisal of the 
dependence of Grass' political work on a period which is now 
over is the man himself I In 1975 he assessed his experience 
in much the same terms as this study has done.This is a point 
of agreement to end with :
All das, was man sich gewünscht hat, wofür man 
gearbeitet hat, jeder auf verschiedene Art und 
Weise, mit verschiedenen Wünschen, ich nun (...) 
im Verhältnis zur SPD, mit Hilfe von Wähler­
initiativen »all das hat kurzfristig zum Erfolg 
geführt und ist in einem bestimmten Bereich be­
endet oder auch gescheitert. Diese Ära Brandt, 
und ich möchte dazu auch gleich noch Gustav 
Heinemann nennen, ist eine für deutsche Ver­
hältnisse einmalige Periode gewesen, oder zu­
mindest erstmalige, so etwas haben wir hier 
noch nie erlebt, und sie ist sehr kurz gewesen; 
(...) Wichtig scheint mir, daß das vorbei ist, 
nicht grundsätzlich, damit ist nicht alles zer­
stört, was getan worden ist, aber vieles wird 
als Bauruine stehenbleiben; es sei denn, andere 
arbeiten daran weiter. '
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